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ABSTRACT 
 
Four Facets of the Relation of Tragedy to Dialectic and the Theme of Crisis of Expectations. 
(May 2008) 
Muhammad Haris, B.E., NED University of Engineering and Technology; 
M.E., Texas A&M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. John J. McDermott 
 
 
As a whole, this work serves to illuminate the tragic as a fundamental human phenomenon and 
an objective fact that is distinct not only from comedy and irony but from other forms of 
calamity and modes of failure.  I consider three distinct sources of philosophical knowledge on 
tragedy.  The first is tragic drama and literature, the second is the theory of the tragic and the 
third source consists of the employment of the concept of tragedy to discuss events or characters 
that one encounters in life.  I carefully draw upon the first two sources to thicken the elaborations 
of four different facets of the third.  In this process, I extrapolate Szondi’s notion that tragedy is a 
specific dialectic in a specific space.  In the course of this work, I place a greater emphasis upon 
this general concept of the tragic as opposed to a poetics of tragedy.  The dissertation bears out, 
however, that it is ultimately poetics - and not the dialectic as general concept - that provide us 
with the richer insights into tragedy as it unravels in life.     
 
The specific dialectic of tragedy unravels so as to cause the irreplaceable loss of something of 
great value.  This provides me with a structuring element that ties the four central chapters 
together.  In terms of content, I emphasize also upon the tragic flaw as a set of character traits 
(manifested by an individual or some form of collective) which keep tragedy in place.  The 
consideration of the figure of Willy Loman allows me to examine the tragedy of failure of 
expectations which is a distinct category of the tragic and yet it oscillates such that ties 
together the other themes.  A central idea that emerges from an analysis of the overlapping 
themes is that prior to tragedy is the investment of the deepest inner resources into a process.  
This investment gives rise to identity and to expectations.  As a tragedy unfolds, the source of 
the identity or of expectation becomes also the birth place or the generator of all threats to this 
identity and the collapse of long nurtured expectations.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In terms of content, the underlying focus throughout the dissertation remains upon formulating 
connotative responses to the following questions – What are the traits that keep tragedy in place?  
Or what is the tragic flaw that lies at the root of the forms of human tragedy under consideration?  
The dialectic is the structural element which provides the bare skeleton on which the contents of 
tragedy are placed as flesh.  I am investigating the relation of various aspects of dialectic (as in 
Hegel, Szondi, Simmel, Sartre, Nietzsche) to tragedy in life and also in life as represented in 
drama (as in Antigone, Oedipus, King Lear and Death of a Salesman).   I rely upon Hegel’s 
definition of the processes in dialectic, that is, the unification of opposites, the sudden 
transformation into one’s opposite, self-division and the negative positing of oneself1. I am 
however, not embracing Hegel’s full metaphysics.  Neither do I adhere to any form of 
necessitarianism, Hegelian or otherwise.  In particular, I do not follow any notion of Aufhebung 
or Sublation (Hegelian or not) which implies a resolution or reconciliation of tragedy.  It can be 
argued that a tragic process moves dialectically towards a dignified, teleological end, but my 
primary aim is to gain philosophical insight into the processes of tragedy and not the end.  
Moreover, I will demonstrate in this dissertation that the tragic dialectic consumes something of 
great value which cannot be recovered.  One can present arguments to justify the loss but these 
arguments do not lead to a revival of what has been definitively lost.  Speaking in terms of 
structure, the second chapter is about diremption and conflict in the dialectic; the third chapter is 
about objectification and alienation in dialectic and the fourth is about self-deception in dialectic.  
The upshot of chapters II, III and IV is to appear in the fifth chapter which is about the crisis of 
identity or the failure of persons’ expectations.   
 
There are certain basic premises on which this dissertation is grounded.  Firstly, tragedy is an 
objective fact, event or phenomenon that has the potential to unfold in human experience; it is 
not a take or perspective on a situation.  Secondly, tragedy is exclusively a human phenomenon 
and the destruction caused by tragedy is felt as a real and irreplaceable loss by human persons.  
Not all of human life is tragic; I am not embracing any kind of existential pantragism.  The tragic 
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style and format of The Chicago Manual of Style, 14th ed. 
1 See Peter Szondi, An Essay on the Tragic, translated by Paul Fleming (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2002), p. 55.   
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is rather very specific and it may or may not become an experience for a person or group of 
persons.  Having said this, I need to assert clearly that in my mind the tragic phenomenon can 
and does express itself in a variety of ways.  We cannot say that there is only one form or 
category of tragedy.  On the contrary, the tragic is multifaceted and different people can and do 
experience different forms of tragedy based on varying social and historical contexts.  This 
means that the tragic is not a universal essence or concept that can be applied across differing 
situations.  I think that the tragic is intractable in its concreteness.  A tragic event undoubtedly 
unfolds in time and is subject to transience.  In the perspective of one looking at a past tragic 
event, it may change and get transformed into something else.  Thinkers can justify a tragedy on 
the basis of the discovery of a causal relation between the destruction and future human progress.  
Also, philosophers and theoreticians have dealt with and understood the tragic with reference to 
metaphysical concepts or notions of transcendence.  However, I think that it is important also to 
speak about the tragic so that the focus remains only on the dialectic within the event or 
phenomenon and not on metaphysical systems or an interplay of ideas and concepts which can 
be applied to tragedy.   My approach to the matter can be termed pragmatic because my main 
interest is in attaining some insight into the relational factors at play in a tragedy as it unfolds in 
concrete human experience.       
 
The structure and content of this inquiry into the tragic are motivated by two different sources.  
The structure is inspired by my understanding of the central arguments in Peter Szondi’s “An 
Essay on the tragic”2. The content is based upon my immersion into certain forms of tragedy 
which I think are a part of shared human experience.  The dialectic, as structuring element, 
prevents the latter from lapsing into mere autobiography.   My position is that the tragic is not 
only an objective fact but it also has a meaning that is objectively present and not simply 
perspectival.  I will now speak in some detail about my understanding of Peter Szondi’s book. 
 
At the beginning of his book, Szondi makes a clear distinction between the philosophy of the 
tragic and a poetics of tragedy.  In my mind, the basic questions driving Szondi’s project are of 
the following sort – What is the tragic process in its entirety? How does it unfold? What is the 
origin of the tragic process? What is the idea of tragedy? I agree with Szondi in that these 
questions are very different from the questions raised in Aristotle’s Poetics and the body of 
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theoretical literature that is built upon it3.  Szondi points towards Schelling as the founder of the 
philosophy of the tragic, which is radically different from a poetics of tragedy.  Poetics is 
concerned with determining the formal laws of tragic poetry so that the art work (tragic drama) 
extracts feelings of pity, fear and the catharsis that follows from these.  Aristotle’s notions of 
imitative instinct (origin of tragedy) and catharsis (affect of tragedy) lie at the foundation of 
poetics of tragedy.   The philosophy of the tragic, on the other hand, concentrates upon the 
phenomenon of the tragic itself and not upon the formal laws of drama or upon the affect that the 
tragic has on an audience.   
 
After making the point that the formulation of concepts of the tragic is an inquiry distinct from 
poetics of tragedy, Szondi extracts definitions of the tragic from out of the writings of thirteen 
thinkers (Schelling to Benjamin).  I think that the central tension in Szondi’s book emerges from 
two sources.  The first source of tension can be located in Szondi’s effort to see as to how the 
definitions of the tragic given by the various thinkers can “take the place of tragic poetry” and 
“describe tragedies or even their models”4.  What does it mean to say that a particular idea of 
tragedy can replace tragic poetry?  I think that in Szondi’s philosophy the tragic is a fundamental 
phenomenon or event in life.  It is a mode of destruction or a process of unraveling which is 
either underway or has the potential to unfold.  The various thinkers’ definitions of the tragic 
fundamental phenomenon are modes of the tragic.  Just as there is a Sophoclean and 
Shakespearean mode of the tragic, there is also a Nietzschean or Hegelian mode of the tragic. 
The various formulations of the idea of the tragic and the various representations of the tragic in 
drama and poetry are all manifestations of one specific process of destruction. The tension here 
emerges from the fact that most of the thinkers that Szondi delves into are not interested in 
reaching towards a general conception of the tragic (which is Szondi’s project).  It is rather the 
case that they encounter the tragic as they build their own metaphysical systems (German 
Idealist Philosophers) or concepts that terminate systems (Post-Idealist thinking).  The 
philosophers whom Szondi looks at are asking the basic questions about the tragic but solely 
within the context of their own philosophies.  Szondi approaches all of these different concepts 
in order to extract a structural element common to them all – the dialectic.  This approach creates 
stresses because the philosophers themselves were never interested in general concepts or the 
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dialectic (barring Hegel, of course) for that matter.  Szondi seeks to show, however, that even as 
the tragic plays itself out in the life of the intellect or mind, it follows a dialectical pattern.                
 
I see openness in Szondi’s approach to the subject.  He wants to posit the dialectic as a valid 
criterion for conceptualizing the tragic.   And yet, he extricates the dialectic from its formal-
logical properties and its adherence to systems.  I think that for Szondi, the dialectic provides us 
with a framework grounded in reason through which can attain deep insights into the realm of 
the tragic, a phenomenon that characterized by ineffability and ambiguity.  The dialectic gives us 
a point of reference for speaking about a phenomenon that is multifaceted.   Szondi’s basic point 
is that the tragic is a mode of destruction which unfolds dialectically.  The content of a tragedy 
can vary from case to case but the structure is dialectical.  Moreover, Szondi seeks to study the 
tragic in such a way that the focus remains only the dialectic of the elements (concepts, 
phenomenon, and events) which constitute the tragic process itself without having recourse to 
sources of explanation that lie outside the tragic event.  I think that in Szondi, we can observe a 
resistance to all attempts to justify tragedy or provide consolation for the toll it takes my making 
an appeal to indestructible absolutes or to concepts.  Most significantly, for Szondi, the dialectic 
of the tragic needs to be revaluated as it makes its appearance in different tragedies.  There is not 
one single, definite form of the tragic (dialectic), it would change form in differing tragic events. 
 
Now, in my view, the openness of Szondi and his concern for the tragic for its own sake comes 
into tense conflict with one aspect of most of the philosophical theories that he examines-their 
emphasis upon a teleology rooted in the triumph or assertion of a universal or sublime, above 
and beyond the particulars of tragedy.  In the philosophy of Schelling, for instance, the tragic 
dialectic consists of a conflict between freedom and objective necessity.  The end of the tragic 
process is signaled by the sublation of this conflict into a transcendent sphere where the oneness 
(identity) of freedom and necessity is restored.  It seems then that for Schelling the teleology of 
the tragic process is the assertion of human freedom.  Freedom is destroyed during the process 
and yet asserted precisely through this destruction which comes from the objective world.   
 
In Nietzsche’s philosophy, the Dionysian represents the universal or sublime which is unified, 
one, whole.  In the Nietzschean form of the tragic, the dialectic consists of a tearing apart of the 
Dionysian as it enters into a world of individuation, which (in Nietzsche) is the Apollonian realm 
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of images.  At the end of this process of destruction (or self-destruction) Dionysus emerges once 
again as a unified whole.  So, in Nietzsche Dionysus represents the highest value and it 
determines the telos of tragedy, which, is the preservation of this value at an even higher level.  
In Holderlin’s philosophy, I think that Nature is the sublime universal and the teleology of the 
tragic process is the revelation of Nature.  In Holderlin’s tragic process, the sacrifice of the tragic 
hero leads to the revelation of Nature.  The conflict here is between divine infidelity and human 
infidelity.  This contradiction is sublated when Nature or God is revealed as a result of the 
sacrifice of the sign (tragic hero).  
 
In the thought of Schopenhauer, the tragic dialectic consists of the “autosublation”5 of the Will, 
which is the absolute or universal principle upon which the world is founded.  In the 
Schopenhauerean form of the tragic process, the telos is the self-destruction of the Will as it 
battles against itself.  The sublation in this process also occurs immanently because there is 
always a possibility that a subject can see through or attain knowledge of the self-destructive 
activities of the Will.  This knowledge leads to resignation from the world of appearances or 
representations of the Will.  In Solger’s philosophy, the dialectic consists of a conflict between 
the Divine Idea and Existence.  The Idea is human destiny but humanity is grounded always in 
existence so the Idea appears to be destroying itself as it emerges in existence.  I think that the 
sublation in Solger also occurs immanently.  The telos of tragedy is the realization that human 
nature consists of a split between divine idea and existence and the former is preserved always in 
an ideal realm.                    
 
Hegel is the philosopher from whom Szondi extracts the dialectic and yet once we approach 
Hegel’s writings on the tragic in search of an open, general or pure dialectic of tragedy, we face 
a genuine struggle.  In Hegel’s dialectic, the whole or one of universal is the dynamic ethical life.  
The tragic conflict is a tussle between two embodiments of right and this contradiction is 
inevitably sublated as the opposing sides become reconciled with ethical life.  Kierkegaard, 
being an existentialist philosopher, posits that the tragic contradiction or conflict is not an 
objective fact rooted in reality but a despairing perspective that occurs at each of the three stages 
of existence.    In Kierkegaard, the conflict is sublated immanently, that is, tragedy can be 
overcome by changing one’s perspective and thinking about it from an ironic, comic or religious 
                                                 
5 Ibid., p. 28 
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perspective. The point that I want to make here is that most theories of tragedy are resistant to an 
open ended dialectic of tragedy that focuses only upon the configuration of the elements within 
it.  I learn from Szondi that the dialectic is indeed a common structural element in all major 
theories of tragedy, but, nevertheless, in most of these theories there is sublation and telos which 
is grounded in a universal that lies beyond tragedy – a universal which remains whole and is not 
destroyed by the movements of the tragic.  
 
My understanding of the questions that Szondi pursues is as follows – Is it possible to have a 
dialectic for gaining deeper insight into the tragic such that we avoid sublation (immanent and 
transcendent) and telos? Can we think of the tragic dialectic in a secular way, that is, without 
reliance on a sublime or universal? Is it possible to give concepts of tragedy such that these 
concepts do not cover over the phenomena that constitute tragedy?  I feel that Szondi’s dilemma 
can be encapsulated in the following text drawn from his essay: 
   
“The history of the philosophy of the tragic is itself not free from the tragic.  It resembles the 
flight of Icarus.  The closer thought comes to the general concept, the less that the substantial, 
the source of thought’s uplift, adheres to it.  Reaching the height of insight into the structure of 
the tragic, thought collapses, powerless.  At the point where a philosophy, as a philosophy of the 
tragic, becomes more than the knowledge of the dialectic around which its fundamental concepts 
assemble, at the point where such a philosophy no longer determines its own tragic outcome, it is 
no longer philosophy.  It therefore appears that philosophy cannot grasp the tragic – or that there 
is no such thing as the tragic.”6  
 
I think that an acute sense of the finitude of rationality underlies Szondi’s work and I share this 
sensibility with him.  Despite this sense of limits though, Szondi does seek for a point of 
reference, a general structure that would yield insights into a fundamental phenomenon.  Now in 
this context, what does it mean to say that a philosophy of the tragic must progress with a sense 
of its own failure?  To me, this means that the best we can do is to pursue insights into the 
relations that form the pattern or dialectic of tragedy.  We can deepen our insights into the tragic 
while yet avoiding telos and sublation.  My position is that the tragic as it appears in social and 
historical life is meaningful by virtue of the processes that go on within it.  My take on Szondi’s 
                                                 
6 Ibid., p. 49 
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basic point is as follows - the tragic is a dialectic that results in the irreversible destruction of 
something valuable and this destruction does not lead towards the sublation of the original 
conflict or the healing of the wound, so to speak.  In my mind, “valuable” does not have to be 
something of the “highest value”, the Nietzschean Dionysus or Schelling’s Freedom.  What is 
lost in tragedy does not necessarily have to be framed within the context of a unified whole 
(universal) or an overarching concept.  The meaning of tragedy does not have to be based on the 
assertion of a universal or a concept.  I am with Szondi until this point but where I certainly 
disagree with him when after laying out the dialectic as a valid structuring criteria, he fails to 
supply the required substantive content.  The value of my project lies in the substantive content 
which I place in relation with the dialectic.   
 
The tragic, as it appears in social and historical life leads to concrete human suffering, why can 
we not speak about tragedy from that perspective? This loss is irreversible, so is it necessary to 
think in terms of sublation?  Most significantly, the tragic dialectic as it makes its appearance in 
the life of a “common man” is also tragedy. This is something that needs to be framed right here, 
at the beginning of this dissertation.  The last chapter of my project is based on the tragedy of 
Willy Loman.  Not being a Hamlet or an Oedipus, he is certainly not the embodiment of a 
universal.  His tragedy is that of failure of expectations and broken promises.  Content-wise this 
is a theme that would bind all four chapters of my project.  There is dialectic at play in Willy 
Loman but it does not have a telos and neither is Loman’s tragic loss sublated into a 
transcendental or immanent sphere.  My position is that the tragic in the common life of Willy 
Loman provides us with a model for exploring substantive themes like the displacement of 
identity and the investment of all of one’s inner resources and expectations not in a void but in a 
process that involves other people who have now turned away.           
 
In above quoted text, Szondi says that the “closer thought comes to the general concept, the less 
that the substantial, the source of thought’s uplift adheres to it”.  Szondi seeks to introduce the 
dialectic in his analyses of the plots of various tragic dramas.  I think that the search here is for 
the “substantial” and one purpose of this search is to look for ways to strengthen the thesis that 
the dialectic is a valid criterion for analyzing forms of tragedy. An even more important purpose, 
in my view, is the deepening of our understanding of various forms of the tragic.  My 
dissertation is an effort to carry the project outlined by Szondi into a different direction.  My 
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position is that forms of tragedy in philosophical systems and in drama are reflections of the 
tragic as it unfolds in social, historical life.  In my project, I explore as to whether or not it is 
possible to supply the required “substantial” element through images and themes drawn from 
social and historical life and then see how much the dialectic and content of forms of the tragic 
in philosophy and literature can help us understand the former. 
 
The concern with the idea of tragedy and not the poetics, dialectical process, openness, 
resistance to systems and teleology are all structural elements derived from my reading of 
Szondi.  These themes would bind all four chapters of my dissertation together.  I hope to have 
provided enough clarification of this point.  I hope also to have shown that my work can be 
placed in the tradition of theorizing on the tragic that begins with Schelling.  In terms of content, 
my emphasis upon the notion of tragic flaw is one of the elements that hold the entire project 
together.   I think that a tragic process is undergone by a human person or persons.  Even when 
speaking about the tragedy of culture in chapter II, I work according to the premise that culture is 
embodied in human persons even though it has now attained autonomy.  The tragic flaw is that 
aspect of a person’s character which leads to tragic unraveling.  The term tragic flaw may bring 
forth some negative moral connotations but that should not be the case.  Tragic flaw as an aspect 
of character is very different from piety and impiety or other such morally laden notions.   I 
understand tragic flaw as the adherence and refusal to give up on a role and all of the 
expectations that emerge from it even as it is precisely this role which becomes the source of 
tragic unraveling, that is, the failure of expectations.  In my view, tragic flaw is the complex of 
character traits which keep tragedy in place.  Another factor or complex of factors is the power 
of the objective.  It is difficult for me to move away from the subject-object dualism, particularly 
when I think about tragedy.   
 
In each of the four chapters I consider a different form of tragedy having a specific and concrete 
social meaning.  The second chapter is about irreconcilable differences that destroy harmony.  
From a formal perspective, this chapter is on diremption and conflict in the dialectic.  The 
substantial content which provokes the investigations in this chapter is a tragic event or image of 
the following sort.  There are two (or more) sets of obligations which are equally justified and 
yet irreconcilable different from each other.  These conflicting obligations may lie at the basis of 
one single community or society or they may be part of a broader sphere of relations among 
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different societies or segments of the world.  Now let us say that fateful circumstances arise 
whereby groups of persons embodying the different obligations come into conflict with each 
other.  Persons constituting each of the two groups adhere to their respective obligations with 
such fierceness that they becomes blind towards the position of the other side and refuse to 
accommodate and recognize opposing concerns.  The situation moves to a point where the 
persons belonging to the two groups call out for the physical elimination of the other.  In fierce 
adherence to their respective positions, the persons undergoing the tragic process manifest the 
tragic flaw.  It is evident that the adherence to inherited and assumed roles and obligations is 
necessary for this tragedy.  In other words, the tragic flaw loses meaning in this thematic context 
if there are no deeply felt obligations.  Also, the dialectic is at play here because either one 
community is being ripped apart from within or two entirely different groups of people have 
come together in a state of opposition.  It is the former case, which, in my view is more acutely 
tragic.       
 
In this chapter I turn to the Natural Law Essay where Hegel posits that tragedy is the dialectic- 
diremption and reconciliation - of ethical life.  After careful textual analysis of this text and 
struggling with the teleological inevitability therein, I move to the Spirit of Christianity text and 
then devote considerable space to the Aesthetics, a text in which Hegel relies least on his 
metaphysical system.   In addition to the philosophical texts, I center also upon the American 
Civil War, an event tested on the anvil of history and other events that are more current.  This 
latter group includes the civil confrontation in Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  I also 
explore the dialectic of law and love in the Antigone of Sophocles.  In this chapter I struggle 
with Hegelian inevitability and give, what I think is a secular and ameliorative understanding of 
the notions of ethical life as the source of rational obligation, tragic fate and guilt and 
reconciliation.  In my view, Hegel has a deep concern for the vitality of the ethical life.  I 
understand ethical life as a complex of rationally and historically grounded obligations.  Broadly 
speaking, the vitality of the ethical life is based on the elimination of the inorganic, which is the 
complex of factors which threaten to disrupt this unity.  The one main source of the emergence 
of the inorganic is the creation of a situation where the embodiment of one obligation is 
suppressed for sake of the ascendancy of the others.  Another source of the inorganic could also 
be obligations that are no longer justified in a specific historical context and they only play a 
disruptive role.  All of the justified obligations have to be kept alive and respected for the sake of 
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the vitality of a single community or in the sphere of relations among different communities.  
The ethical life is also the ground or source from which people derive their political roles and 
obligations.  The roles assumed by a current generation have already been molded or remolded 
by the actions of the previous generation.  In assuming their respective, conflicting roles, current 
generation carries the burden of ignorance and blindness coming from the past.  This is one 
aspect of tragic fate in the dialectic of ethical life. My position on reconciliation is that is 
ultimately only an affect or emotion that emerges when we see the conflict through the lens of, 
what for Hegel is the philosophical spectator.  From this context it can be clearly seen that all of 
the colliding obligation have some strong force of justification on their side.  However, for the 
vitality of the ethical life, we either need mutual recognition or the persons embodying one of the 
complexes of roles needs to be sacrificed.  Reconciliation that comes out of mutual recognition is 
the only way in which the harmony among opposing particulars can be restored. Otherwise, one 
of the sides in the conflict would need to be destroyed as an inorganic, disruptive element.  The 
thrust of my arguments in this chapter is that it is possible to understand diremption without 
recourse to metaphysical necessities even as we work within the framework of Hegel.  
 
The theme of the second chapter is the tragedy of culture.  From the formal perspective of this 
dissertation, this chapter is about alienation or objectification in the dialectic.  The most 
important conflict here is between institutional certitude and individual freedom.  The original 
purpose of any genuine cultural product – is to motivate growth in the mind that engages with it.  
In other words, culture is not an essence but a process which consists of the engagement of the 
human mind (subject) with the creation of and extraction of intellectual and spiritual 
nourishment from objects of culture.  Now, it can and does happen that as a cultural product 
develops through history, it deviates from its original purpose so much so that it becomes 
alienated from and is a source of the decline of precisely that human mind which it was supposed 
to enhance and nourish.  This is the basic premise on which this chapter is grounded. Just one of 
the concrete images that come to my mind is the ongoing transformation of Islam into a 
reactionary force characterized by denial of the creative capacities of the individual. 
 
Now, if the process of culture consists of dialectic between subject and object then this dialectic 
assumes a tragic form when the subject (mind) is alienated from the object of culture.  So a split 
occurs within one process, that of culture.  Moreover, the tragic dialectic plays itself out over 
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here also in the sense that the objects of culture which represent a good turn into their opposite 
and cause damage.  The tragic flaw also comes through in the course of this chapter.  When the 
dialectic of culture turns into tragedy, it continues to adhere to a process that has lost its value.  
Great expectations were built around the objects of culture but even as the human mind becomes 
alienated from them, it is still drawn towards them and these objects continue to diminish the life 
of the mind leading to the failure of all of expectations.  Here too, the crisis of expectations 
emerges from the source that was supposed to fulfill them.  Both Georg Simmel and Nietzsche 
have written about the way in which the dialectical process of culture turns into a tragedy, that is, 
as culture becomes autonomous in its historical development, it misses and subverts the goal that 
it was programmed to achieve.  I develop this theme of objectification and alienation on the basis 
of the texts these two thinkers while laying much more emphasis upon Nietzsche.  I draw a 
distinction between objective and cultural value on the basis of my study of Simmel.  However, 
it is Nietzsche notion of culture as an activity which engenders the capability of making and 
keeping either some specific promise or promises in general that provides me with the 
foundation for inquiry.   
  
Chapter III is about the tragedy of self-deception - I investigate the relation between self-
deception and the tragic dialectic.  Speaking with reference to structural continuity, we can say 
that this chapter deals with objectification in the dialectic. I understand objectification as the 
replacement of reality with abstractions. The tragic flaw in this thematic context consists of two 
factors.  First, there is a strong consciousness and robust affirmation of a role and all the 
expectations and obligations that come with it.  This consciousness comes paradoxically into 
conflict with a complete lack of consciousness towards the self and towards concrete reality. 
That the self is a unified whole is a basic premise on which this chapter is grounded. This 
blindness drives a wedge through the person undergoing this tragic process.   The tragic figure in 
self-deception knows that he needs to fulfill certain promises. He affirms these obligations and is 
driven by a desire to fulfill them. However, his actions only drive the tragic dialectic forward.  
This dialectic consist, mainly of two elements, actions carried out with the intention of healing 
wounds and these same actions yielding precisely the opposite, that is, destructive results which 
serve to intensify the crisis of expectations. Once again, at the centre of this dialectic is 
objectification of that which lies within the self – (Lear’s “darker purposes”) - and that which is 
concretely present in the world.  This chapter is built upon Oedipus Rex and Sartre’s Analysis of 
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Bad Faith from Being and Nothingness.  I draw a distinction between tragic self-deception and 
ordinary self-deception to show that the former leads to irreversible loss and more crucially, it 
cannot be overcome by an exercise of will and freedom. 
  
In the fourth chapter I focus upon tragedy as the failure of expectations and the question of 
human dignity.  In terms of the structure binding together all four chapters, the focus here is on 
the relation between identity crisis or crisis of expectations and the dialectic.  I think that 
thematically, the upshot of the first three chapters appears in this, the final chapter of my 
dissertation.  The tragic process undergone by Willy Loman is the locus of this chapter.  This is a 
relatively less explored topic in the philosophical literature on tragedy.  It would in fact, not be 
inaccurate to say that in the eyes of most scholars, Willy Loman is not even a tragic figure.  I am 
assuming that this bias towards Loman is provoked by the fact that he is simply an ordinary 
person, a common man, so to speak, whose life is falling apart.  In the context of my project, it is 
precisely the commonness of Willy Loman which makes his tragedy so significant.  As I have 
asserted before, the tragic process results in an irreparable or irreversible loss of something of 
great value.  The term “loss” here could denote a complex of factors but what it ultimately boils 
down to is the failure of persons’ expectations due to broken promises.  I have been stressing 
upon this theme throughout my dissertation but it is only here that it gains real prominence.  It is 
the bareness of Willy Loman’s character which makes it possible for us to zero in on the crisis of 
expectations and establish that this is a tragedy in its own right in addition to being general 
enough so that it can encompass other tragic themes that have a social and historical meaning.  In 
the previous three chapters, there are factors which prevent us from focusing upon the crisis of 
identity for its own sake.  This is because the human persons at the center of those chapters are 
always at the helm of something “big”.  In chapters II and IV, the focus really is on Antigone 
and Oedipus respectively – both are embodiments of obligations towards the state.  In the third 
chapter, the focus is on culture, which is once again something that goes above and beyond 
individual human person even as they undergo its tragedies.             
 
Yet, Willy Loman presents us with a very different understanding of the toll that a tragic event 
can take on the people who undergo it.  I show how the tragedy of Willy Loman provides us with 
a mythological model or path for gaining insight into crises of expectations undergone by the 
common man.  I think that the dialectical pattern of this form of tragedy is also quite evident.  
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Basically, Loman’s crisis is generated when promises are broken in precisely those relations 
where he invested himself with his deepest inner life.  The tragic flaw of Willy Loman is his 
refusal to relent, to give up on the relations that are the source of his deepest expectations and 
define his place or identity in the world.  In the contrast between Willy and his son Biff, we also 
see the difference between tragic and non-tragic characters.  It becomes clear that the potential 
for tragedy is manifested only in those who strive to form a place for themselves in the world by 
assuming a role, fulfilling responsibilities and expecting reciprocation.     
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CHAPTER II 
IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES OR DIREMPTION AND CONFLICT IN 
DIALECTIC 
 
Irrespective of the radical differences between various philosophers who have written about the 
tragic, this is a point on which all of them would agree - The tragic conflict consists of a clash of 
forces, all of which have some strong justification on their side.  I think that the justification of 
each force in a conflict can be located in many different types of ground.  To say that the 
grounding consists purely of ethical right – in a narrow, abstract sense - is to be blind to the 
plurality inherent in a tragic conflict. The grounding for a force may well be in the realm of 
ethical norms or religious beliefs but then people are willing to die for other types of principles. 
There are forces of nationalism, race, ethnicity and economic class and then there are forces of 
religious ideology.  There are also more hidden, mysterious forces whose grounds lie perhaps in 
the murderousness, violence and will to dominate that lies beneath the surface of human 
civilization or they may well be the product of the project of rational human enlightenment.  
These two grounds are still not totally outside the grasp of human sight but I think that there can 
be a ground of conflict which is more inaccessible and mysterious.  In short, to say that the tragic 
conflicts in political and social life can be approached purely through means of normative social 
inquiry is to be blind to the multifaceted nature of the subject matter.  
 
Before moving on to a discussion of philosophical texts, I would like to further delineate my 
subject matter and to show what motivates me to do what I am doing.  My subject matter is the 
tragic strife in human life that leads to the rupture of communities, loss of life and the destruction 
of culture and value.  The definition of tragic conflict that I started with comes through a study 
of Sophoclean tragedy in western culture.  However, my position is that the actual locus of the 
tragic conflict is not drama or philosophical system, but life.  A very important question that can 
be raised at this point is as follows – Why take the route of the philosophy of the tragic to 
address a matter that ultimately calls out for very practical inquiry?  I think that every situation 
of tragic political strife is unique with its own set of apparent and hidden conflicting forces.  
Such a situation does indeed call out for practical, scientific inquiry with a conciliatory focus.  
The aim of such an inquiry is to appease as many of the apparent forces as possible and to 
perhaps even make forays, on the basis of creative intelligence, into what remains hidden.  
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Granting that, there is a crucial element that the study of the philosophy of tragic conflict can 
bring to the inquiry and make it richer in insight.  This crucial element consists first of all of the 
concrete sensibility of our limits in reaching a total resolution of the conflict.  Whether we place 
it in the conceptual realm or in the situation on the ground, there is bound to be an unassimilated 
remainder that would always persist.  There is a fierceness with which the forces in conflict 
adhere to their respective grounds and this is revealed by the philosophy of the tragic.  Speaking 
from within a situation, there are limits that all parties in a conflict have to recognize and abide 
by in order to maintain equilibrium, albeit a tense one. There is nothing deeper than tragedy to 
teach us lessons about the recognition of difference and the limits of self-assertion. The study of 
the philosophy of the tragic also brings into question the very idea of reconciliation.  It opens up 
the issue of teleological ends by asking the following types of questions: Is there an end towards 
which all this strife is moving? Will all this bloodletting ever lead to something great?  If the 
inquiry into conflict has to maintain its integrity and authenticity, there must be recognition of 
the possibility of failure and its various modes.   
 
The subject matter of this dissertation is exploration of the concrete meaning of tragedy at a very 
broad political, social and historical level.  After surveying the literature on the philosophy of the 
tragic, I have decided to devote this chapter to texts drawn from Hegel.  I feel that for this 
specific topic, the employment of other great writings on the tragic would require too much of an 
extrapolation.  Hegel, in my view is the one who addresses the subject most directly.  This 
chapter is based on historical, textual analysis - I start with selections from the Natural Law 
essay, devoting considerable space to it after which I move on to a shorter discussion of 
quotations from Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate and then spend the most amount of time 
delving into the Aesthetics7.  It is important to note that broadly stated, in his philosophical 
oeuvre Hegel employs tragedy as a model for explaining conflict and for explaining historical 
progress or change.  The chief examples of the latter model are Phenomenology of Spirit and 
Lectures on the History of Philosophy. In both instances, Hegel remains consistent with the 
notion that tragedy is the dialectic of ethical life, however, these are two radically distinct 
philosophical uses of tragedy and we must avoid any undue conflation of the two.  In my mind, 
Hegel’s references to tragedy as a model for conflict are more pertinent in the context of this 
                                                 
7 See Peter Szondi, An Essay on the Tragic, translated by Paul Fleming (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2002). pp. 15 – 24. In writing about Hegel in this chapter, I have often taken guidance from and 
relied upon Peter Szondi’s analysis.     
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chapter and it is this consideration that has led me to turn to the Natural Law essay and the later 
texts which, in my view, are more direct continuations of the view on conflict presented in the 
earlier work.  
 
Hegel understands tragedy as the dialectic of ethical life.  This is a basic position that he 
consistently maintains throughout his work. I will first be looking at Hegel’s exposition of his 
basic stance on the tragic as it appears in the Natural Law essay8.  As we know, in Hegel’s view 
the task of philosophy is to overcome dualisms.  The Natural Law essay is directed chiefly 
against the formalistic dualisms that Kant and Fichte bring into philosophy.  In the realm of 
ethics, Kant and Fichte leave us with rigid separation of positive law and individual morality and 
the universal and particular. Hegel confronts these dualisms with the dialectic and self-
consciousness. With his concept of “ethical life”, Hegel seeks to unite into a single, living whole 
all the splits between duty and free, inner self-conscious moral life.  Let us look at some quotes 
from the natural law essay surrounding this issue: 
 
“Fichte wants to see every action and the whole existence of the individual as an individual 
supervised, known, and regulated by the universal and the abstraction that are set up in 
opposition to him.”9   
 
“Formalism disrupts perception and its identity of the universal and the particular…the real, 
however, is a sheer identity of the universal and the particular.”10  
 
Hegel has problems with the abstract, artificial distinctions and oppositions that have been 
created between the universal and the particular. The real, in Hegel’s philosophy consists of the 
total identity of the universal and the particular. The universal can be extracted from the 
particular and vice versa.  In Hegel’s ethics, the ethical life of the individual (particular) and the 
universal absolute ethical life are presented in their identity.  “The essence of the ethical life of 
the individual is the real and therefore universal absolute ethical life; the ethical life of the 
                                                 
8 G. W. F. Hegel, The Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law, Its Place in Moral Philosophy, and Its 
Relation to the Positive Sciences, translated by T. M. Knox (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1975).  
9 Ibid., Knox, p. 124. 
10 Ibid., Knox, p. 125.  
 
 17
individual is one pulse beat of the whole system and is itself the whole system.”11 This unity of 
the two is, however, defined by dialectical confrontation; this identity of the universal and the 
particular is not a stable, perpetually harmonious state. Hegel may have done away with abstract 
distinctions but in their place he brings in a dynamic opposition. The oppositions are not done 
away with; rather, based on the notion of Aufhebung from Hegel’s logic, these oppositions are 
uplifted into the center of the concept of identity and retain their dynamic interaction therein.  
Hegel understands the relation between the opposing components of identity as relations 
between powers. So there is struggle between the powers of vital individuality and inorganic 
law, that is, between living particular and abstract universal.  The conflict between the powers is 
immanent, that is, it suffuses the unity and it is precisely that which gives vitality to this unity or 
identity.  The power that tends towards diminishing the ethical life of the whole is separated and 
sacrificed.  Inorganic law as an abstract universal is a power that the ethical life rigorously 
separates from itself and sacrifices it.  
 
For Hegel, both the state of nature (absence of law: anarchy & lawlessness) and the law in its 
institutional form are inorganic elements of concrete ethical life and are also present in the Idea 
of ethical life.  In opposition to formalism, Hegel’s “absolute Idea of ethical life…contains both 
majesty (of law) and the state of nature as simply identical” 12. It is important to note that Hegel 
places law in the inorganic part of ethical life and sees it as an abstract realm where the universal 
and particular are set in rigid opposition. “The whole state of law” is “alien to individuals” and is 
a “supreme power” that is “single and particular” and keeps the individuals under subjection13. It 
is crucial also to note the distinction between the Idea of Ethical life and Ethical life itself. In 
contrast to its ideality which is characterized by unity ethical life in existence is rife with 
fragmentation or difference. For Hegel tragic conflict occurs precisely because the Idea of ethical 
life as an absolute universal – the Divine - enters into a reality that is subject to the principle of 
particularization.     
 
Hegel says that “absolute ethical life” or “absolute ethical totality” is “nothing other than a 
people” and the individual proves his affiliation with an ethical totality (a people) by necessarily 
                                                 
11 Ibid., Knox, p. 112 
12 Ibid., Knox, p. 66 
13 Ibid. 
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exposing himself to the risk of death14.   The impulse of the absolute, the infinite, is to unite the 
ethical totalities into an identity.  The various individual ethical totalities are thus pitted against 
each other because they have radically different positions and struggle against the absolute 
which is characterized by indifference.  Hegel wants to give a notion of substantive ethical 
position and individuality that is rooted in concrete reality.  Individualities, says Hegel, are not 
simple rational entities.  They are instead in relation with totalities (peoples) and also with the 
Divine universal.  All relations in Hegel have both a positive and a negative aspect and the same 
applies to relations amongst individualities.  On the one hand, individualities can co-exist in 
relative independence from each other and even flourish together.  On the other hand, however, 
individualities do bear negatively on each other and are impelled to cancel each other out.   This 
negative aspect of the relation between individualities is expressed in the virtue of courage.  For 
Hegel, this negative interaction of one individuality with another establishes the necessity of 
war15.  At this point, Hegel gives his own take on regenerative strife.  In Hegel’s philosophy war 
is necessary for the maintenance of a healthy ethical life, not only of people but also of ethical 
institutions.  The ethical health of a people demands that the institutions do not become static 
and lifeless, that is inorganic.  An active, dynamic relation has to be always maintained between 
the individuals and the ethical institutions.  Even devastation of the most immense sort is a 
necessary sacrifice for the Absolute and the people.  “Just as the blowing of the winds preserves 
the sea from the foulness which would result from a continual calm, so also corruption would 
result for peoples under continual or indeed ‘perpetual’ peace.”16  It is evident from this that 
Hegel seeks to justify the sufferings of war and destruction because for him they are necessary 
for the progress of absolute ethical life.        
 
As has been discussed above, Hegel’s natural law essay is directed against the abstract divisions 
between universal and particular that Fichte and Kant bring into philosophy.  Hegel’s discussion 
of absolute ethical life also reveals another attack on formalism.  Kant wrote a famous essay on 
“perpetual peace” and he along with Fichte proposed that human history is progressing towards 
universal harmony where all peoples in the world would live together in a cosmopolitan order 
and that they would all agree upon set principles.  For Hegel, this is not so.  The necessary 
plurality of ethical individualities is rife with conflict at many different levels.  Towards the end 
                                                 
14 Ibid., Knox, p. 92.  
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
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of his essay, Hegel emphasizes upon the necessity of the negative relations between 
individualities. He asserts moreover that individuality (particularity) has a living relation with 
the spirit (universal).  Individuality, for Hegel, is the living embodiment of the spirit (universal).  
At the same time, this individuality, even if totally subsumed - in all its vitality - into the 
absolute spirit does not constitute the totality of this spirit.  That is why, says Hegel, there is 
“always an incongruity between absolute spirit and its shape”17.  This vital, ethical individuality 
cannot attain absolute shape by simply being placed under abstract universals.  Hegel here refers 
to the following as escapisms – “the shapelessness of cosmopolitanism”, “the void of the Rights 
of Man” or “the like void of a league of nations or a world republic”.  Hegel, as we know, wants 
to affirm individuality in all its vitality and violence as part of absolute ethical life.  The 
Absolute Idea, for Hegel, possesses intuition (Anschauung) in which it sees both the universal 
and the particular.  It sees itself in its individualities that is, in its objective form and fully 
recognizes it before returning to itself in its totality.  And this is what makes it absolute spirit and 
“perfect ethical life”18.  This absolute spirit in its ethical life disengages itself from negativity but 
not before recognizing that negative as a part of itself, that is, its fate.  The absolute spirit purges 
itself of the negative and this process is a tragic sacrifice because that which has been sacrificed 
was always a part of the absolute spirit.  This sacrifice can be a sacrifice of certain principles that 
deviate from the organic ethical life, for instance principles based on pure economic expediency 
or it may be a sacrifice of entire individualities (a people) themselves.  The elements that are 
being sacrificed are those which have either isolated themselves totally from the process in 
which the whole ethical life flourishes or they have become dead and inorganic - institutions, for 
instance.  These elements, which could potentially have been positive, thus become negative and 
their sacrifice is necessary for the progress of ethical life towards increasing freedom.  
 
Hegel’s notion of the “inorganic” is multi-faceted; however, focus on one aspect of it will take 
us closer to Hegel’s definition of tragedy.  Following the model of Plato’s Republic, Hegel also 
divides society into three classes and explains the virtues belonging to the respective classes19.  
There is, however, a crucial difference in the criterion that Hegel adopts for the assignment of 
virtue.  This criterion is freedom and Hegel assesses how free a class is based on how much the 
individuals belonging to that class are willing to risk their own lives for the life of the ethical 
                                                 
17 Ibid., Knox, p. 132 
18 Ibid., Knox, p. 133 
19 Ibid., Knox, p. 99 - 103 
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totality.  For Hegel, the universal ethical life permeates the individuals in a very organic manner.  
The very identity of individuals belonging to an ethical totality is inextricably bound up with this 
whole and therefore the highest class lives and dies to maintain this identity and to let the whole 
flourish.  The aristocrats and nobles belong to this highest class and their work consists of giving 
their lives for the whole and also the development of political life.  The virtue of the aristocratic 
class is courage.  The second class consists of traders and businesspersons.  Individuals 
belonging to this class adhere to their own subjective interests, remaining always at the level of 
understanding and never proceeding to the level of reason where ethical life dwells and which 
demands the sacrifice of one’s life and purely personal interest.  This second class adheres to 
“bad infinity” because they are engaged in an unreflective and empty pursuit of wealth.  The 
virtue of the traders is honesty.  There is a third class that consists of laborers working on the 
land.  The virtue of this class is loyalty and they never hesitate to serve in the armies run by the 
nobility.   
 
Hegel sees the necessity of the second class for the flourishing of the whole.  The existence of 
the class of traders – which is not an organic part of ethical life - is justified as long as their 
perspective on things as it were does not dominate the social whole.  This existence, however, is 
also seen by Hegel as a sacrifice given by the ethical life to “subterranean powers” in order to 
appease them and this sacrifice is necessary, it is fate.  For Hegel, fate consists of what he refers 
to as the inorganic part of ethical nature.  This inorganic nature is not apart from ethical life; it is 
intrinsically involved with it and must be recognized as such.  
 
“Tragedy consists in this, that ethical nature segregates its inorganic nature (in order not to 
become entangled in it), as a fate, and places it outside itself: and by acknowledging this fate in 
the struggle against it, ethical nature is reconciled with the Divine being as the unity of both.”20
 
In our discussion of the class schema in Hegel, we saw how the business class deviates from the 
ultimate goals of ethical life.  However, Hegel recognizes this class as necessary.  The commerce 
class is not detached from ethical nature.  It is very much a part of ethical life and created by it in 
its movement towards freedom.  This class is nevertheless “dead” and “inorganic” and is to be 
recognized by the individual as fate.  There is a necessity to this process where ethical life 
                                                 
20 Ibid., Knox, p. 105 
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engages with its inorganic nature and keeps itself pure.  The economic necessity within the 
ethical whole is only one type of necessity.  There can be other types of inorganic necessities.  
The point to be noted is that this is the way in which ethical life necessarily progresses through 
history and towards freedom.  Ethical nature, which here includes both the individual, the ethical 
totalities and the Absolute undergoes division within itself whereby it recognizes its fate.  This 
recognition, in Hegel’s view, is a crucial step towards reconciliation where the inorganic element 
(fate) is ultimately united with the Divine. 
 
In the preceding paragraphs, we have focused on one aspect of necessity or of the inorganic.  It is 
clear though that the concept of fate has a much broader application for Hegel.  We need only to 
revisit one aspect of Hegel’s metaphysics and see how it builds into his theory of tragic conflict.  
Ethical Life, for Hegel, is organic (alive) and is a “sheer identity of the universal and the 
particular”21.  Due to this, ethical life always has an “individuality and shape”22.  The ethical life 
assimilates within itself living individuality which is subject to chance and necessity.  This, 
Hegel says, is the inorganic side of ethical life albeit it is organically immersed in it.  In this 
connection, Hegel speaks of “world-spirit” as it manifests itself in different shapes in different 
peoples.  There is an element of necessity to the way people belonging to different cultures and 
different geographical regions of the world determine the shape of their ethical life.  However, 
despite radical individual differences, the world-spirit does move through all individual 
groupings of ethical life. For Hegel then, this individuality which is both accidental and 
necessary is something that would lead to tragic conflict.  This individuality leads precisely to an 
enrichment of the ethical life even though this is often achieved through war and destruction.  
 
“As a result of the supersession of this confusion of principles, and their established and 
conscious separation, each of them is done justice, and that alone which ought to be is brought 
into existence (i.e., the reality of ethical life as absolute indifference, and at the same time the 
reality of that indifference as real relation in persistent opposition) so that the second is 
overcome by the first and this compulsion itself is made identical and reconciled.”23      
 
                                                 
21 Ibid., Knox, p. 126  
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid., Knox, p. 104 
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This above text appears in the Natural Law Essay after the discussion of class schema.  The 
conflict of principles that Hegel here speaks of are those that are adhered to by the various 
classes.  The courage of the nobility and the loyalty of the laborers are pitted against the private 
self-interest of the bourgeoisie.  I would extrapolate at this point and say - in the light of the 
other parts of the essay – that this conflict of principles can occur at many different levels of the 
ethical life precisely due to the radical plurality that it holds within itself.  There are radically 
different systems of belief and not just belief but also things like ethnic and clan affiliations that 
come into conflict with each other.  After all, if the identity of the individual (as Hegel sees him) 
is organically connected with a whole then he or she will fight for this whole (whether it is a city, 
a country or just a group) at various different levels.  Returning to the text, we can see how, for 
Hegel, the conflicting principles are individual and specific and yet each of them is done justice   
and not because one or the other attains ascendancy over the others.  It is just that what 
ultimately attains ascendancy is the ethical life in its sheer identity of the universal and the 
particular.  The ethical life has two aspects, absolute identity or indifference and the oppositional 
conflicts that play out between the particulars that are a part of this identity.  All strife ends in 
reconciliation at a higher level where the conflict itself is reconciled with indifference or unity.   
Hegel continues thus: 
 
“This reconciliation lies precisely in the knowledge of necessity, and in the right which ethical 
life concedes to its inorganic nature, and to the subterranean powers by making over and 
sacrificing to them one part of itself.  For the force of sacrifice lies in facing and objectifying the 
involvement with the inorganic.  This involvement is dissolved by being faced; the inorganic is 
separated and, recognized for what it is, is itself taken up into indifference while the living, by 
placing into the inorganic what it knows to be a part of itself and surrendering it to death, has all 
at once recognized the right of the inorganic and cleansed itself of it.”24
 
The world-spirit divides itself into various ethical totalities (peoples) having specific individual 
characteristics.  These characteristics are a product of necessity.  The world-sprit would pervade 
through all ethical totalities nevertheless every totality is conditioned by geography, culture and 
ethnicity.  It seems to me that for Hegel, this element is something that cannot be resolved by 
philosophical reason.  It is rather something that needs to be confronted and honored for its 
                                                 
24 Ibid. 
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intractability.  Necessity and the inorganic are linked with particularity.  According to Hegel’s 
notion of intuition, this aspect of particularity has to be seen together with what is universal and 
absolute (ethical life).  Thus, there is a self-division within ethical nature whereby the element of 
necessity and the inorganic are sacrificed.  After this sacrifice, the division is cancelled out and 
both parts – as seen in the definition of tragedy – are reconciled and united with the Divine. 
 
“This is nothing else but the performance, on the ethical plane, of the tragedy which the Absolute 
eternally enacts with itself, by eternally giving birth to itself into objectivity, submitting in this 
objective form to suffering and death, and rising from its ashes into glory.”25
 
This essay contains echoes of Hegel’s philosophy of history.  I think that for Hegel, the Absolute 
or Divine or Universal is ultimately history.  It is well-known that Hegel gives us a theodicy of 
history.  The Absolute pervades through history.  It has two natures or attributes.  The first is 
ethical nature, which is the realm where the progress of history towards human freedom takes 
place.  The second is what can be called physical nature.  This is the part that is rife with 
necessity, plurality, death and suffering.  The Absolute enters into the physical, objective world 
and is torn apart.  However, precisely as a result of this tearing apart, the Absolute re-emerges 
from the process with greater self-knowledge and freedom.  Hegel thus gives a system that 
would reconcile all the tragedies of history.  There is a teleological end in Hegel and the 
movement towards this end is based on a dialectical logic, however, Hegel fully affirms the 
tragic conflicts that occur in the journey towards this end. 
 
Hegel further illustrates the tragic process of self-division and reconciliation by reflecting upon 
the dual nature of the Divine26.  The Divine, as it makes its appearance into objectivity is always 
dual natured (ethical and physical) and its movement herein is the absolute unity (opposition) of 
these two natures.  The Divine is always gaining self-knowledge and in this movement of its 
conflicting natures, it comprehends (intuits) itself as courage.  As we know, knowledge, for 
Hegel is freedom and in the tragic process the Divine frees itself from the necessity and death 
that is intrinsic to the physical part of its nature.  The Divine achieves knowledge of courage as 
an ethical principle that is necessary for progress.  The courage that the Divine displays in 
                                                 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
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sacrificing its inorganic or physical nature is reflected in the courage shown by those noble 
individuals of ethical totality who risk their own life for the enrichment of the whole.  Now this 
liberation comes at the cost of the life of the Divine because this life is inextricably linked with 
the inorganic nature.  However, death itself is a part of the inorganic nature and once the latter is 
sacrificed, “death is mastered” and the Divine emerges victorious and indestructible.  The 
physical, inorganic nature possesses a power of abstraction that is purely negative.  This means 
that the inorganic nature is constituted such that there is a compulsion to remove its particularity 
from the universality of the Divine.  In the tragic process, however, which is the process in 
which the Divine becomes objective, the pure negativity of the physical nature is cancelled and 
this nature is shown as being a part of the living unity of the Divine.  The Divine flows into the 
physical nature as spirit and becomes one with it in ideal unity.  Hegel says that physical nature 
is the “living body” of the Divine, in other words, the Divine is reconciled in this living body.  
The tragedy here is that the living body is rife with plurality and difference and therefore, 
through spirit, the living body always experiences the Divine universal as alienated from it.   
 
Hegel uses his interpretation of the conclusion of Aeschylus’ Eumenides as an illustration of his 
notion of tragedy as the dialectic of ethical life.  Towards the end of the drama, there is a legal 
conflict, as it were, between the Eumenides “as powers of law in the sphere of difference”27 and 
Apollo “the god of indifferenced light”28 over the destiny of Orestes.  The conflict unfolds in 
front of the “organized ethical order, the people of Athens”29.  The Eumenides represent the 
inorganic part of ethical life.  The Divine appears and acts in both the human mode – as the 
Areopagus – and in the Divine mode as Pallas Athena.  In the human mode, the council of 
Areopagus recognizes both particulars of the conflict but does not reconcile the two.  The Divine 
then appears as Pallas Athena and brings about “a reconciliation in such a way that the 
Eumenides would be revered by this people as Divine powers, and would now have their place 
in the city, so that their savage nature would enjoy (from the altar erected to them in the city 
below) the sight of Athene enthroned on high on the Acropolis, and thereby be pacified.”30 The 
conflict between Apollo and the Eumenides represents the self-division of ethical nature and the 
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recognition of the Eumenides first as an inorganic power and then as fate shows the sacrifice that 
is to be given so that Orestes is fully restored to the ethical totality (city of Athens). 
 
From the preceding discussion, we learn that for Hegel the historical process in general and 
ethical life in particular is suffused with tragic conflict.  It is the element of Fate that makes a 
conflict tragic.  This fate appears as inorganic necessity.  It would be interesting to consider 
Hegel’s discussion of comedy in the Natural Law essay because in comedy there is an absence of 
fate or necessity.  This, for Hegel is not the way in which conflicts that produce progress in 
history unfold: 
 
“Either it falls within absolute vitality, and thus presents only shadows of clashes (or mock 
battles with a fabricated fate and fictitious enemies), or else it falls within non-life and therefore 
presents only shadows of self-determination and absoluteness; the former is the old, or Divine 
comedy, the latter the modern comedy”31.  
 
When speaking of the first type of comedy, Hegel refers to Dante’s Divine Comedy.  This drama 
unfolds in a medieval world where God will always be dominant; no serious questions or 
oppositions can be raised against His authority even though there is much conflict as to what this 
authority means.  There is “absolute vitality” here because the inorganic elements of necessity 
(death, suffering, war, plurality) do not create any ruptures within the Divine.  All wars and 
struggles are fought not against a concrete inorganic nature that creates real hurdles in the road 
towards greater freedom and consciousness.  The battles are, in a sense, stylized struggles fought 
amongst enemies that are all fictitious.  The other type of comedy is that where the ethical life is 
basically dead and there is no longer even an imaginary fate.  The tussles over here take place 
between self-centered individuals.  The Absolute, in Hegel’s terms is now an illusion and is 
replaced by shallow principles of self-determination.  There is no ethical totality to which the 
individuals belong in any real sense and they create their own identity.  The people struggled 
with one another on a purely individual basis and the Absolute is nowhere in the picture.  
 
In Hegel’s writings after the Natural Law essay, he presents us with a theodicy of history but the 
oscillations of this theme are already present within the exposition of tragic conflict in this early 
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work.  In the context of the natural law essay, we can say quite fairly that the Divine or Absolute 
or History has an ethical nature which is the realm of freedom and progress.  This ethical nature 
is, however, always enmeshed in a dynamic relation with an inorganic element of necessity.  If 
ethical nature in its purity is universal then the inorganic nature is the realm of particularity, 
necessity, death and suffering.  The inorganic nature provides an opposition to the ethical that is 
necessary for progress to occur.  The “world-spirit”, on the ethical level, divides itself into 
“ethical totalities” or peoples who are organically associated with this totality.  The vitality of a 
people requires some to always be ready to lay down their lives and many others to be loyal to 
the whole.  The particularization inherent in ethical totalities always leaves them open to 
ruptures within and also conflicts with other totalities.  This element of particularization or 
inorganic necessity provokes growth.  The movement of ethical life is always towards the 
flourishing of the whole.  If a society becomes very individualistic in that the impulse towards 
the whole weakens or if institutions lose their organic vitality then the people enter into a stage 
of decay.  Such trends can only be reversed through the action of those who are going to risk 
their lives and embrace death.  All such sacrifice and violence is ultimately reconciled with the 
progress and freedom that is attained due to it.  
 
Before moving on to Hegel’s writings on tragedy from the Aesthetics, it is important to delve 
briefly into Hegel’s exposition of ethical life and tragic fate from an earlier work, “The Spirit of 
Christianity and its Fate”32.  The text on Christianity was written in 1798 - 1800 and here too, 
Hegel sketches out a critique of Kant’s ethics, but unlike the essay on Natural Law this critique 
is placed within the structure of a study of the philosophy and the history of Christianity.  Hegel 
sets up his critique within the framework of the clash of Christianity with Judaism.  For Hegel, 
the spirit of Judaism is similar to that of Kantian ethics or of law.  As we have seen before, Hegel 
thinks that Kantian ethics creates rigid, irreconcilable opposition between the universal and the 
particular, life and law and the human and Divine.  The particular is totally subjugated to and 
governed by the universal.  Through his description of the spirit of Christianity, Hegel seeks to 
bring forth his own dialectic.  The spirit of Christianity overcomes the dualisms through the 
figure of Jesus.  Jesus is the power of love that mediates between the human and the Divine.  He, 
being both the Son of God and the Son of Man, creates an identity of the human and the Divine, 
                                                 
32 Hegel, G.W.F., The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate, in Early Theological Writings, translated by T.M. 
Knox (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992) 
 
 27
reconciling both forces through a dialectical movement and His resurrection is the mediation 
between life and death.  In Kantian ethics there is the notion of duty which corresponds to the 
objective Divine command in Judaism.  Hegel seeks a notion of ethos that is not based on 
objective commands; rather, it is grounded in human subjectivity in its identity with universality.  
The figure of Jesus binds together subjective disposition with universality.  This Identity, not 
unlike that posited in the Natural Law essay, possesses an inner, dialectical movement of the 
powers that are in it.  Identity is not a static form; it contains within itself the movement of self-
division and reconciliation.  What gets split from the Identity is fate and reconciliation with fate 
occurs through love.   Judaism, in Hegel’s view, is devoid of fate because the individual is 
subject to the objective, divine commands.  For Hegel, it is Christianity that establishes the 
possibility of tragic fate. It has to be kept in mind that Hegel’s notion of fate, even as it is 
expressed in the Christianity essay, can be linked with ancient Greek philosophy.  It is a 
powerful notion with important repercussions for understanding political conflict.     
 
Hegel chalks out the difference between consciousness of punishment and consciousness of 
fate33.  Consciousness of punishment consists of fear of or obstinacy towards a power that is 
alien to me.  Consciousness of fate consists of the recognition of a part of my own self as being 
in opposition to me.  This means that I have performed certain deeds which emerge from my 
subjective disposition.  These deeds are a part of me and they have alienated me from my own 
self.  The only authentic bad conscience or guilt is the one that is evoked by the recognition of an 
opposition within the self.  There is an aspect of the self that has become hostile and the 
recognition of this constitutes consciousness of fate.   
 
This hearkens back to the idea of absolute ethics.  Ethical life faces a rupture from within and 
sees its inorganic nature as fate.  In the Christianity essay, fate is the fear not of an alien being 
(punishment) but a hostile aspect of one’s own life.  This fear or bad conscience is not evoked by 
an objective law.  It is evoked rather by a law that one creates for oneself as life is lived.  Fate is 
thus a product of one’s ethos.  In Absolute Ethics, guilt does not emerge from the transgression 
of an objective law but of a law that one had created through one’s subjective disposition or 
ethos.   
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The consciousness of fate opens up the possibility of reconciliation which is absent when there is 
mere punishment due to violation of an objective law.  In the latter case there is absolute 
opposition between the doer and the deed, hence there is always something that evades the 
punishment.  In Absolute Ethics or Christianity, consciousness of fate is really consciousness of 
one’s own life as being hostile.  There is an opposition here but it takes the form of a dialectical 
relation.  Recognition of fate would eventually lead to reconciliation with it, through love.  It is 
thus that a new harmony is restored within life or ethical life, to be more precise.   
 
In the Christianity essay, Hegel’s concern is to illuminate the origin of fate and with it the origin 
of dialectic.  Both these seem to stem from the spirit of Christianity.  However, it can be seen 
that Hegel’s discussion of tragic fate can be applied above and beyond the borders of just 
Christianity.  In both the Christianity essay and the Natural Law text, tragic fate is the 
embodiment of the instant at which ruptures occur within ethical life.  In the Christianity essay, 
tragic fate is the recognition of an element of one’s own life as being hostile to life and in the 
Natural Law essay the recognition is that of something that is an inorganic part of ethical life. 
There is a clear correspondence here and in the Natural Law essay we can see the general 
concept of tragic fate.  Hegel’s discussion of Macbeth in the essay on Christianity can be seen as 
his explanation of tragic fate as such: 
 
“The illusion of trespass, its belief that it destroys the other’s life and thinks itself enlarged 
thereby, is dissipated by the fact that the disembodied spirit of the injured life comes on the 
scene against the trespass, just as Banquo who came as a friend to Macbeth was not blotted out 
when he was murdered but immediately thereafter took his seat, not as a guest at the feast, but as 
an evil spirit.  The trespasser intended to have to do with another’s life, but he has only destroyed 
his own, for life is not different from life, since life dwells in the single Godhead.  In his 
arrogance he has destroyed indeed, but only the friendliness of life; he has perverted life into an 
enemy.  It is the deed itself which has created a law whose domination now comes on the scene; 
this law is the unification, in the concept, of the equality between the injured, apparently alien, 
life and the trespasser’s own forfeited life.  It is now for the first time that the injured life appears 
as a hostile power against the trespasser and maltreats him as he has maltreated the other. Hence 
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punishment as fate is the equal reaction of the trespasser’s own deed, of a power which he 
himself has armed, of an enemy made an enemy by himself.”34   
 
We can understand this passage by starting with what we have already written about Hegel’s 
disagreement with all theories that create an ineradicable gulf between the universal and the 
particular.  We are working here in the realm of ethics.  So in objective law, there is the law 
itself which is a universal and this is in opposition to the deed of the individual, which is a 
particular.  If the deed has violated a law, then it is abstractly translated into universal terms and 
the doer is punished accordingly.  Hegel counters this notion of objective law by positing life as 
a unity of universals and particulars.  Through a particular deed, the doer has created a rift within 
life.  The results of the deed are seen as an alien, hostile form of his life by the doer.  Life is life, 
as Hegel says, there is no escaping it.  Macbeth is an example of an individual who has 
externalized his fate, that is, he is totally alienated from it.  His act, that is, the murder of Banquo 
has created a hostile element within his own life.  In a state of bad conscience, he refuses to 
recognize that his deed is embodied as Banquo’s ghost and is the hostile incarnation of an 
element of his own life.  The tragic fate of Macbeth is the split that he has created within his own 
life.  He has acted in such a way that he has “forfeited” the unity and refuses to recognize this.  
Macbeth sees Banquo’s ghost as something external to him whereas it emerges from his own 
acts, his own life.  Even though Macbeth has escaped from the objective law, his actions have 
created a rupture within his own ethos and the alienated element extracts vengeance upon him. 
Fate, in short is never external, it is a product of one’s actions.  In Macbeth’s case, justice is 
served on the basis of a law that he himself has created.  The possibility of reconciliation is open 
to the criminal if he strives to restore unity by first recognizing that he himself is responsible for 
a disruption.  The world of objective law, on the contrary remains devoid of such a possibility 
because the law itself remains permanently disconnected from the individual. 
 
The passage about Macbeth is ultimately aimed at explaining the dialectical process of 
subjective fate, however there is another provocative passage from the Christianity essay that can 
be seen as a projection of tragic fate on to entire communities or groups: 
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“The fate of the Jewish people is the fate of Macbeth who stepped out of nature itself, clung to 
foreign Beings, and so in their service had to trample and slay everything holy in human nature, 
had at last to be forsaken by his gods (since these were objects and he their slave) and be dashed 
to pieces on his faith itself.”35
 
Now Hegel’s notion of ethical life, as our discussion of its characteristics may already have 
made evident, is beyond Kantian notions of duty or to take this point further, it is in a sense 
beyond good and evil.  Ethical life is the Divine in Hegel and yet it is inextricably bound up with 
inorganic nature and fate.  This fate is produced as a result of actions.  The unity of ethical life is 
broken up through a dialectical process and this same tragic process also restored the unity.  
Ethical systems which consist of inextricable divisions – Kant and Judaism – are rigorously 
differentiated from what Hegel calls ethical life.  In objective law there is no room for the tragic 
dialectic.  The oppositions within objective law are always maintained.  It seems to me then that 
what “Evil” means for Hegel, is any tendency towards disruption of the unity.   
 
In the above quoted text, I would like to point towards two things.  First of all, there is at work in 
this passage, the notion of tragic fate and the affects of its externalization and lack of 
recognition.  Macbeth, as we have already discussed, is alienated from the fate that he has 
created for himself.  Alienation from fate on a subjective level can occur also at the level of 
communities.  Setting aside the controversial aspects of the above quoted passage, one has to pay 
homage to its explanatory potential.  A community, a state or religious group can act in such a 
manner that it creates for itself a fate that emerges precisely from its actions.  Now, according to 
the natural law essay, tragic reconciliation with this fate can occur only with the recognition and 
sacrifice of the inorganic.  From the essay on Christianity, reconciliation with fate can occur 
through love.  This fate is created through the operation of ethos, which at the broader political 
level is nothing but the sum total of all activities that are carried out to preserve identity and life.  
Some of these activities can create ruptures within the totality of ethical life. 
 
Next, I also want to point towards the conflict between the world of love and world of law that is 
such a central theme in the later Hegel.  I interpret the passage as saying that it is possible for a 
powerful individual -and thus the group he leads- to be subservient only to the objective or the 
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inorganic.  The objective world in general is beset with ineradicable difference.  Universals 
control particulars in that realm.  In this passage, we can see the conflict between this objective 
world and the world of love which is ethical life in its purity.  Subservience to the objective 
removes the possibility of reconciliation with fate which can occur only through love.  If we go 
back to our earlier analysis of passages from the Natural Law essay, it can be seen that such 
subservience can lead to the ossification of ethical life at the level of peoples.  This combined 
with the notion of externalized fate shows how destruction unfolds upon not just the leaders 
(Macbeth in this case) but those whom they lead.   
 
Now that we have set out Hegel’s notions of tragedy as the dialectic of ethical life and tragic 
fate, we can delve into his discussions surrounding tragic conflict from the Aesthetics36 . I would 
like to begin with an exposition of the following text: 
 
“The primary requirement for a dramatic poet as an author is that he shall have a full insight into 
the inner and universal element lying at the root of the aims, struggles, and fates of human 
beings”37. 
 
This statement shows, first of all that even though Hegel’s discussion of dramatic poetry (and 
tragedy as one of its modes) occurs within the context of an Aesthetic Theory, it is directed 
towards explaining conflict in the much broader socio-historical human sphere.  Now what is 
this “universal element” that the dramatic poet needs to fully grasp? To respond to this question, 
we would need to trace relevant aspects of Hegel’s argument from the beginning of the section 
on dramatic poetry38. 
 
Hegel, as we have discussed before, replaces dualisms with dialectical relationships.  In the 
realm of Aesthetics, the dialectic is between content and form.  For Hegel, dramatic poetry 
reveals the “most perfect totality of content and form”.  In drama, Content and Form bleed into 
each other.  Drama is a portrayal of a complete, substantive action and if the content is provided 
by the aims of self-conscious individuals then form is supplied by the character or dispositions of 
these individuals.  The action of a drama is stripped of externality and it has a dual focus – on the 
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hand, it originates and is executed by self-conscious individuals, on the other hand, it has a 
specific end that is determined by the substantive nature of aims that are involved.  The action in 
its completeness consists of collisions of opposing aims and obligations and their eventual 
reconciliation.  In dramatic poetry, the will of the individual coincides with action and the former 
is determined by substantive aims, interests and dispositions that are specific to the individual.   
 
For Hegel, drama has to be the reflection of what actually takes place in human affairs and 
action. The conflicting circumstances in drama are produced by the inner life of individuals.  I 
understand that in Hegel’s thought, there is no lag or gap between inner life and action.  This 
inner life consists not only of will and disposition of character but also of substantive aims and 
motivations. The individual at the center of the action is self-determined but not self-contained 
and purely independent therefore the aims and obligations of one individual come into conflict 
with those of another individual.  Every action has consequences but these emerge not only from 
the inner life of the individual but their repercussions are absorbed by the individual.  The reality 
of the drama is produced by the individual and it is he who eventually absorbs this reality.  This 
is where the notion of fate comes in.  Action is produced by inner intentions and aims and its 
realization is evident to the actor.  This action constitutes the entire reality and the individual 
must identify himself with it for after all, it emerges from the willed actualization of inner aims.  
Action which makes the external world is the actualization of inner aims and therefore the 
individual takes responsibility for what has transpired.  There is a sense of total participation 
here in that there is no gap between disposition of character, impulse, will and action. 
 
The individuality of a protagonist in drama is determined totally by his action.  Hegel goes so far 
as to say that the action is the hero of the piece. Now this action is carried out under specific 
circumstances and it has a “specific end as its universal soul”39. It is action which forms the 
drama and the sole ground of this action is the inner life of the individual with its complex of 
will, intention and disposition of character.  This inner life or individuality consists not of 
objective things but of aims and their accomplishment.  Every action has a specific end and it is 
produced by the self-determined individual and yet, the scope of this end lies above and beyond 
the particularity of the individual.  This means that the wills, obligations and intentions that 
motivate an action have something substantive about it.  These are rooted in the inner life and yet 
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that inner life is “only its living instrument and animating sustainer”40.  Hegel’s notion of fate 
once again plays its role here. Aims are self-consciously established and yet their outcome and 
goal are outside the power of the individual.  The end of an action opposes not only the intention 
and will behind it but also the aims of other individuals and it is in these conflicts that the 
essence of human affairs is revealed. 
 
If we step back for a moment and examine what Hegel is up to here, we find that in his view of 
human action as it appears in the Aesthetics he is interested not only in overcoming the dualisms 
of traditional philosophy but also to provide a genuinely experiential basis for his theory.  
Actions have outcomes that were not intended by the actors.  There is a dual collision at work 
here, the first being the lack of harmony between the motivating inner life and the end itself and 
then between the various different motivations that are in play.  I think that what Hegel aims at 
giving us here is a very open-ended dialectic that is not dependent upon a metaphysical system 
per se. We will see this as we go along. 
 
What gives dramatic character to an aim, objective or pathos is that it comes on the scene in such 
a way that it calls forth another distinct and opposing pathos. There is something very specific in 
the nature of every aim which can be traced back to the circumstances in which the individual 
decides to put his will into action. The situation calls forth opposing obligations in the 
individuals who are involved: 
 
“This driving ‘pathos’ may indeed, in each of the actors, derive from spiritual, moral, and Divine 
powers, such as law, patriotism, love of parents, relations, spouses, etc., but if this essential 
object of human feeling and activity is to appear dramatically, it must come on the scene 
separated into different and opposed ends, so that the action has to encounter hindrances from 
other agents and fall into complications and oppositions where both sides struggle for success 
and control”41.  
 
There is a specific context within which a conflict develops.  This conflict is nothing but a 
conflict of specific aims directed towards specific ends.  There are forces that drive the aims.  
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These forces or obligations are grounded in concrete obligations towards different aspects of 
what Hegel would call the living ethical order or ethical life.  Different and opposing obligations 
are evoked within a specific context and the action is a direct expression of these obligations or 
deeply, vitally felt obligations.  The individuals in conflict are expressions of the obligations that 
they harbor. They are vital instruments of these obligations such that these obligations define the 
individuality of the agents. There is a very strong adherence to the forces that evoke these 
obligations among all parties in the conflict.  Each party is driven specifically by a particular 
force and struggles to impose itself on the other party or to simply overcome it.  There is one 
context which evokes different, opposing aims and obligations.  The separation of these 
obligations from within one context points towards a tragic human blindness.  For Hegel, the 
forces that drive the aims towards their opposing ends take full control of the individuals so 
much so that they are blind to the obligations felt by opposing individuals.   
 
The element of tragic finitude comes fully into the picture. I have self-consciously affirmed the 
forces or loyalties that drive me. There is something very substantive about these forces; these 
are not simply lyrical outpourings of whims and fancies.  A set of specific circumstances provide 
the impulse whereby I form aims and will them into action in a way that I am my action and the 
world that is thereby formed is a product of my action.  The action has a specific end or outcome 
that is beyond my control and so also were the self-consciously enacted obligations.  I may not 
intend it but my actions come into conflict with other actions.  The substantive powers that drive 
me are fully justified but they also leave me in a state of blindness.  My obligations are also my 
limitation.  The radical difference within obligations place limits upon our capacity to live in 
harmony. 
 
“The real thing at bottom, the actually all pervasive cause is therefore indeed the eternal powers, 
i.e. what is essentially moral, the gods of our actual life, in short what is Divine and true; yet the 
Divine does not appear here in that tranquil might in which, instead of acting, the unmoved gods 
remain blessedly sunk in themselves like peaceful statuesque figures, but on the contrary it is the 
Divine here in its community, as the substance and aim of human individuality, brought into 
existence as something concrete, summoned into action and put in movement.”42   
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In our discussion of the Natural Law essay, we have seen how Hegel replaces rigid oppositions 
with dialectical relations.  The ethical life of the individual is immediately the ethical life of the 
absolute or Divine.  I think in the Aesthetics, what Hegel means by the Divine is less of a 
metaphysical principle.  The conflict still occurs when the Divine (universal) enters into the 
human community (world of particularization) however this relation has now been further 
subjected to the rigors of contingency and specificity of circumstances.  What needs to be 
stressed here is that Hegel’s Divine does not have to necessarily be understood as a metaphysical 
substance. It is the totality of ethical life as constituted by the substantive pathos of individuals.  
The forces of all the obligations sacred to the people, so to speak, together form the Divine.  This 
totality does get separated into distinct aims but nevertheless there is something absolute that 
remains despite all the ruptures that it undergoes.  In actual human conflicts, the ethical totality is 
necessarily separated into distinct actions that come into opposition with one another.   
 
“But if in this way the Divine is the inmost objective truth lying in the external objectivity of the 
action, then in the third place, a decision on the course and outcome of the complications arising 
from the action cannot lie in the hands of the single individuals who oppose one another, but 
only in those of the Divine itself, as a totality in itself.  Therefore the drama, no matter in what 
way, must display to us the vital working of a necessity which, itself self reposing resolves every 
conflict and every contradiction.”43
 
The material ends of actions form the objectivity of dramatic conflict.   The subjective element is 
provided by the way in which the individuals decide to act upon aims and then absorb the 
consequences of these actions.  The Divine is the truth that lies at the center of both the objective 
and the subjective aspects of an action.  For Hegel, it is necessary that the Divine or totality 
would return to itself after undergoing collisions through the individuals which are its 
instruments.  Hence it is the totality itself which always inheres through conflict and determines 
the reconciliation that occurs at the end.  The self-conscious individuals assume responsibility 
for the outcome but they will always be guilty because they have, of necessity violated some 
aspect of the sacred whole.  This sacred whole or Divine totality is what emerges intact.  It is this 
totality which contains all obligations that define what the opposing individuals are.  
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In our discussion of Hegel’s text from the Aesthetics we started by asking what the universal 
element is that lies at the core of human struggles and fates.  Hegel tells us that what lies at the 
core is the totality of all the differing or opposing obligations that humans hold as sacred.  The 
dramatic poet for Hegel must have an all encompassing vision that penetrates to the core of 
conflict. He must be able to discern not only the specific obligations that are evoked by 
circumstances but to also understand the way in which they would come into conflict with other 
obligations.  It seems that for Hegel the dramatic poet holds the position of the philosophical 
spectator. 
 
“He must be capable of recognizing what those powers are which apportion to man the destiny 
due to him as a result of what he has done.”44
  
We have already elaborated upon Hegel’s notion of tragic fate.  This fate is not something 
external to the individual; it is rather a product of the actions that he has carried out.  For Hegel, 
the pathos that drives action has both an objective and a subjective aspect.  The innermost 
objective aspect is the Divine or the totality of all possible vital obligations.  There is also 
something objective about the specific powers that the individual adopts from within the totality 
of powers or obligations.  The pathos or aims are nevertheless self-consciously affirmed and the 
responsible individual fully absorbs the outcome that results from the individualized realization 
of pathos – this is the subjective aspect of pathos.   
 
“The right as well as the aberration of the obligations that rage in the human heart and impel to 
action must be equally clear to the dramatist, so that where to the ordinary man’s eye it is 
obscurity, chance and confusion that prevail, there is clearly revealed to him the actual 
accomplishment of what is absolutely rational and true.”45  
 
In Hegel’s thought, dramatic poetry is the reflection of what unfolds in actual human conflict.  
Individuals become action which is determined by the obligations that they carry.  These 
obligations can be clearly discerned by one who has the vision of totality.  The conflict is a 
conflict of aims individualized in action and these opposing aims are distinct from one another 
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because they are drawn from different sources.  The conglomerate of these aims, which is the 
Divine, is what is absolutely rational and true. There is something very specific and pure about 
the aims that have been individualized in drama.  These aims are rooted in specific spiritual 
powers and they are not to be confused with other types of objective properties.   
 
I think that I need to provide one brief but concrete example from History to show what this 
dramatic conflict is that Hegel speaks of and what constitutes a philosophical spectator or 
dramatic poet.  The American Civil War is without doubt a tragic, dramatic conflict and for me, 
Abraham Lincoln is more than a philosophical spectator, in a sense he is the Hegelian world-
historical individual.  In the theatre of the American Civil War, Lincoln clearly discerned the 
opposing aims that were in conflict with each other. There were those who were driven by the 
obligation to abolish slavery even at the risk of the destruction of the Union. Then there were 
others who were against slavery but they were driven primarily by the obligation to preserve the 
union. There were some who were motivated by the progressive ideals of the North which 
wanted to see America as an industrialized notion.  All of these groups came into opposition 
with the confederates whose aims and objectives were driven by a obligation to maintain 
agrarian society and aristocratic nobility which demanded the continuation of plantations.  As a 
philosophical spectator Lincoln clearly discerned the presence of the central conflicting aims.  
He could also see how the obligations driving the two sides made them totally blinded to each 
others’ points of view.  What mattered most to Lincoln was the preservation of the Union and 
individual liberty therefore he recognized the aberration in the pathos that drove the 
confederates.  As an actor, Lincoln worked to preserve his two most cherished principles while 
at the same time he recognized with much pain that the pathos of the South must be overcome 
and sacrificed.  The civil war as a tragic conflict of opposing aims emerged from within a single 
ethical order. 
 
“In drama they (spiritual powers) enter in their simple and fundamental character and they 
oppose one another as ‘pathos’ in individuals.  And the drama is the dissolution of the one-
sidedness of these powers which are making themselves independent in the dramatic characters, 
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whether, as in tragedy, their attitude to one another is hostile, or whether, as in comedy, they are 
revealed directly as inwardly self-dissolving.”46
 
The actors become their pathos through their action.  Each actor is the individualization of a 
specific pathos or aim.  Drama reveals most clearly the pathos in their pure, original form.  
Pathos produces one-sidedness, blindness towards the pathos of the opponent.  The characters, in 
their adherence to their pathos think that they can gain independence from or overcome the 
opposing pathos.  However all pathos are part of one ethical order or totality and therefore it is 
necessary that in drama this one-sidedness is eventually merged into that original totality or the 
Divine.  In terms of tragic drama, Hegel’s favorite is the Antigone of Sophocles.  For Hegel, 
Antigone is the individualized expression of the “spiritual power of family piety”47. Her 
opponent Creon is the independent expression of another pathos that emerges from the legal 
constitution of the state.  Sophocles’ play for Hegel shows that the tragic flaw of both is their 
blindness to the opposing pathos.  Their hostility towards each other is a result of their adherence 
to one, albeit justified pathos.  The movement of the drama shows, Hegel says that the two 
opposing obligations are complementary and necessary for the enrichment of the ethical order.  
The conflict itself was necessary, I think, in order to fully revive for the human community of 
Athens, the two central spiritual powers.  However the two need to work together for the 
flourishing of the ethical life of the community.   
 
What keeps tragedy in place, according to Hegel, is the total seriousness of the characters about 
the pathos or obligation that they embody, which is what lies at the root of the conflict. This is 
the way in which conflicts unfold in history.  In comedy, at the opposite of tragedy, there is a 
self-dissolving seriousness about pathos which prevents the outbreak of deadly conflict.  Not 
only are Tragedy and Comedy are two opposing modes of dramatic poetry but also reflections of 
two radically distinct ways in which obligations are understood and adopted.  I think that our 
discussion has prepared us to delve into Hegel’s definition of tragedy as it appears in the 
Aesthetics.   
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It should be evident by now that the tragic, whether in history or in dramatic poetry brings forth 
what Hegel calls “absolute truth”.  The term has a transcendental-metaphysical ring to it but I 
think that what Hegel means by this is the eternal ethical order which forms the vital basis of all 
of the substantive obligations, aims and actions that individuals harbor. The other aspect of tragic 
action is of course human consciousness or subjectivity.  The obligations are carried through into 
action by fully self-conscious and self-determined individuals. Hegel has the following to say 
about tragic action: 
 
“The true content of the tragic action is provided, so far as concerns the aims adopted by the 
tragic characters, by the range of the substantive and independently justified powers that 
influence the human will: family love between husband and wife, parents and children, brothers 
and sisters; political life also, the patriotism of the citizens, the will of the ruler; and religion 
existent, not as a piety that renounces action and not as a Divine judgment in man’s heart about 
the good or evil of his actions, but on the contrary, as an active grasp and furtherance of actual 
interests and circumstances.”48      
 
For Hegel, the Divine is rooted in human consciousness.  It is the ethical order in its totality.  
This order consists of spiritual powers some of which Hegel has already enumerated.  What 
makes tragic action tragic is that all of these powers are equally justified.  When Hegel speaks of 
justification, it is quite clear that his focus is not on good and evil. The substantive nature of an 
aim is precisely its justification.  It is an obligation that is deeply felt in ethical life; it is not 
imposed from without as in the case of religious commands.  Hegel wants to capture the vitality 
of conflict and I take him as saying that all forces in conflict emerge from within those who are 
acting. Even religious beliefs are evoked by circumstances and they must coincide with pathos.  
Ultimately, a vital force that originates from within the ethical order is actualized in the subjects 
which are its instruments.  This force aims at subduing or canceling out another force that has 
equal justification.  
 
In speaking about “genuinely tragic characters”49 Hegel says that their entire being is determined 
by the one aim that drives them. Their character is not an ensemble of differing qualities; instead 
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they are solid like “works of sculpture”50. They have strong individuality which demands that 
they self-consciously adapt and follow one substantive aim from out of the ethical order. The 
aim gets fully actualized in the being of the tragic characters.  
 
In terms of Aesthetic subject matter, Hegel, when speaking about tragic characters and the 
obligations that form the ethical order, is referring to the world and poetry of the Greeks. I think, 
however, that these elaborations can yield powerful insights about massive political tragedies 
that unfold in front of us every day.  Before going further, I would like to express my 
understanding of Hegel’s view of the justification of the various aims.  This justification emerges 
not from external benchmarks but inheres precisely in the very substantive nature of the aims 
themselves.   
 
If we look briefly at Iraq from this perspective, we can see several conflicting aims and 
obligations.  The Americans are driven by the cause of liberty and the furtherance of national 
interests.  Among Iraqis there are many who clash with the American troops.  Some of these 
insurgents are driven by nationalism which is a substantive interest.  Then there are others whose 
fight against the American army on the basis of values deriving from religion.  These values are 
fully actualized in their action through which they are furthering their own interests.   
 
The most intense tragic conflict occurs however amongst the people of Iraq. In Hegelian terms, 
there is a free self-consciousness among the people whereby they have independently adopted 
aims which have little to do with the broad national life.  I think that Shia and Sunni Islam can be 
seen as two substantive sources of spiritual power within the ethical order that is Iraq.  Leaders 
belonging to the two sects have totally adopted those aspects of the teachings of their sect that 
are most in conflict with the other side.  This adoption of ideology is totally passionate and one-
sided to the extent that the individuals driven by it are blind to the substantive nature of aims 
adopted by the other side.  We can see how leaders of the two sects are ordering the destruction 
of people from the other sect.  This slaughter of the innocent is a tragic situation in Hegel’s terms 
because both parties draw not only upon the same ethical order but also the same religion from 
within the ethical order.  All religions teach tolerance and respect but we can see that in a tragic 
conflict what is most at stake for the actors is the furtherance of the interest of the specific 
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community to which they belong; they are in no mood to observe or recognize any objectively 
framed and external notion of duty.  They have become their obligation, Shia obligation or Sunni 
obligation and these obligations were evoked by specific events in history.  Moving back to 
Hegel: 
 
“The proper theme of the original type of tragedy is the Divine; not, however, the Divine as the 
object of religious consciousness as such but as it enters the world and individual action. Yet in 
this actual appearance it does not lose its substantive character, nor does it see itself there as 
inverted into the opposite of itself.  In this form the spiritual substance of will and 
accomplishment is the concrete ethical order…Everything that forces its way into the objective 
and real world is subject to the principle of particularization, consequently the ethical powers, 
just like the agents, are differentiated in their domain and their individual appearance.  Now if, as 
dramatic poetry requires, these thus differentiated powers are summoned into appearance as 
active and are actualized as the specific aim of a human ‘pathos’ which passes over into action, 
then their harmony is cancelled and they come on the scene in opposition to one another in 
reciprocal independence.  In that event a single action will under certain circumstances realize an 
aim or a character which is one-sidedly isolated in its complete determinacy, and therefore, in 
the circumstances presupposed, will necessarily rouse against it the opposed ‘pathos’ and so lead 
to inevitable conflicts.  The original essence of tragedy consists then in the fact that within such a 
conflict, each of the opposed sides, if taken by itself, has justification; while each can establish 
the true and positive content of its own aim and character only by denying and infringing the 
equally justified power of the other.  The consequence is that in its moral life, and because of it, 
each is nevertheless involved in guilt.”51
 
In this passage from the Aesthetics, Hegel aims at giving an expansive definition and 
explanation of tragic conflict.  I have already elaborated upon many of the ideas that are being 
discussed here but some further reflection upon central notions is needed.  I would like to begin 
with Hegel’s notion of tragic guilt which corresponds directly with the notion of tragic fate 
which we discussed earlier.  I think that in the Aesthetics Hegel has secularized the notion of 
tragic fate, almost completely freeing it from overarching metaphysical and religious systems 
and rooting it in lived human experience.  The tragic characters become the embodiment of a 
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specific, well-justified ethical pathos.  In being this pathos, the tragic hero lives his ethical life.  
However, it is precisely in living this ethical life that he infringes upon another tragic hero who 
is the embodiment of an opposing pathos.  The tragic fate of the hero is that through one and the 
same action, he fulfills a deeply felt obligation but also infringes upon the execution of another 
equally justified obligation.  The tragic hero or actor in carrying out his action fulfills one aspect 
of the ethical order but that same action leads him towards creating a division within the ethical 
order.  This guilt is tragic because it is incurred by carrying out an action that is fully justified.  
The hero’s guilt emerges from his fate which in turn is created by the action that is has carried 
out willingly and knowingly.  The judgment of guilt is not based upon abstract notion of 
morality, law, good and evil.  It stems rather from the accomplishment of an action which was 
necessary for the revivals of a specific aspect of the ethical order.  More importantly, it is 
necessary that the execution of the action would result in the infringement or violation of those 
who are vital instruments of other aims.  So the tragic guilt or suffering or fear is not in front of a 
power that is external to the hero.  It emerges rather from the ethical order which is a 
determinant not only of the freely chosen and legitimate act but also of the resulting collision.  
The tragic individual as embodiment of one power of the ethical order bears full responsibility 
and guilt in front of the totality.   
 
By speaking in terms of the Divine and its particularization, Hegel undoubtedly brings in a 
metaphysical context but I think that this metaphysics is experiential.  What I mean by this is that 
the pathos of the individuals is not rooted in a transcendental sphere; rather, it is founded upon 
their concrete history and the actions that they and their ancestors have carried out.  Hegel makes 
it clear that this Divine is not the Divine of religious consciousness.  Tragedy deals with concrete 
human action and the consciousness at work here lies outside the ambit of religious 
consciousness.  In the Natural Law essay, the tragic conflict is linked essentially with the Divine 
but here in the Aesthetics the Divine is surrounded by concrete, contingent circumstances.  The 
Divine, as we have discussed before is the ethical order and it is precisely the ethical that 
undergoes division during tragic conflict.  However, the manner of division instead of being 
based on Substance metaphysics is determined by the concrete, specific circumstances in which 
the ethical finds itself.  The ethical universal is expressed only through human action, in concrete 
particularization. As a particular substantive element of the ethical order it provides the 
motivation for action and is actualized in the accomplishment of the action.  Once again, it is 
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very important to note that this ethical order as a universal is the totality of substantive, strongly 
justified obligations.  In the realm of Ideas, there is a difference that prevails amongst these 
obligations, as constituents of the ethical order; however, this ethical order is not confined purely 
to Ideality, it appears only in the real world whose nature is such that the obligations come on the 
scene in opposition to one another.   
 
Tragic conflict then presents us with irresolvable contradictions and guilt which occurs precisely 
on the basis of actions that are fully justified.  I think that Hegel’s schema gives some insight 
about irresolvable political conflicts in the world around us.  For Hegel, the full truth of the 
ethical order can, however be revealed not through conflict alone but also through the necessary 
reconciliation.  The reconciliation that Hegel speaks of in the Aesthetics does not emerge of 
necessity out of his metaphysical system but well grounded in human experience and as tragic as 
the conflict itself.  Reconciliation, for Hegel is a state where the individuals with conflicting 
obligations learn to engage with each other in harmony.  This reconciliation, as is evident from 
our discussion of tragic action, does call for the sacrifice of what Hegel calls “the one-sided 
particular”52.  I understand this as the individual who fails to recognize the validity of the 
opposing claims and continues to act in a way which makes it impossible for harmony to be 
achieved. The one-sidedness or blindness towards harmony needs to be annulled in order for 
harmony (or truth) to shine through and this is the deeply tragic aspect of reconciliation.  It 
results from the sacrifice of a one-sided individual who embodies a spiritual power which is a 
necessary element of the harmonious ethical order that eventually comes into view. 
 
Reconciliation is that part of the unfolding tragic conflict which has more affinity with the 
resolution of the conflict in comparison to the conflict itself.  For Hegel, reconciliation calls for 
the adoption of a tragic outlook on conflict.  This outlook calls for recognition of and reflection 
upon all of the conflicting aims and is yet critical of what Hegel calls the “false one-sidedness” 
of these aims.  The powerful tragic figures that embody a substantive obligation would 
eventually either be destroyed because of their one-sidedness or they would need to resign 
themselves into accepting what they had with full force rejected.  So the tragic reconciliation is 
an outlook, a state of mind that raises the state of conflict above guilt and suffering.  I think that 
the way in which Hegel speaks about reconciliation in the Aesthetics shows that this 
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reconciliation emerges affectively from the way in which the action unfolds. The conflict itself is 
irreconcilable.  Its resolution occurs either with the destruction of those who continue to remain 
one-sided or it would occur when the parties in the conflict become conscious of their one-
sidedness and resignedly accept the validity of the position of the other side.  In other words, the 
conflict destroys everything except the justified obligation itself.  In a tragic conflict, it is 
difficult to reach reconciliation among the individuals in collision, however, the value that they 
embody – assuming they are justified – come alive in the fabric of the community.   
 
It is crucial to note that unlike the Natural Law essay where reconciliation occurs due to the 
necessity inherent in the metaphysical system, reconciliation in Aesthetics is a sense or affect 
that emerges from the unfolding of the violent tragic conflict.  I would say that reconciliation is 
not necessary in metaphysical terms.  When a tragic conflict unfolds, it brings to our view what 
Hegel calls “eternal justice”53.  I understand this justice as being what is true and in accordance 
with reason.  This sense of justice refuses to see the irreconcilable conflicts as being permanent 
and demands their resolution.  The ethical obligations that the individuals put into action have 
both a positive and a negative side.  The positive side of these obligations is that they fulfill 
through action one specific constituent of the ethical order.  The negative side is that they can 
commit the tragic individual to a position whereby he wants to struggle against and eliminate 
those who hold opposing obligations.  The sense of justice calls for the adoption of an all 
encompassing outlook that gives all parties of the conflict their due.  The positive side of all aims 
has to be affirmed while the negative side needs to be annulled because the tragic conflict cannot 
be a permanent condition according to the demands of reason and justice. 
 
 The Israel Palestine conflict is a tragedy that has been unfolding for the past sixty years.  In 
Hegelian terms, it is the conflict between two obligations – Palestinian nationalism and Islamic 
ideology on the one hand and Israeli nationalism and Judaic (Zionist) ideology on the other.  
Both parties in the conflict are driven by aims that emerge not from an abstract morality but from 
an ethical order.  These aims come from deeply felt obligations that have been evoked by 
specific historical circumstances.  Individual leaders and many people on both sides have 
become the embodiment of their actions. They suffer due to their actions because these actions 
have created the world in which they live and thus their tragic fate.  Both sides, in my view, are 
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equally guilty because of their false one sidedness.  The Palestinians have perhaps suffered more 
because of lack of military and economic power but nevertheless Israelis have also gone through 
major wars and live in fear of terrorist attacks.  Through their actions both fulfill obligations 
towards their community but they continue to remain blind to the obligations felt by the other 
side.  The tragic conflict as it unfolds affectively brings to the surface a sense and need for 
reconciliation.  Justice demands that the unity of the ethical ordered be restored.  The idea of 
disharmony lasting forever goes against the sense of reason and justice. The reconciliation is not 
going to emerge of necessity as a result of some metaphysical principle.  It is rather a sense or 
outlook that emerges from contemplation upon the situation of irreconcilable opposition and it 
demands that both sides give up the negative side of their obligation.  If not, one or most likely 
both parties of the conflict would get destroyed.  The best possible resolution would demand the 
emergence on both sides of leaders who embody the obligations towards the interest of their 
respective community and yet have an all encompassing tragic outlook that recognizes the value 
of these opposing obligations for the creation of harmony. 
 
The ethical pathos that drives the action of the protagonist at the center of a tragic conflict is 
supplied by the ethical order. A specific pathos is one aspect of the ethical order as it undergoes 
schism in our finite world of particularization.  The tragic conflict is therefore between 
individuals who are passionate embodiments of individual, opposing aspects of the ethical order.  
Now, as we have seen, Hegel’s definition of tragedy from Aesthetics is very expansive and 
ostensibly indeterminate and it caters to tragic conflicts emerging from various different aspects 
of the ethical order. However, there is a particular set of opposing aspects of the ethical order 
which Hegel considers to be the most important.  This is the conflict between what Hegel calls 
“the law of the land” and “family love”54.  At another point in the Aesthetics he refers to it as the 
collision between “the state, i.e. ethical life in its spiritual universality, and the family, i.e. 
natural ethical life”55. In the Antigone of Sophocles the two main protagonists, Antigone and 
Creon become embodiments of these two spheres of the ethical order.  Hegel says about 
Antigone that it is “the most magnificent and satisfying work of art of this kind.”56 I think that 
for Hegel, this “chief conflict” more or less illustrates the “essence” of all profoundly tragic 
collision. For Hegel, law and love are - “the clearest powers that are presented in tragedy, 
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because the full reality of ethical existence consists in harmony between what an agent has 
actually to do in one and what he has to do in the other.”57
 
What then is the concrete and specific significance of this subject that is “valid for every epoch” 
and “despite all national differences, continues to excite out lively human and artistic 
sympathy”58?  Speaking first in the context of our entire discussion in this chapter, we can see 
that from the Natural Law essay to the Aesthetics Hegel is moving towards a progressively 
broader notion of tragic conflict. In the Natural Law and Spirit of Christianity texts, tragedy is 
purely the dialectic of an ethical life that suffers ruptures within itself through the formation of 
fate and is reconciled with this fate through love.  The realm of law, in those earlier texts is an 
arena defined by the rigid oppositions between universal and particular, subject and object and 
therefore excludes the possibility of dialectical relations and thus the tragic.  In his Aesthetics, 
Hegel argues not only for Antigone’s ethical pathos which consists of absolute loyalty to 
unwritten laws deriving from ties of kinship but also for Creon’s ethical pathos which rises out a 
deep sense of loyalty to the written laws that govern public life and the welfare of the state.  Just 
as there is no confusion in the character of Antigone as she as subject becomes the embodiment 
of the law of family loyalty, Creon also without vacillation becomes the essential embodiment of 
a deeply felt obligation towards the law of the land.  In fulfilling, through action their respective 
ethical obligations both Antigone and Creon simultaneously and necessarily satisfy and 
transgress the ethical order.  In the writings preceding the Aesthetics, the world of the law of the 
land was not even considered a part of the ethical life, however, now, the tragic conflict consists 
precisely of the dialectic between law and love which are both elements of the substantive 
ethical order.  
 
Having spoken about the conflict between love and law within the context of Hegel’s philosophy 
of the tragic it is important now to see how it plays a role in the harmony or discord of political 
life.  As we have seen, Hegel refers to the state (or law) as the ‘ethical life in its concrete 
universality’.  ‘Law’ means the laws of the state or the contents of the constitution which are to 
be universally followed and upheld by all citizens living in the state.  I think that it is important 
to emphasize again that in the Aesthetics, Hegel conceives the law as a power that is an integral 
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part of the ethical life.  This means that laws have a presence that is vital.  The law is not an 
inscription that exists in separation from the individuals.  It is rather an ethical pathos, a deeply 
felt obligation.  Hegel refers to love as ‘natural ethical life’.  I take natural to literally mean blood 
ties. Hegel calls love family love.  I take Hegel as speaking here about deep rooted ties or 
relations that take the form of familial love or familial loyalty.  In my mind, Hegel’s notion of 
family love applies to a great extent literally to kinship ties but then it must also go beyond just 
that.  I understand Hegel as speaking about a familial form of love.  This means that I have to 
love with a deep sense of loyalty all those with whom I am linked, even outside the circle of my 
immediate family.  This loyalty is also a vital part of ethical life and it has to be nourished.  
 
I will speak now in terms of society and culture and on the basis of personal history.  I have 
witnessed the dialectic between law and love in two different societies, my motherland Pakistan 
and modern American society59. In the United States there are many people who literally hold 
the constitution and the bodies that interpret it (Supreme Court) as sacred.  The Army of the 
United States promises to fight in defense of the constitution.  Americans in general and at the 
widest possible level live in agreement with the law of the land because this law ultimately 
upholds individual freedom and liberty.  However, my experience has taught me that ‘natural 
ethical life’ in the United States is in a state of decline.  The weakness of this one element of the 
ethical life puts the whole at risk of disease.  I have met very few young people who come from 
families that are intact.  Ties of kinship have become shallow and weak.  Family, even when it is 
there is devoid of blood.  Friendship and love are for the most part very artificial and synthetic. 
The coming together and falling apart of people is often seen as purely accidental.  Adherence to 
the law of the land and only to that has also made America a very legalistic, formal society.  
Exchange between individuals, even of love, is more like a legalized business exchange.  In short 
there is a disharmony between love and law in the United States and the dominance of the latter 
is leading towards social decay.  There is, nevertheless no doubt in my mind that individual 
freedom is a goal that every society needs to attain and this is a goal that the United States as a 
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society has achieved.  The tragic sacrifice of a deep sense of loyalty among family and friends is 
perhaps a fair price to be paid for the sake of individual freedom.    
 
 If I think of Pakistan in terms of the conflict between the law of love and the law of the land, I 
see the former as being in ascendancy over the latter.  The constitution of Pakistan reflects very 
little in the national life of the people.  It perhaps still retains some of its vitality but it is a 
document that has been amended by successive rulers not for the national interest but for 
propagating their own rule.  In Pakistan, many of the people, both rich and poor are always in 
search of ways and means through which they can evade the law.  There are vast portions of the 
country where the writ of law does not even run; the law of state is not even universal.  
Moreover, if an individual is rich and well-connected, he can get away even with heinous crimes 
like rape and murder.  The law of the state as a crucial aspect of ethical life has been in decline 
since the inception of Pakistan.  The opposing sphere of love however is still quite strong and 
that is what keeps ethical life alive in Pakistan, albeit in a state of discord and disharmony.  I 
think that the ‘natural ethical life’ in Pakistan is so strong that there is often very little sense of 
individual freedom.  The substantive obligations that bind you to your family are often times the 
only substantive powers which give meaning to your life.  People may well not respect the law 
but they would take daring action in circumstances that place family honor or integrity at stake.  
There are numerous instances of individuals coming into conflict with the law of the land by 
taking actions for the good of the family.  It is also not very unusual to observe that close 
relationships of friendship and love that fall outside the ambit of the immediate family are seen 
as being inscribed in blood. In short, familial loyalty runs deep.  The society, however, remains 
in deep discord.  Pakistan is a land of great injustice. The law of love cannot on its own preserve 
the fabric of ethical existence.   
 
 49
CHAPTER III 
TRAGEDY OF CULTURE OR OBJECTIFICATION AND ALIENATION IN 
DIALECTIC 
 
I would like to begin this chapter by putting a softer touch on the topic at hand, which is 
objectification and alienation in dialectic or the tragedy of culture. I assert that my focus is upon 
the tragic side of culture which reveals itself in certain specific contexts or historical 
circumstances.  My point here is that culture is not necessarily tragic and moreover, there can be 
many different types even within the category – “tragedy of culture”.  I am not adhering to any 
broad based metaphysical presuppositions about the definition of culture or the teleological aims 
of culture. In my mind, culture is an inclusive phenomenon at many different levels. On the one 
hand it incorporates everyday life, mannerisms and folk traditions. On the other hand, it also 
includes, what in my mind are projects – economy, religion, technology, art, law, the list is 
immense and diverse. It is inclusive and not exclusive also in the sense that it carries the negative 
and the positive, the sick and the healthy within its fold. It incorporates within itself that which is 
drawn with hard, clear lines and that which is vague, nebulous and as yet unresolved. Culture 
opens up possibilities of human freedom and yet, in my mind, all forms of culture contain a strict 
normative element.  I do not think that a tragic dialectic is a necessary or essential aspect of 
culture. We can and do have tragedies of culture but this does not mean that culture is in any way 
inherently or essentially tragic.  I think also that we need to be careful about bringing any 
metaphysical assumptions to bear upon the exploration of the relation between persons and 
culture.  This relation is in a constant state of evolution and to say that culture has this or that 
specific meaning for an individual or a society is deeply problematic. Moreover, since culture is 
an inclusive phenomenon, it is problematic to offer a particular logic or dialectic according to 
which the evolution of culture or the relation between people and culture occurs. When engaging 
in cultural critique, I feel that it is better to avoid adherence to ideological thinking which seeks 
to completely overturn the existing cultural order.  In theorizing about culture, it is important to 
separate that which calls out for critique from that which deserves affirmation. I think that in 
conducting philosophical inquiry into the realm of culture (or any other realm for that matter); 
one has to maintain a pragmatic and ameliorative sensibility.   
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Having begun this discussion with an appeal or claim to open-mindedness, I hope now to be 
consistent with this as I delve deeper into the matter.  A process in which the forces of culture-as 
embodied in institutions, technology, ideology – cause the irreversible loss of things that are of 
great valve is, in my mind, the tragedy of culture.  The idea of the tragedy of culture has to be 
kept distinct from ideas of cultural decline or from the clash of cultures although all of these do 
overlap in concrete human history.  I start with an assumption which, from all the evidence that I 
have, is a sound one - every major historically grounded cultural force contains within itself a 
promise or “Good” which are meaningful only when understood with reference to and in relation 
with individuals or society. If a cultural force manifests itself in such a way that it breaks its 
promise (alienating persons) and causes irreversible harm then we can say that a cultural tragedy 
is unfolding.  According to Heidegger, the movement of western philosophy after Plato is a 
cultural tragedy in this sense.  The original promise of western philosophy was to open up the 
question of Being.  After Plato, this original purpose became rigidified and objectified into an 
essence that deviated from the path that it was supposed to take.  Thus philosophy, in having 
turned away from the question of Being, is alienated from itself and moreover, it has closed the 
possibility for the individual to encounter Being.  Philosophy as a cultural activity and institution 
adheres to and has invested all of its expectations in an objectified essence which over the course 
of time has moved far away from the call of Being. 
 
The notion of broken promises is the contextual net around which this chapter is being 
constructed.  Behind every cultural institution, there is some original promise; furthermore, 
during my discussion of Nietzsche later on in the chapter, I will establish that the general 
purpose of culture as species activity is to produce individuals who can make and fulfill 
promises.  In a tragedy of culture, institutional certitude comes into conflict with the passion of 
the individual. In this tragedy, the original promise is reversed and objectified.  These themes 
will be fleshed out by appealing to and creating an ideational conversation between 
Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet, King Lear and Dostoevsky’s parable of the grand inquisitor.    
              
Towards the end of the previous chapter, I broached upon the topic of law in the context of the 
Hegelian conflict between law and family.  If we think about law as a cultural force or more 
precisely an autonomous cultural institution, then its inherent promise or the good that it should 
produce is, I think, quite evident.  In the absence of the rule of law, only power prevails.  Law, as 
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a cultural force or institution promises accountability and the negation or minimization of 
reliance upon sheer power as the only way of attaining justice.  Now, if in a particular social or 
historical context and location, law serves power instead of keeping it accountable that is, it 
punishes the weak and protects the powerful then a promise has been broken.  When law starts to 
produce harm, the tragedy linked with this particular cultural institution is already underway.  
And this tragedy becomes concrete for those who live by the law, respect the institution and 
when faced with injustice they appeal to the institution, they are crushed even more by power.  
So when law breaks its fundamental promise, the expectations invested into it collapse.  The 
cultural value of an existing institution of law resides solely in its capacity to deliver on its 
promise of providing justice in every situation, all else counts only towards objective value60.  
There are societies in which the institution of law is autonomous, economically self-sufficient 
and labyrinthine in terms of hierarchies and procedures. Despite this, the system cannot provide 
justice to those who abide by it.  In such circumstances, the impressive structure of the institution 
adds only to the objective value and serves to intensify the common, law abiding persons’ 
alienation from the legal system.  To have genuine cultural valve, the institution of law needs to 
actively and consistently fulfill its basic promise. A high objective but low cultural value means 
that the soul of the legal institution, so to speak, has become rigidified and objectified. In the 
latter case, those running the system of law are adhering only to objectifications of laws (and not 
their spirit) that have no currency when it comes to delivering justice in concrete situations.   In 
this tragedy, not only are the appellants alienated from the justice system but the system itself 
has become alienated from the aims which it was originally expected to fulfill. 
 
Within the space of the above mentioned discussion in chapter II, I also considered the notion of 
family or the world of love, as Hegel calls it. If we carry the notion of family as a strong cultural 
institution into Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet61, I think that the tragedy of culture emerges as 
perhaps the strongest theme of the play.  The drama is set in a milieu in which family is the 
strongest cultural force or institution, at least much more so than the law.  I think that the 
promise that family as a cultural institution makes is that it will in every way nurture all persons 
                                                 
60 My use of the concepts, objective value, cultural value, autonomy and differentiation is inspired by my 
reading of Georg Simmel.  Reference: Simmel, Georg. The Concept and Tragedy of Culture from Simmel 
on Culture edited by David Frisby and Mike Featherstone (U.K: Nottingham Trent University, 1997), pp. 
55-74.  
61 William Shakespeare, Romeo & Juliet, edited by Roma Gill, (Oxford England, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2005). 
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within its fold and enforce harmony and unification among them so as to ensure the prosperity of 
the unit as a whole.  The Capulets and the Montagues are two families at the center of the tragic 
conflict and they do seem to fulfill the promise that I have just outlined.  However, it is also the 
case that through the course of history, the intense familial loyalty has led to a violent 
competition among the two families.  This ongoing feud has resulted in the objectification of the 
meaning of membership in either one of the two families.  So, since Juliet is born a Capulet, she 
must hate or have animosity towards all Montagues.  And since Romeo is born a Montague, he 
must consider absolutely all Capulets as enemies.  Thus, when Romeo and Juliet fall in love with 
each other, their passion comes into conflict with the rigidified objectified meaning of what it 
means to be a Capulet or a Montague.  The heads of the two households care deeply for their 
own; however, the care for one’s own has become causally aligned with hatred towards the 
other.   When seen through the myopic lenses of their respective families, Romeo and Juliet are 
necessarily enemies.  Hence, when they come together as lovers, the institution as a whole turns 
against this love.  The Montague and Capulet families adhere to a rigid, objectified formulation 
of what it means to be a Montage or a Capulet. This obsession is the tragic flaw at the level of 
institution. Romeo and Juliet manifest the tragic flaw simply in the intensity and passion of their 
love which goes against the expectations of their families.  The family, in acting so as to fulfill 
the fundamental promise, breaks the promise precisely by insisting upon a rigidly outlined 
course of action. As the tragedy unfolds, the two families and Romeo and Juliet become 
alienated from each other even as they remain intractably bound to each other.  The mode of 
destruction ends in the death of Romeo and Juliet and of their love, a thing of the highest value.  
The overall dialectical structure of this process should by now be quite evident.  The institution 
of the family moved to protect its own but ended up causing their demise.  In the eyes of the 
family, Romeo and Juliet are of necessity enemies but in their deepest inner selves, they are 
lovers.  A radical split occurs within a single unit -the family- as Romeo and Juliet embody aims 
that are in opposition to what the culture demands.  The two opposing families are reconciled 
after the death of Romeo and Juliet but that event does not redeem that which was destroyed by 
the institution. 
 
In order to thicken this discussion on the tragedy of culture and to bring forth with fuller clarity 
the dialectic and tragic flaw that relates to it, I have decided to delve into The Grand Inquisitor, a 
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parable presented in Dostoevsky’s Brothers Karamazov62.  I will establish during my analysis 
that based on my understanding of the theme under consideration, the legend of the grand 
inquisitor can be read as a tragedy of culture.  The cultural force or institution that is under 
consideration here is Christianity.  That there is no single tragic hero who gets destroyed in 
Dostoevsky’s parable is a point that can be brought up to show that this is not a tragedy.  My 
point here is that for a specific dialectical process to qualify as tragedy, it must entail the 
irreversible destruction of something of great value precisely by what should have preserved it.  
Dostoevsky’s parable is set up right in the midst of a process in which the fundamental values of 
Christianity are being destroyed by the institution of the faith. 
 
I think that in his work, Dostoevsky is deeply interested in certain fundamental traits that 
characterize the origin of the Christian faith as a cultural force.  These traits, for Dostoevsky, are 
embodied in the figure of Jesus Christ.  I think that for Dostoevsky, Jesus is a complete 
embodiment of two virtues – freedom from material needs and the capacity to love all around 
him unconditionally.  These two virtues make Jesus a saint and ultimately a martyr.  It is 
precisely the saintliness which comes into conflict with the world and leads to the destruction of 
the saint.  In my mind, the theme of saintliness gains most prominence in Dostoevsky’s novel 
“the Idiot”63.  That novel revolves around Prince Myshkin who, after enduring a traumatic event, 
has decided to give unconditional love to all whom he comes in touch with.  Myshkin is a Christ 
like figure who is devoid of the power of miracles and who is also free from some of the 
sharpness and bitterness demonstrated by the Jesus of the gospels.  In creating such a figure – a 
genuinely simple and good soul - Dostoevsky is testing the limits placed on one who practices 
the dual virtues of freedom and unconditional love.  In my mind, Myshkin is basically a secular 
saint because he seldom refers to his faith and does not purport to carry out his deeds in the name 
of God.  Myshkin is genuinely free for there is no transcendental basis or ground for his actions.  
In the maddening finale of that novel, Dostoevsky details the destruction of Myshkin precisely 
on account of his virtues.  The destruction that ensues in the denouement of that novel comes 
upon not just Myshkin but also those whom he loves the most and here too it seems that 
Dostoevsky gives a causal link between the saint’s consistently loving way and the tragedy it 
brings.  
                                                 
62 Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Grand Inquisitor from The Brothers Karamazov, translated by David McDuff 
(London; New York: Penguin Books, 2003), pp. 322 – 345. 
63 Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Idiot, translated by David McDuff (London; New York: Penguin Books, 2004)  
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As I have stated before, tragedies of culture are not simply occurring at all times and across all 
contexts but rather in specific circumstances.  And this is also where the social and historical 
significance of a cultural tragedy comes to the fore.  Now, Dostoevsky’s parable of the grand 
inquisitor is set within the context of the Spanish Inquisition.  Is there any doubt that the period 
of the Inquisition is one of the darkest chapters in the history of western civilization with specific 
reference to the historical development of Christianity as a cultural force?  During the 
Inquisition, we see the manifestation of a complete reversal of freedom and love, the two virtues 
that – at least in Dostoevsky’s thought - lie at the origin of the faith.  In the Spanish Inquisition, 
Muslims, Jews and other Christians who fell under the broad label of “heretics” were given a 
choice between conversion to Roman Catholicism or death and exile.          
 
The dialectic weaves its way through the parable in many different ways.  In Dostoevsky’s 
depiction of the atmosphere of the Inquisition, we see how the cultural project has moved in 
unexpected directions so that its original promise is violated from within.  The main 
confrontation is between two figures within the same institution.  On the one hand is Christ, as 
the embodiment of the original promise.  On the other hand is the Inquisitor, who becomes the 
embodiment of the violation of precisely that promise.  It is interesting to note that in this 
parable, Dostoevsky makes Christ appear not as an ordinary man like Myshkin in the Idiot but 
with the miracle healing and of raising the dead back to life.  The focus, however, is not upon the 
myth of the miracle but upon the power and limits of concrete and possibly secular saintly values 
of freedom and love.  In the confrontation between the two figures, we can also observe the 
absolute silence of Jesus in opposition to the verbosity of the Inquisitor.  It seems as if the words 
of the inquisitor are preemptively destroying anything that Christ may say in response.  
However, the silence of Christ is not a disinterested one for on his part he adheres passionately to 
the original promise of the culture.  It seems to me that by not reacting angrily to all the 
provocations from the Inquisitor, Jesus manifests one particular saintly virtue – to live so that 
there is no causal reaction from within the self to all the cruelty and suffering coming from 
without.  This is in opposition to how the Inquisitor has lived his life.  After viewing all the 
depravity and cruelty in the world, the Inquisitor does indeed develop a causal reaction within 
his self and foregoes one of the most fundamental values of the cultural force.  If, as in 
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Nietzsche’s schema, the meaning of culture is “training and selection”64, then I think that in 
Dostoevsky’s view, the basic question underlying saintly freedom is as follows -   How do I 
discipline myself so that there no longer remains a causal link between the resentful feelings of 
fear, anger, revulsion and the circumstances which surround me? I think that this is freedom 
from aesthetic point of view – to discipline oneself to not react resentfully to outside 
circumstances.  To live so that one reacts without resentment and self-pity to circumstances 
which would call out these emotions in most people, is to live with freedom.  This idealized form 
of freedom reaches completion when one loves everyone unconditionally without any need for 
reciprocation.  This love cannot be possible without freedom from the need to react resentfully to 
objective circumstances.  So, in terms of character, the Inquisitor heads the institution of 
Christianity with a fanatical devotion and yet, he has completely turned against the saintliness 
demonstrated by the person who is the symbolic origin of the cultural force.  The opposing, 
contradictory figures of the Christ and the Inquisitor arise from within the same cultural force 
and this gives tragic acuteness to Dostoevsky’s parable.  Throughout his provocative speech, the 
Inquisitor seeks an angry response from the other side but at the end, the Jesus figure “suddenly 
draws near to the old man without saying anything and quietly kisses him on his bloodless, 
ninety-year-old lips. That is his only response”65.  This response shows that the Jesus figure 
adheres to his original position. And in saying; “Go and do not come back…do not come back at 
all…ever…ever!”66, the Inquisitor shows that he would stand by the new, objectified meaning of 
the mission of Christianity.  As Ivan adds later on, “the kiss burns within his heart, but the old 
man remains with his former idea”67.  In this parable if Jesus is the embodiment of the original 
character traits and even more significantly, the original promise of the cultural force the 
Inquisitor is the embodiment of all that has resulted in the violation of the promise.  One crucial 
point is that the Jesus figure appearing in the midst of the inquisition only breaks into reality for 
an instant and vanishes forever while the grand inquisitor appears as a concrete historical fact.  
The Jesus figure appears only as a reminder of the original promise and the inquisitor represents 
the concrete fact that the promise has been irreversibly lost in history. 
                                                 
64 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche & Philosophy, translated by Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1983).  
65 Dostoevsky, Brothers Karamazov, p. 342 
66 Ibid., p. 342 
67 Ibid. 
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I think that the theme central to any tragedy of culture is the broken promise. Dostoevsky makes 
this very explicit in this parable. In my view, the theme appears in the text in several distinct 
ways.  The first appearance of this theme is in continuity with the notion of “Deus Absconditus” 
which attains existential gravity in Dostoevsky’s work.  In my view, a religious sensibility is 
important to think this thought and to take it seriously.  The basic idea is that there is a divine 
spirit or God and this spirit has turned away from the world.  This turning away is the violation 
of a promise that was made with the people in the world.  For if there is a divine spirit then that 
spirit must consistently pervade through the world and take care of the people.  I think that for 
Dostoevsky, the figure of Jesus is the embodiment of the divine spirit and its promise of specific 
benevolence.  The breaking of the “vow”68 to return is an idea that Dostoevsky’s brings forth 
with almost obsessive clarity.  In the parable of the grand inquisitor, the return is in itself a 
tragedy.  This is because the return does not heal the wound.  Rather, this coming back serves 
only to intensify the wound for it brings into painful prominence that which has been lost for 
ever.  Dostoevsky places the return in the specific context of the Spanish Inquisition.  
Understood dialectically, the luminosity of the spirit serves only to accentuate the darkness of 
the world which at that specific moment encroaches upon the institution set up in the name of 
that very spirit.  We must remember, however, that the specific institution in question here is the 
Roman Catholic Church and not the Russian Orthodox Church which still holds promise for 
Dostoevsky.  I think that the tragic feeling in Dostoevsky’s parable emerges due to the author’s 
personal, intellectual commitment to the fathers of the Russian Orthodox Church (Zossima in 
Brothers Karamazov) whom he sets in contrast to the figure of the Cardinal.  In my view 
Dostoevsky holds on to this commitment even when plagued by feverish doubt and anxiety 
about the future course that the Russian Church would take:  
 
“Oh, this is not, of course, that coming in which He will appear, according to his promise, at the 
end of days in the clouds of heaven with power and great glory and which will take place 
suddenly…No, He has conceived the desire to visit his children at least for an instant and 
precisely in those places where the bonfires of the heretics had begun to cackle.”69                
 
                                                 
68 Ibid., p. 323 
69 Ibid., p. 324 
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Thinking further along religious lines, it seems as if the world is never ready for the fulfillment 
of the divine promise.  When Jesus, as the first embodiment of the divine, comes into the world 
he is martyred.  In this second appearance in Dostoevsky’s parable, Jesus returns at a time when 
the expectation and yearning for this event are at their greatest.  And yet, it seems as if there is an 
opposition between the divine and the world that calls desperately for it.  The Jesus figure 
appears and he is turned away.  A long period of yearning for and expecting the spirit ends with 
a brief return and immediate expulsion of this spirit.  The hope is for the return of a divine spirit 
that does not belong in the world.  This religious thought becomes the precursor of what in my 
view is ultimately a secular notion of culture.  My point is that Christianity as a cultural force 
makes a promise with regard to ameliorating the conditions of the world.  The parable shows the 
reversal of the original meaning and the transformation of the cultural force into an autonomous 
institution that is rigidly objectified and alienating.   
 
It is important to extract the dialectic from the most concrete elements of plot and dialogue.  The 
Jesus figure as the original face of the culture appears in the midst of an actual historical tragedy.  
This is a Spain where the new face of the church, the “Cardinal Grand Inquisitor” orders the 
burning of hundreds of heretics on a daily basis and in the midst of widespread disease, death 
and poverty.  I need to point out here that the full force of the parable embodies the tragic in 
simultaneity with the ironic which Szondi refers to as a “counter concept” of tragedy70.  The 
tragic, however, cannot be subsumed under the ironic. Even as the Jesus figure appears on the 
scene and practices the miracle of healing or bringing the dead back to life, the focus remains on 
the theme of the promise of culture and its violation.  While rendering the parable, Ivan says: 
“He has appeared quietly, unostentatiously, and yet – strange, this – everyone recognizes Him.  
That could have been one of the best bits in my poem – I mean the question of why it is that 
everyone recognizes him.”  The original promise has been broken over the course of history but 
the memory remains.  This memory no longer refers to the original meaning of the ideal which 
has been lost over the course of time.  In being drawn towards the Jesus figure, the people are in 
fact attracted by the traces of a path that was mapped out according to the ideal.  Since the exact 
meaning of the path is lost, the path itself has become inaccessible.  The return of the Jesus 
figure serves only as a reminder of what has been lost but this return does not lead towards its 
                                                 
70  Peter Szondi, An Essay on the Tragic, translated by Paul Fleming (Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press 2002)   
 
 58
retrieval.  The brief return is a flame that illuminates the course that events were expected to 
follow but did not. 
 
I think that Dostoevsky’s detailed depiction of the initial stages of the confrontation between the 
inquisitor and the Jesus figure opens up a dialectic which carries through to the end of the 
parable.   As the people huddle around the Christ figure, the inquisitor appears. Dostoevsky lays 
emphasis upon subtle aspects of the inquisitor’s appearance and attire.  For instance, he points 
towards the “monkish cassock” that the inquisitor wears during the encounter as opposed to the 
“resplendent Cardinal’s attire” that he wore while presiding over the burning of the heretics.  The 
two different aspects of the same figure show objective differentiation within the institution.  
The inquisitor orders his guards to arrest the Jesus figure. The people who until then where 
yearning to get close to the Jesus figure, simply fall in line en masse and bow down to the 
inquisitor.  This shows the strength of the institution.  The Jesus figure represents the original 
promise of a culture and the inquisitor is the face of the institution erected in the name of 
precisely that promise.  Through history the institution has gained power and autonomy as it has 
moved further and further away from the original meaning of the cultural force.  The people are 
alienated from the culture but under the sway of its objective power.  Not a single person in the 
frame resists as the Jesus figure is led away to prison.   
 
“The Guard conduct the Captive to a narrow and murky vaulted prison in the ancient building of 
the Ecclesiastical Court and lock Him up in it.  The day goes by, and the dark, passionate and 
“unbreathing” night begins…In the midst of the deep murk the prison’s iron door is suddenly 
opened and the old Grand Inquisitor himself slowly enters the prison with a lamp in his hand.  
He is alone; the door instantly locks again behind him…” 
 
I think that the central elements of my understanding of the meaning of tragedy of culture are 
etched out in this simple picture.  The Christ figure is locked up by the Cardinal in a cell inside a 
building of the legal arm of the church.  This represents an alienation of culture from within.  
The iron door of the prison separates the origin of the cultural force from the objectified form 
that it has now taken.  That the entrapment and alienation occur within one cultural institution 
adds to the strength of the dialectical structure.  The sheer scale of the building is a metaphor for 
the highly objectified form that the culture has assumed.  The Cardinal enters the cell as an 
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interrogator, closing the door behind him.  Within the suffocating confines of the cell, the 
original promise is set up against everything that has resulted in its violation.  The narrow space 
further intensifies the unity within which unfolds the dialectical opposition of two radically 
different aspects of the same cultural force.  The autonomous institution has become so powerful 
that it can entrap, reject and expel the very ideal on which it is based. 
 
In the following passage I would like to reflect upon one aspect of the autonomy of cultural 
systems or institutions.  I take it as a universal, but nevertheless quite mysterious fact that at any 
given point in our lives, we are under the sway of one autonomous cultural system or the other. 
Even nomads fall under the sway of some sort of tribal cultural system. The system makes 
demands upon us in terms of specific commitment and the expenditure of spiritual and physical 
energies.  In return the system provides us with what I would call nourishment and it enables us 
to prosper or at a minimum sustain our lives.  This is the basic rule of reciprocation that all 
cultural systems are based on.  A system maintains strict scrutiny of all the persons who come 
under its power.  If you display weakness in that you do no fulfill the demands that the system is 
making upon you then you are deprived of nourishment and eventually expelled.  This mode of 
punishment inflicted by the system is not necessarily unfair.  In my mind, a system is fair 
(broadly speaking) as long as there is balanced reciprocation.  This means that as long as persons 
continue to give what the system demands from them they actualize sources of growth within the 
system otherwise they are punished, expelled or destroyed depending on how they have failed 
with reference to the basic rule of the system.  The system manifests its power through the 
individuals working at different levels of hierarchy.  All of these individuals, however, are mere 
faces because the system in itself is autonomous.  If punishment or reward comes upon a person 
from another person or group of persons more powerful than him, it is simply the system 
expressing its power and not the individuals.  It is clear to me that this aspect of the autonomy of 
a system contains within itself the seeds or the potential for a tragedy of culture.  A situation can 
unfold whereby the system breaks its own fundamental rule or promise of reciprocation.  This 
means that the system makes excessive demands upon persons and gives little or nothing in 
return.  The tragic is intensified in this context with an increase in the demands that the system 
makes upon the people who come under its power and decrease in what it gives back.  As the 
demands of the system increase so does the element of exclusion and punishment because more 
and more fail to give what the system needs.  In Dostoevsky’s parable the Cardinal appears as 
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the expression of the power of the Roman Catholic Church which, during the Inquisition, is a 
system that has broken the fundamental rule of reciprocation.  It is the single most powerful 
institution in 16th century Spain and it encroaches upon the very soul of all those who come 
under its sway, taking away more than just economic goods.  The system seeks to literally absorb 
all sense of individuality and any content of consciousness that does not fall in line with a 
particular, objectified meaning of Christianity.  After taking away all of this, it gives nothing 
more than bare basic sustenance to those who do not occupy the avenues of power.  
 
The idea of the tragedy of culture as presented in Dostoevsky’s parable runs much deeper than 
what has been stated in the above passage.  Returning again to the narrow confines of the prison 
cell where the Cardinal launches a speech against and into the silence of the Jesus figure, I would 
like to reflect upon the implications of the following lines: 
 
“You have no right to add to anything to what was said by you in former times.”71
 
“You gave your promise, you sealed it with your word, you gave us the right to bind and loose, 
and so of course you cannot even dream of taking that right away from us now.  So, why have 
you come to get in our way?”72
 
“I shall find you guilty and burn you at the stake as the most wicked of heretics, and those same 
people who today kissed your feet will tomorrow at one wave of my hand rush to rake up the 
embers on your bonfire.”73
 
In the context of the parable, the silence of the Jesus figure - as the embodiment of the original 
promise – is not fatalistic.  The original promise is still valid even though it has been distorted 
and its meaning is lost to the people.  However, the current form of the institution is so powerful 
and it has deviated from the original to such an extent that even the concrete embodiment of the 
original is helpless in reversing the damage that has occurred over the course of history.  The 
original promise has been distorted and objectified to such a great degree that it would no longer 
be possible to rejuvenate and reconnect it with the past.  According to the new meaning of the 
                                                 
71 Ibid., p. 326 
72 Ibid., p. 328 
73 Ibid., p. 326 
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institution, the Jesus figure himself is in violation of laws against heresy because adherence to 
the original has now become a sin.  The original ideal is now so completely unacceptable that 
Christ himself, from whose name the institution derives its power, deserves to be burned at the 
stake.  Moreover, the people are required to participate in the burning of their most revered 
figure because they are clueless as to the original meaning and inescapably entrenched in a 
system that demands precisely this kind of obedience.  The Cardinal renders the new meaning of 
the term “bind and loose” as uttered by the biblical Jesus.  This term now refers solely to the 
power and autonomy of the system and not towards the promise of perpetuating freedom, 
compassion and integrity.   
 
This may already have come across through what I have written thus far but I would like to 
reassert my original position which is that I want to investigate the relation between dialectic and 
tragedy as it appears in literature and in life.  Now, the image of a silent embodiment of the 
original promise in opposition to the rigidified and objectified form of the promise has powerful 
reverberation towards understanding cultural tragedy in the context of the history of Pakistan.  I 
think that in this context we need to think about Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the man who is the face 
of the original promise on which the country was founded in 1947.  Jinnah is often depicted as a 
modernist figure in the same vein as Mustafa Kemal Atatürk which in my view is only partially 
true.  Jinnah and his close companions, the founders of Pakistan so to speak, had a modernist 
vision not rooted simply in Pakistani nationalism but also in the religion of Islam.  Jinnah wanted 
to do for Pakistan and Islam what Atatürk did for Turkey.   Atatürk did not think that Islam as a 
cultural force could ever develop any modernist response to history.  Jinnah, on the other hand, 
affirmed the cultural value of Islam and believed that the religion could be reinterpreted, 
modernized and given due recognition in history.  It is crucial to note that in Jinnah’s vision, 
Pakistan was to be a “fresh” country where law, education and politics were to be recognized as 
genuinely modern cultural forces and the promise associated with each of these would be 
fulfilled through the institutions erected in their name.  Jinnah himself was a jurist of some 
genius and an astute politician well familiar with the function of government in advanced 
democracies like Britain and the United States. Moreover, his view of Islam was centered on 
freedom and open mindedness.  He placed emphasis upon the need for developing modernist 
responses to history while remaining within Islam and not brushing aside its core values.  Those 
who are familiar with the history of Pakistan would recognize that the way in which the country 
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has unraveled over the past sixty years or so is not just ironic or comic but genuinely tragic and 
inexplicable.  A portrait of Jinnah is a mandatory feature of buildings that house the various 
cultural institutions whether they are legal, political or educational.  Every one of these 
institutions is built upon the dead and buried bones of the original promise. Nevertheless, they 
purport to function in the name of the original promise and the figure of Jinnah.  Jinnah himself 
has become objectified and his ideals locked away, inaccessible and forgotten.  Attempts are 
made every now then through books, articles or films to revisit the original meaning of the 
dream of Pakistan.  However, as long as these attempts do not encroach upon and challenge the 
powers that be, they are applauded and soon covered over because most people have forgotten or 
repressed the very meaning of the original promise.  In the previous chapter, I spoke briefly 
about the status of the legal system in Pakistan.  My point here is that due to the utter and 
complete of violation of the promise of all cultural institutions (with the exception of family) in 
Pakistan, a void has been created which is now being filled with a new and emerging form of 
Islam.  This is a cultural force that has completely detached itself from modernity and is purely 
reactionary and nihilistic.  This is another reversal of the promise of Jinnah who wanted Pakistan 
to be a model of a modern, Islamic country.  This new cultural force asserts that Pakistan was 
created by Jinnah in the name of Islam and nothing more.  I think that the cultural tragedy of 
Pakistan will only intensify now that this new form of Islam will take revenge upon the existing 
institutions for their complete failure.  This new force would also strive to destroy the cultural 
heritage of Pakistan and the lives of many people who do not fall in line with its movement.  
Jinnah as a cultural symbol stands alienated from and powerless against all of this. 
 
I think that in Dostoevsky’s parable he tests the notion of whether the Inquisitor himself can be 
seen as a tragic figure and evidence for this can be obtained through the following line, “Would 
not one such man be enough to produce a tragedy?”74 My focus thus far has been on the actual 
elements of the dialectic in a tragedy of culture.  However, we need also to discuss the traits that 
keep this tragedy in place, that is, the tragic flaw. We can obtain a clear clue to this if we 
examine the gist of the Cardinal’s argument with reference to the three temptations of the 
biblical Christ.  In Dostoevsky’s thought, the central tenet of the life and teachings of Christ is 
consciousness of freedom and the unbounded love and compassion that flows from it.  The 
Cardinal’s rejection of each of the three temptations is based upon his dispute with precisely this 
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original notion of freedom. Now, the Cardinal presents an argument the conclusion of which is 
that Christ should have accepted all three temptations instead of rejecting them. The Cardinal’s 
radical reversal of a motif as central as the temptations is not simply driven by cynicism; it is 
driven rather by a love for what he calls the mass of humanity.  Paradoxically, implicit in the 
Cardinal’s position is a deep sense of reverence far the doctrine of freedom.  The Cardinal points 
towards his past life when he himself lived like a monk, saying “I too blessed the freedom with 
which you have blessed human beings”75.  The split that has occurred within the culture is also a 
schism that has divided the very soul of the Cardinal, with one part alienated from the other. The 
Cardinal’s turn away from the doctrine of freedom is based upon the observation of an 
existentially obvious fact: people in general escape from freedom because they are not strong 
enough to bear the responsibility and loneliness that comes with an affirmation of freedom.  It is 
this premise on which is based the Cardinal’s assertion; “Had you accepted that third council of 
the mighty Spirit, you would have supplied everything that man seeks in the world, that is: 
someone to bow down before, someone to entrust one’s conscience to, and a way of at last 
uniting everyone into an undisputed, general and consensual ant-heap.”76 It should be noted that 
the Cardinal, like the biblical Jesus has a deep concern and love for humanity.  The Cardinal has, 
however developed a resentful reaction to the original ideal of freedom after an empirical 
observation of human nature as manifested through history. The Cardinal who in the past was 
devoted to freedom is now devoted to everything that cancels this freedom thus siding with 
Satan now instead of the Jesus and saying “We are not with you, but with him, there is our 
secret!”77 The Cardinal is also driven by a love for humanity but the expression of this love is the 
exact dialectical opposite of the original.  The Cardinal thinks that it is not through freedom but 
through oppression that historical progress can be made towards his conception of ‘utopia’; “I 
returned and adhered to the crowd of those who have corrected your great deed.”78 I read 
Dostoevsky as saying that both the inquisitor and the Christ would agree upon one teleological 
goal – human happiness.  However, the understanding of what this happiness entails and the 
process to be followed in reaching there are radically different.  The trait or tragic flaw that 
keeps a tragedy of culture in place is precisely this adherence to a path or developmental process 
and a teleological end even though the original meanings of both the process and the end have 
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been long lost.  In order to further thicken the inquiry but while still holding on to this line of 
thought, I would like to delve into Nietzsche’s view of the purposes of culture and extract some 
insight into tragedy of culture as I understand it.  I will be relying upon the direction that 
Deleuze takes in his interpretation of Nietzsche79. The affinity between Dostoevsky’s parable 
and Nietzsche’s theory of culture should also become evident as we go along.   
 
While remaining true to Nietzsche’s genealogical philosophy – which challenges all types of 
traditional metaphysics and transcendental critique - Deleuze sketches out three perspectives on 
culture.  The first perspective is prehistoric, the second post-historic and the third is historic.  
Even before going into any of these points of view in any detail, we can intuit, based on our 
discussion thus far that the possibility for explaining a tragedy of culture would truly come up 
when culture is considered from historic point of view or in its historical movements.  
Nietzsche’s genealogical schema consists of character types and their relation to the will to 
power80.  The term “character type” may mislead us into thinking that Nietzsche’s philosophy 
has a purely psychological significance which is not true because type refers simply to the kind 
of force that dominate an event, situation or a person.  This is a new kind of empiricism.  In 
Nietzsche’s typology there are two character types – Active and Reactive or Master and Slave.  
The master affirms the will to power and in this character type the active forces prevail over the 
reactive forces or the reactive forces have been made active.  In the slave type there is a negation 
of the will to power and the reactive forces triumph over active forces or the reactive forces are 
never transformed into active forces.  Each of the two main types or categories has sub-
categories which correspond to specific mechanisms, principles and products.  In Nietzsche’s 
schema culture is a sub-category of the master or active type.  According to Nietzsche, the 
primary purpose or promise of any culture is to select and transform reactive forces into active 
forces.  More specifically, culture is a “generic activity by which reactive forces are trained and 
tamed”81.  The reactive type has three sub-categories, Ressentiment, Bad Conscience and the 
Ascetic Ideal.   In Nietzsche’s thought, culture provides a therapy for ressentiment and bad 
conscience which are spiritual sicknesses that pervade through human history.  The original 
promise of the activity of culture is to cure and transform these illnesses. The teleological end of 
this activity is the production of the self-legislating, free and sovereign individual.  In history, 
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however the reactive forces triumph over active forces and it is here that an insight into the 
tragedy of culture can be obtained through Nietzsche’s philosophy.  It is commonly said that 
time is a great healer; however in this context of tragedy of culture, time seems to create and 
intensify wounds for it is over the course of time (meaning history) that the reversal of the 
original promise occurs. 
 
To reiterate, in Nietzsche’s philosophy, the purpose of culture is the selection and training of all 
that is base, weak and lowly in human nature (reactive forces).  The term training is quite 
literally understood as enforcement of traditions, customs, habits and obedience by the 
employment of a mechanism of violence.  Nietzsche, like Karl Marx, is deeply interested in 
species activity, that is, human beings’ “generic”82 activity before any kind of social, racial or 
religious organization.  This is also in accordance with Nietzsche’s genealogical philosophy.  
The specific demands of the mechanism of violence are radically different in prehistory and 
history.  In my mind Nietzsche (like Marx) is a thinker who is opposed to the established order.  
Hence, in Nietzsche’s philosophy, that which needs to be obeyed after social organization is 
always “historical, arbitrary, grotesque, stupid and limited; this usually represents the worst 
reactive forces”.  This aspect of Nietzsche’s thinking reflects a kind of necessitarianism that I am 
wary of because I do think that there are elements of the established order that deserve to be 
affirmed.  However, I do agree with Nietzsche’s further point on this matter.  The demand for 
obedience or observance of the law is common to both history and pre-history.  A human person 
is always subject to the structure of the law.  From the perspective of species activity, the human 
person is presented with a model to follow.  And the purpose of this model is simply to select 
and train that which is reactive.  From the point of view of species activity, habits are enforced 
by culture so as transform all types of reactive forces into active forces.  For our purposes and 
also for Nietzsche himself, the most important consequence of the training of culture as species 
activity is to produce a man who can make and deliver upon promises.  So the original ideal of 
culture, in Nietzsche’s schema, is to produce a consciousness that can keep promises.  The 
importance of culture in terms of the relations between persons is the inculcation of the habit of 
making and keeping premises.  This is a simple but very powerful thought for ultimately, in a 
tragedy of culture; one person has broken a promise with another person or group of persons. In 
the parable of the grand inquisitor, he has broken a promise that the culture of Christianity had 
                                                 
82 Ibid., p. 133 
 
 66
made with the people. The inquisitor does remember the promise but the remembrance of a 
promise has meaning only with reference to future fulfillment and not the past. The fulfillment of 
a promise occurs only in the future and not in the past. 
 
What lies at the origin of all cultures is a generic activity that enforces consciousness so that 
promises can be made and kept.  In general, that is, going above and beyond organizational 
differentiation, the normativity of culture is centered upon a mechanism which trains persons to 
make promises and adhere to them.  Culture as generic activity always defines a path that needs 
to be followed and the deviation from the path constitutes distortion or violation of a promise.  I 
think that it is important to think about this point from within Nietzsche’s typology with specific 
reference to the place of consciousness in his schema. In this schema consciousness is a sub-
category of the active type or master83.  There is no possibility of consciousness in the reactive 
type or slave.  It seems to me that in Nietzsche coming to consciousness in the first instance 
constitutes forgetfulness.  The faculty of forgetting is the “regulative principle”84 of 
consciousness.  As I have asserted before, the quality of the will to power in the master type is 
affirmative.  Nietzsche is against all types of dialectic which excludes things on the basis of and 
for the fulfillment of overarching metaphysical presuppositions.  He is also against all 
metaphysical presuppositions which subsume things under arbitrary, transcendental categories.  
Total affirmation places a burden upon consciousness.  The affirmation of life which is 
characterized by ambiguity and to not seek for principles of ultimate intelligibility opens up the 
possibility of unresolved, irreconcilable and burdensome memories.  I think that in Nietzsche’s 
thought, to come to consciousness is to come to terms with the wounds of the past so that they do 
not fester and thereby throttle activity.  This is also where the chief difference between the active 
and reactive type comes into play for the latter only magnifies and holds on to the festering 
wounds of the past, letting them throttle all activity and dictate life and thought. 
 
Coming to consciousness with an affirmative will to power is to learn to deal spontaneously with 
all of the negativity and darkness with which life strikes us.  As life becomes more intense and 
active, the negativity also increases.  According to my understanding of Nietzsche, to come to 
consciousness is to react to the world in a certain way.  In Nietzsche’s philosophy, the world is 
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formed out of nothing other than forces and these forces are qualitatively different from each 
other.  So in terms of the forces or events in life that demand reaction, the master type draws a 
distinction between what deserves a reaction and what deserves to be repressed.  To have 
consciousness is to be able to make this selection.  Consciousness reacts only to that which 
excites it, makes it move forward, and projects it towards the future.  Even the most painful of 
events have something that can be reconstituted as part of future growth and development.  
Anything that stays behind as a trace and resists assimilation in a dynamic movement needs to be 
successfully repressed.  Consciousness is really devoid of content because it only consists of 
excitations which are fleeting, transitory and disappear once their energies have been utilized so 
as to move consciousness itself to a higher level.  All traces - which I understand as past events 
or components of events which may linger on in the reactive type - are functionally repressed by 
consciousness.  Functional repression is an ongoing activity of the will and its aim is to keep 
under the surface all which may disturb dynamic movement.   The trace, like everything else in 
Nietzsche’s schema, is a force but one that creates ressentiment and bad conscience.  The only 
force that consciousness keeps, so to speak, is excitation which denotes all that is fleeting and 
energetic.  The faculty of forgetting is the “regulative principle of consciousness” and its 
ultimate aim is to produce, what Nietzsche calls the noble man85. 
 
As I have discussed before, the purpose of cultural activity at a generic, prehistoric level or 
universal level is to open up the possibility of making and fulfilling promises. Both culture and 
consciousness are sub-categories of the master type, they both have an affirmative will to power 
and one aim – to let active forces dominate over reactive forces.  However, their originating 
principles and mechanisms are radically opposed to each other.  If consciousness is based upon 
the regulative principle or force of forgetting then culture is based upon the teleological principle 
or force of memory for without memory promises are meaningless.  If consciousness is 
characterized by fleeting, transitory excitations and it rejects all memory then how can this 
consciousness be made to keep and fulfill promises?  That forgetting and memory are two 
opposing forces creates an apparent conflict within the heart of the master type.  Culture 
overcomes this challenge through violence.  Prior to culture consciousness consists only of 
fleeting sensibility. It is only after culture that the faculty of promise is added to consciousness 
through great violence and sacrifice.  The main point here is that the making and fulfilling of 
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promises and commitments lies at the very foundation of any cultural force or activity and 
Nietzsche employs his genealogical philosophy to establish this.   
 
As I understand it, the central aim of the activity of culture is the production of persons (as 
embodiments of the institution) who are reliable, that is, they can willingly remember the 
promises that they make and strive actively for their fulfillment.  Promises are meaningless in the 
absence of memory.  Nietzsche draws a qualitative distinction between two kinds of memory.  
The first kind of memory is associated with ressentiment.  It consists first of all of sense 
impressions (traces)86 which remain lodged in the past and which the slave type can never 
overcome.  It consists also of words that were given as parts of promises made in the past.  These 
are words linked with promises that remained unfulfilled and they too remain lodged in the 
memory as sense impressions that the slave type cannot move beyond.  The memory of 
ressentiment is linked with sensibility.  These are vague impressions that are never forgotten and 
they only fester and grow with time.  The memory enforced by culture is that of the future, not 
the past.  Cultural memory can be developed only after all reactive forces have been overcome.  
This is a memory that looks into the future with a strong sense of causality.  The memory of 
culture is linked with the will, not the sensibility87.  This is a memory of words that have been 
stated with a full consciousness of the necessity of that which is being promised.  This is 
memory in which the original word is linked causally with a future event that must transpire.  
This memory is not that of a trace or an impression that the slave type has failed to overcome 
and is now passive in the face its decay.  The memory of words consists of a desire to hold on to 
a future event that would fulfill the promise contained in the words88.  A promise can be made 
only with an insight into the future course of events.  It has to be made on the basis of necessity 
and not chance.  A promise can be made only by someone who is fully active.  I think that 
Nietzsche has given us the genealogy of the very act of making promises.  A promise is a sacred, 
willed activity that can be given only by one who looks into the future and not by one who is 
lodged in the past.  The genealogy of the enforcement of the habit of promise making displays 
also the violence practiced by culture for this purpose. 
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In Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals, we find passionate and detailed descriptions of the violent 
means used by culture as species activity for the enforcement of the faculty of memory and 
promise making.  One way to understand this is to say that culture will not shy away from any 
kind of violence to bolster consciousness of the active type.  Another way to respond to this 
would be to say that Nietzsche is serious about philosophy and yet he is not an argumentative 
philosopher but a genealogist so in accordance with his method he presents the violent interplay 
of forces in history.  The most important point in this respect is that immense and real sacrifices 
have been given in history for the sake of the strengthening of the faculty of making and keeping 
promises.  So when a cultural institution breaks promises, the persons responsible are laying 
waste to thousands of years of painful training. 
 
“If we place ourselves at the end of this tremendous process, where the tree at last brings forth 
fruit, where society and the morality of custom at last reveal what the have simply been given the 
means to: then we discover that the ripest fruit is the sovereign individual, like only to himself, 
liberated again from morality and custom, autonomous and supramoral (for “autonomous” and 
moral are mutually exclusive), in short, the man who has his own independent, protracted will 
and the right to make promises.”89   
 
The production of persons who can make promises to others lies at the very heart of the activity 
of culture.  The tragedy of culture is the loss of this faculty of making and fulfilling promise. I 
interpret Shakespeare’s King Lear as a tragedy of culture.  More specifically, I think that King 
Lear can be read as a tragedy about the loss of the virtue of promise making within the context of 
the meaning of culture.  As we have seen in Nietzsche’s philosophy, the virtue of making, 
remembering and keeping promises is enforced into consciousness by culture in its generic, 
prehistoric activity.  In my view, the issue in King Lear is not about making a promise related to 
this or that cultural goal.  The matter is simply of giving one’s word, making a promise in 
general. 
 
“Meantime, we shall express our darker purpose.  Give me the map there.  Know that we have 
divided in three our kingdom; and it is our fast intent to shake all cares and business from our 
age, conferring them on younger strengths, while we unburdened crawl toward death.  Tell me, 
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my daughters (since now we will divest us both of rule, interest of territory, cares of state), 
which of you shall we say doth love us most.”90
 
These are Lear’s first words in the play and I think that in these lines the central dialectic of the 
tragedy is already set forth.  This dialectic centers first of all on the very meaning of promise.  In 
this tragedy, the making of promise collides with its violation.  There is a conflict between the 
objectified meaning of giving a word and its real meaning.  If this is seen as conflict between 
power and virtue then the chief virtue at stake here is the desire and capacity to make promises 
with respect to future realization.  The institutionalization or organization of cultural forces 
brings up the issue of power and authority.  This is because institutions confer power upon 
individuals who may be driven simply by motives that have nothing to do with the teleological 
principles that drive culture in its generic form.  
 
Lear makes his appearance on the scene in the midst of murmuring and speculation about the 
division of the “kingdom”.  These murmurings center upon, what I think are surface aspects of 
the kingdom, the literal drawing or redrawing of the geographical boundaries and who should or 
should not get what.  My point is that the “kingdom” that Lear speaks of is a quite general 
metaphor for cultural institution.  Lear is the head or driving force of a cultural institution.  And 
he has built this institution, unified it and enforced the law over a long period of time and 
through the use of brute force.  In Nietzschean terms, the general teleological end of cultural 
activity is the production of a sovereign individuals; legislators who can make and fulfill 
promises.  The principle of culture is the enforcement of a memory of words that mean 
something definite with reference to the future. I think that this is also deposited in Lear’s 
consciousness as a force from prehistory and this is how I make sense of the use of the term 
“darker purposes” and his demand for words.  The division of the kingdom could have been a 
simple matter but no, Lear demands verbal promises.  I see Lear as bequeathing a cultural 
institution upon “younger strengths” but before they inherit anything they need to show that they 
are reliable and can “stand security”91 for themselves.   
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As the first two daughters speak Cordelia reacts but such that no one hears anything.  To 
Goneril’s profuse expression - “Sir, I love you more than word can wield the matter, dearer than 
eye-sight, space and liberty…” Cordelia responds – “What shall Cordelia speak? Love, and be 
silent.”  In response to Regan’s words – “…that I profess myself an enemy to all other joys 
which the most precious square of sense possesses, and find I am alone felicitate in your dear 
highness’ love.”.  To this Cordelia says – “And yet not so; since I am sure my love is more 
ponderous than my tongue.”  Lear, however, trusts these words at face value and rewards his 
daughters and husbands with their respective shares of the kingdom, that is, the cultural 
institution.  The unfolding of the tragedy reveals that Lear has given power to those who are not 
responsible and reliable.92
 
Simply stated this is a conflict between saying what you actually feel and saying something just 
because you ought to say it.  I would approach the plot element described above on the basis of 
the distinction between objective and cultural value set out at the beginning of this chapter.  As 
the mode of destruction unfolds in the play, we see that Lear’s acceptance of the words reflects a 
confusion of objective and cultural meaning.  The acts of giving a word or of making a promise 
have genuine cultural value only if they are affectively connected with the soul.  Also, the words 
have genuine cultural value if they are coming from a free, sovereign, legislative individual.  If 
these two conditions are not met then the act of giving a word or making a promise is simply a 
meaningless objectified expression of the purpose of culture, which, once again, enforces 
consciousness with the principle of memory and promise.   The words that Lear accepts have 
only an objective, not cultural value.  These are empty promises made under the seduction of a 
power that would ultimately be devoid of virtue.  The words of the sisters are simply currency 
used in exchange for power.  Among the three daughters, only Cordelia is the embodiment of 
love and loyalty towards Lear.  She is the only one capable of making a promise that has cultural 
value.  In her reaction to the words of her sisters, we see a conflict between promises that are 
dead and those that are alive and willed.  Here also we already see the basis for what would 
develop into Cordelia’s total estrangement or alienation from Lear and by implication the 
cultural institution itself.  The root of Cordelia’s alienation lies in what she is in her innermost 
self – a fully reliable person who can make promises because she is the embodiment of love and 
loyalty.  Cordelia has become existentially incompatible with the institution.  The dialectic 
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comes into play here as Cordelia is expelled from the cultural institution precisely due to the fact 
that she fulfills the teleological end of culture – the production of a person who can make 
promises. 
         
Let us now move on to the actual tussle between Lear and Cordelia and reflect upon the reason 
for this fight between the old “dragon” and his daughter: 
Lear: …what can you say to draw a third more opulent than your sisters? Speak.   
Cordelia:  Nothing, my lord. 
Lear:  Nothing? 
Cordelia: Nothing. 
Lear: Nothing will come of nothing: speak again. 93
 
In my mind, Cordelia’s “Nothing” opens up a rift between the path that the culture was, so to 
speak, destined to take and the path that it has actually taken.  I think that what we need to focus 
on is the sheer arbitrariness of Lear’s demand for obedience.  Cordelia is the embodiment of 
obedience and yet Lear demands of her that she establish this through words.  As we have learnt 
from Nietzsche, the demand for obedience is a part of the mechanism of culture and its purpose 
is to produce individuals who are reliable and can make promises.  We also learn from Nietzsche 
that when culture appears in history in the form of institutions, the demand for obedience can 
become a demand for that which is “arbitrary, grotesque, stupid and limited”94.   The aim of this 
latter demand is to simply assimilate the individual within the institutional matrix.  The 
“Nothing” brings into view the gulf between cultural institution and the very soul of the 
individual.  In my mind, Lear occupies a dual role as a father and as a head of a cultural 
institution.  His anger at Cordelia stems from her refusal to obey the arbitrary demand of the 
institution.  As a father, he loves Cordelia much more than his other daughters and he also 
realizes that Cordelia too loves him immensely.  However, Lear is the very embodiment of the 
cultural institution and completely assimilated into it.  That is why it is impossible for him to 
discern the fact that Cordelia’s disobedience is towards Lear as the master of the institution and 
not towards Lear as father.  With Cordelia’s “Nothing”, the very soul of Lear is split into twp 
because his obligation towards the objectified institution comes into conflict with his obligation 
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as father.  It is the latter which prevails as Lear adheres to his demand for verbal promises that 
conform to the institution and not to himself as father.  His role as “dragon” encroaches upon his 
role as father which I think is the key to understanding what he says to Kent who challenges the 
decision against Cordelia: 
 
“Come not between the dragon and his wrath. I loved her most, and thought to set my rest on her 
kind nursery. Hence, and avoid my sight! So be my grave my peace, as here I give her father’s 
heart from her!”95
 
The reference to “dragon” shows that Lear is the personification of the monarchy as a cultural 
institution.  He is also the loving father of Cordelia.  The drama contains enough evidence that 
prior to this tragic moment, the relation between the two was based on mutual reciprocation.  
Later on also as the devastation unfolds and Lear awakens, he says “come, let’s away to prison; 
we two alone will sing like birds in the cage”96 At the beginning of the tragedy, however, when 
Lear still has all the power that comes with it, he disgraces his beloved daughter and banishes her 
into exile.  The role as dragon destroys Lear’s role as father.  It is thus that the institution moves 
against all of Lear’s emotions and feelings as a father.  When Lear relinquishes power he is no 
longer the dragon.  Lear exercised control over the institution as long as he was in power.  Once 
that is gone, we see that Lear as a human person was always fundamentally disconnected from 
that institution.  Now autonomous and beyond his reach, the dragon unleashes his wrath on Lear 
himself, destroying him and everything that he held dear.  Lear as an individual becomes the 
victim of the cultural force to which he gave his entire life.   
 
Lear’s devaluation of Cordelia in the first scene of the play is in itself reflective of ressentiment.  
The basic meaning of ressentiment is precisely this – the mental act of the devaluation of 
something which actually has a high value97.  Furthermore, when I examine the tragic process 
undergone by Cordelia, a chief aspect of her fate is that she is being penalized precisely because 
she embodies the great values of love and loyalty which are also what Lear demands.  Scheler’s 
definition of the tragic finds its validation in Cordelia’s punishment – “It is tragic in the most 
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pronounced sense…when one and the same power allows a thing to realize a high, positive value 
(of itself or of another thing) and, in the process of effectuating this, causes the destruction of 
just this thing as a value bearer”98.  When Lear regains consciousness and as everything around 
him unravels tragically, he says, “The art of our necessities is strange that can make vile things 
precious.”99  I think that careful attention to this line takes us into the very heart of this play in 
particular and the tragedy of culture in general.     
 
Different “necessities” are at play in this tragedy.  There is some specific promise that is inherent 
in every culture or cultural product.  An examination of the path that culture has followed in pre-
history would show that the opening up of the possibility of making promises to others and 
fulfilling them is at the very center of all cultural activity.  King Lear as a tragedy of culture 
centers not upon some specific promise but upon making promises in general in accordance with 
the prehistoric spirit of culture.  Lear as the head of a cultural institution now wants to bequeath 
his position to his daughters.  Driven by, what in my mind is prehistoric necessity, Lear makes a 
demand for promises.  The future leaders of culture must prove that they can give their word.  
Lear is obsessed with “vows”.  He takes the words of Goneril and Reagan to be reflective of 
actual and not simply empty promises.  In Lear’s mind, the fact that they have given him their 
word fulfills the perfectly valid purposes of culture.  The thing that matters most to Lear is the 
expression of loyalty through words.  Moreover, these words must be given in the context of the 
inheritance of the cultural institution (the state or kingdom). Cordelia is cultured in the sense that 
there is no chasm in her character between her commitments and what she is.  She is already a 
promise fulfilled but Lear cannot see this because his concern is with verbal promises and not 
with who is giving them. The tragic process reveals that for Goneril and Reagan the promises are 
simply objective requirements and they do not have to be made with full authenticity.  It seems 
as if these promises were given to fulfill a beauracratic necessity.  Once again, making a promise 
in general terms means that you embody the words that you speak and that you have a desire to 
fulfill them in the future.  In bureaucracy it is the word itself and not the person who is giving it 
that counts.  Goneril, Reagan and their husbands embody disloyalty and are driven by the 
necessities of the lust for power.  What is at stake here is culture but in its institutionalized form 
and with that issues of power encroach upon and displace the virtue of loyalty.  The motive for 
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power – “vile thing” displaces loyalty.  The objective meaning of promise displaces its real 
cultural meaning.  Words take precedence over the person who gives them. 
 
In my interpretation, Lear’s tragic flaw is his abiding faith in the value of a culture even after it 
has deviated from the path that it should have taken.  There is an obsessive intensity in Lear’s 
insistence upon vows.  He has a blind trust in the capacity of culture to produce individuals who 
can give their word.  I can think of no other explanations for the manner in which he transfers 
complete control of the institution to Reagan and Goneril simply on the basis of their word.  
Promises given in the context of the state have taken on a purely objective meaning and Lear 
abides by them as if they were real.  All of his expectations emerge from his trust in these 
promises even though the words are disconnected from the individuals who give them.  He 
exercises his own promise giving faculty as a cultural power one last time when he degrades and 
banishes Cordelia paying heed neither to his own heart nor to her pleas.  Even as the tragedy 
unfolds and the destruction becomes evident, Lear is filled with a mad wonder whenever a 
promise is broken.   
 
“When the mind is free, the body is delicate; this tempest in my mind doth from my senses take 
all feeling else what beats there – filial ingratitude.”100
 
“They are not men of their words: they told me I was everything; it is a lie.”101
 
In this I see a refusal to believe that the state as a cultural institution which he nurtured is now 
governed by those who do not know the meaning of loyalty. After Cordelia dies he says, “I 
might have saved her; now she has gone for ever!”102 It is apparent that the original promise has 
now completely disappeared but he still wonders, “Is this the promised end?”103
  
As I move towards the end of my discussion on King Lear, I need to assert that the most 
important scene in the context of the tragedy of culture is the one where Lear and Cordelia 
struggle with one another.  Cordelia’s “Nothing” carries a hypnotic resonance and hearkens back 
                                                 
100 Shakespeare, King Lear, Act 3, Scene 4, lines 11- 13 
101 Shakespeare, King Lear, Act 4, Scene 6, lines 102-103 
102 Shakespeare, King Lear, Act 5, Scene 3, lines 269 - 270  
103 Shakespeare, King Lear, Act 5, Scene 3, line 265 
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to the silence of the Christ figure in Dostoevsky’s parable.  And her dismissal by Lear reminds 
me of the finality with which the inquisitor rejects the Christ figure, “we shall never let you near 
us again”.  This, in my mind is once again the original promise of culture colliding with the 
objectified form that it has taken.  Now devoid of the original meaning, culture is alienated from 
the ideal and can only devalue and reject it.  Lear needs words because for him “nothing will 
come out of nothing”.  Only the words in a promise have any currency in the objectified culture.  
Cordelia’s has all the words to express her loyalty but she will give only “Nothing” and then 
silence to the demands of Lear as king.  Her silence to the demands of the institution is not 
passive, but violent.  There is exactitude, a precision to her silence resistance which is borne out 
by her lines, “Unhappy that I am, I cannot heave my heart into my mouth: I love your majesty 
according to my bond; no more nor less” and “Good my lord, you have begot me, bred me, loved 
me: I Return those duties back as are right fit, Obey you, love you, and most honor you.104 The 
following dialogue also deserves note: 
 
Lear: “So young, and so untender?” 
Cordelia: “So young, my lord, and true.”105  
   
We also need to take into account what Nietzsche has to say about the type of character that can 
make promises  - “Man himself must first of all have become calculable, regular, necessary, 
even in his own image of himself, if he is able to stand security for his own future, which is what 
one who promises does! This precisely is the long story of how responsibility originated.”106
 
The notion that culture as generic activity enforces the faculty of promise making is valid only in 
terms of interpersonal relations.  Cordelia and Lear have a strong relation, a “bond” between 
father and daughter.  Cordelia’s actions bear out that this “bond” is simply that and is not to be 
confused with the relation as seen in an institutional framework – princess and monarch.  A 
strong relation is built upon mutual reciprocation.  Feelings and emotions are reciprocated 
through action and being.  One feels indebted to the other for a demonstration of affection and 
wants to reciprocate.  Absence of reciprocation points towards a lack of the sense of 
responsibility.  To have a relation in this sense is to be in a perpetual state of fulfilling a promise 
                                                 
104 Shakespeare, King Lear, Act 1, Scene 1, lines 94 - 97 
105 Shakespeare, King Lear, Act 1, Scene 1, lines 105 - 106 
106 Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals,  Book 2, # 2 
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which is that the loyalty and devotion from the other would be repaid.  The character that can 
fulfill this promise of reciprocation is one in whom there is no gap between the feelings evoked 
and demanded by the relation and the actions of state of being required for the reciprocation of 
these feelings.  In such a person, the feeling of indebtedness for all past kindness is not simply a 
feeling; she is consistently being and acting in honor of the memory.  Culture opens up the very 
possibility of strong ties between people.  Forgetfulness and obsolescence go against the very 
logic of human relations.  Deep ties are based on mutual reciprocation and remembrance over the 
course of time without which the word ‘tie’ has no meaning. Moreover, a strong bond between 
two persons requires precision in that all emotions related to the bond and the feelings of 
indebtedness have to be fully actualized.  On the other hand, the nurturing of a bond also 
requires the ability to get over, to forget what is irresolvable instead of allowing it to linger and 
fester.  This is the manner in which Cordelia has constituted herself in her relation with her 
father and that is why I say that she is exact.  Her silence against all the objectivity that caves in 
on her in the first scene of the drama can also be understood in the light of what I have written 
above.  She is silent because her very being is the fulfillment of the promise to Lear and that is 
all because all words given in proof would be superfluous.  She is the very embodiment of love 
and loyalty and does not need to add a single word simply to fulfill the demands of the 
institution. She is already cultured according to the general spirit of this concept and rejects the 
objectified form of culture.  All of the elements required for the making of promises are already 
active in her so she does not need to obey the arbitrary law of the state; that would be 
superfluous.           
 
Returning now to Nietzsche, when culture is considered from the prehistoric and post-historic 
points of view it seems as if the potential of species activity has been mapped out on to it and 
that it is destined to fulfill this potential and produce the free, sovereign self-legislative 
individual who can make and fulfill promises.  The element of history diverts culture from its 
path by grafting on to the very structure of species activity all that is opposed to culture – 
ressentiment, bad conscience, ascetic ideals that come along with institution or simply 
“herds”107.  Nietzsche makes several points in his elaboration of how culture meets with and is 
displaced by its exact opposite in history the consequence of which is the “triumph of reactive 
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forces”108.  One can learn immensely from all that Nietzsche has to say on this matter but there is 
a specific issue which grips my attention the most.  It centers upon Nietzsche’s notion of self-
overcoming or simply self-destruction. This idea applies not simply to individuals but also to 
collectivities as can be seen in the following where Nietzsche refers to the institutions of Justice, 
State and Church:  
 
“It (Justice) ends, as does every good thing on earth by overcoming itself.”109
 
“But this counsel I give to kings and churches and all that is weak from age and virtue – do let 
yourselves be overthrown! That you may come to life again, and to you may come – virtue!”110
 
In both King Lear and the legend of the grand inquisitor, we observe a conflict between an 
ossified cultural institution and the original promise that it was supposed to fulfill. In this sense, 
an irreconcilable dialectical conflict occurs also between the instinct of self-preservation and the 
need for self-destruction.  In both Lear and the Inquisitor, we have two leaders of ossified 
institutions who have confused the original purpose and promise of culture with arbitrary laws 
and they expend all their energies in justifying these laws and by implication the institution 
which is now alienated from its origin.  In the passionate silence of the Christ figure and of 
Cordelia we can read a demand that the institutions must now self-destruct because the purpose 
of cultural activity is not the propagation of institutions that have turned against individuality and 
freedom.  The fulfillment of the original promise requires self-overcoming, however, the 
paradox is that institutions are driven by the instinct for self-preservation.  The conflict is 
irreconcilable.   
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CHAPTER IV 
 
SELF DECEPTION AS TRAGEDY OR ALIENATION IN DIALECTIC 
 
 
 
This chapter is different from the preceding two because it grapples with a form of tragic conflict 
that is located within the human soul but even here the implications of the tragedy can be 
understood fully only in terms of its concrete social and historical meaning.  There are however, 
important notions that carry over from the first two chapters.  The first of these is the 
irreconcilability of tragic conflict.  The element of irreconcilability did not perhaps come forth 
very stridently in the second chapter because approximately half of that chapter is based upon 
texts of Hegel that are built around a metaphysical system and systems tend to incorporate 
reconciliation.  The second chapter drew upon Simmel and the notion of irreconcilability 
appeared in a strident manner because Simmel is not driven by the desire to create or adhere to 
metaphysical systems. On the contrary, he is interested in examining the tragic for its own sake.  
In this chapter the site of the irreconcilable tragic conflict is the human soul as it results from 
self-deception and resentment which are types of spiritual blindness.  We can look at the 
difference between Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex and the Antigone to show how the second chapter is 
different from the fourth.  I spoke about Antigone in my first chapter.  In that play, the conflict is 
between two irreconcilable obligations or rational passions.  Antigone and Creon both make their 
positions very clear through their actions and dialogues.  There is blindness in the Antigone but 
that blindness is not towards what one is, wants or needs to do.  The blindness in Antigone 
emerges in the two main protagonists’ refusal to recognize each other’s perfectly justified 
positions.  Oedipus Rex on the other hand is a play that focuses on the blindness towards what 
lies within the soul.  The play is a progression through the darkness within towards the revelation 
of painful truths.  In this tragedy Oedipus does indeed act out of a sense of obligation towards 
family and state but he is blind towards the actual consequences of what he is doing and also 
towards what he is.    
 
Another notion that is carried forward from the first two chapters is that a tragic conflict is one 
that threatens to split apart a unity or oneness from within.  In the second chapter, tragic conflict 
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threatens the unity of ethical life, in the second it threatens the great process of culture which 
consists of the unification of subject and object.  In this chapter we will be looking at tragic 
conflicts that threaten to rupture the very unity of the psyche.  A very concrete notion that carries 
forward from the first two chapters – even though it was perhaps not made consistently explicit 
there - is that the various forms of tragic conflict are experienced as a failure of expectations.  In 
the second chapter we discovered as to how and why it is so difficult to fulfill any expectations 
regarding the reconciliation of deep seated social and political conflict.  In the second chapter we 
dealt with the broken promise of the cultural process.  Now in this chapter we will engage with 
the failure of our expectations regarding our capacity to successfully impose rational structures 
upon reality and more specifically, to attain self-knowledge.  
 
“The scene of the tragic conflict is man himself, in whom “ought” and “desire” diverge and 
threaten to burst the unity of the I.  The banal disparity of not desiring what one should or of 
desiring what one should not is, of course, not tragic.  On the contrary, what is tragic is the 
blindness in which one, deceived about the aim of his “ought,” must desire what he is not 
allowed to desire….the irreconcilable opposition divides what is one”111
 
The above text has been drawn from Peter Szondi’s summary of Goethe’s theory of the tragic.  A 
brief analysis of this text would help us place the notion self-deception within the context of the 
philosophy of the tragic.  The central tension here can be expressed in several different ways, 
one of which is as follows. The blindness that Goethe speaks of is one that results from lack of 
self-knowledge.  The absence of self-awareness keeps me in the dark, so to speak, with regards 
to the desires or drives that are pushing me to act in some direction.  Moreover, in acting, I have 
convinced myself that I am doing the right thing in accordance with a moral or social norm.  
This implies a tragic failure of authenticity because I believe that I am acting under a moral 
ought or norm while the real motives emerge from a strong desire that is in opposition to 
precisely these norms.  We can also understand this blindness as lack of consciousness with 
regards to the role that I ‘ought’ to play in a particular, problematic situation.  I approach a 
situation with moral norms and under a role that has little relevance for the prevailing situation.  
I am driven to rectify the situation but because of my blindness towards the ‘ought’ that I need to 
                                                 
111 Peter Szondi, An Essay on the tragic. Translated by Paul Fleming, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 
California 2002. p. 26.   
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follow, my actions bear negative consequences.  This scenario is poignantly tragic because the 
intentions behind the acts are good and yet they bear bad consequences because of blindness 
towards the appropriate roles and norms that need to be adopted so as to grapple with the 
situation.  In essence the desire to do good stands in opposition to the blindness towards reality 
and the actions undertaken end in failure.   
 
The notion of self-deception is usually not brought up in philosophical discussions of the tragic.  
A question that can be raised at this point would be – How exactly is self-deception a tragedy? I 
think that a rich and detailed response to this question can be obtained through an analysis of 
plot structure and some of the dialogues of Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex112.  In my view, among the 
classics of western literary and philosophical thought, Oedipus Rex is a work that is most 
prominently marked with the red line of self-deception.         
 
Let us create a landscape on which to build up an analysis of Sophocles’ tragedy from the 
perspective of self-deception.  There are three main (and inter-related) modes of self-deception 
that can be seen in the elements of Sophocles’ plot. The first of these is reflected in something 
that Oedipus says towards the beginning of the play while addressing the suffering people of 
Thebes – “Your several sorrows each have single scope and touch but one of you. My spirit 
groans for city and myself and you at once.”  I think that in his inner life, Oedipus’ feels the 
deepest sense of obligation towards the city state of Thebes.  He is interested in his own spiritual 
salvation but that salvation is always linked with the salvation of Thebes.  Also, Oedipus feels a 
deep sense of obligation towards his family and that is why he takes steps to avoid bringing 
destruction upon his family.  All of Oedipus’ actions are motivated by a desire for salvation. In 
reality, however, each of these supposedly salving actions brings ruin upon Oedipus himself and 
those towards whom he feels the greatest sense of obligation – his family and the city of Thebes.  
Oedipus genuinely wants to do good but his actions bear the opposite consequences.  It is only 
when he is completely destroyed and can no longer play a role in Thebes that there is redemption 
for the city and for Oedipus himself.  There is some truth in what Teiresias says to Oedipus – 
“You are the land’s pollution”113.  
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The second mode of self-deception that Sophocles brings forth centers on the question of human 
freedom and man’s relationship with the divine.  I think in the dramas of Sophocles, human 
consciousness or freedom is always constrained by context or situation.  Sophocles does not 
bring forth a notion of absolute freedom that is not bound by a concrete context but nevertheless 
there is freedom to reconstruct and understand reality.  In Sophocles’ play most characters 
escape from the recognition of this freedom.  There is a definite spiritual presence in the 
atmosphere and events of Oedipus Rex.  However, the destruction that unfolds over the course of 
the play is brought about by human not divine action.  I think that Sophocles’ notion of 
spirituality is one that is grounded in a sense of reverence towards concrete events and the need 
for harmony and order in the world.  Sophocles makes it clear that the Gods will never intervene 
directly in human affairs.  We as humans have to take responsibility for the situation in which we 
are enveloped and try to understand it using our limited capacities.  In this play Oedipus comes 
across as a figure who continues to call out for divine intervention – “I’ll do everything. God will 
decide whether we prosper or remain in sorrow”.  Not only Oedipus but Laios and also the 
people of Thebes rely not on their own knowledge of concrete situations but on the divine 
knowledge that has been translated into human knowledge by way of the interpretations of the 
Delphic oracle.  
 
The third mode of self-deception in Oedipus Rex appears in the manner in which Oedipus allows 
sources outside of himself to construct his self.  He seeks affirmation of his self and his actions 
in what others have to say about him – “I Oedipus whom all men call the Great”114. Oedipus is 
forgetful of the fact that he does know more about himself than the prophet Teiresias or the 
people of Thebes. The crucial point is that he refuses to be awake to his own knowledge of 
himself and continues to trust only in the words of others.  Above and beyond the knowledge of 
people around them, the knowledge conveyed by the oracle remains a powerfully deceptive 
source of “self-knowledge” for both Oedipus and his father Laios.  Both of them allow their 
actions to be completely guided by the words of the oracle and thereby do things that they dearly 
wanted to avoid. Blind to his own self, Oedipus carries out all that the oracle imposed upon him 
and it is only when his gaze is directed inwards that he says – “O, O, O, they will all come, all 
come out clearly!”115.     
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I must say at this point that my description of the modes of tragic self-deception in Oedipus Rex 
is still only rudimentary.  An analysis of self-deception extracted out of this drama must run 
much deeper.  In addition, I also need to provide some insight into the implications of this 
analysis.  In analyzing the tragedy in some detail now, I will structure my narrative around the 
three moments in the play where the voice of the oracle is heard and followed.  In terms of the 
chronological unfolding of events, the oracle speaks first to Laios, then to Oedipus and finally to 
Creon.  In the structure of Sophocles’ play, the Oracle speaks first to Creon who has been sent by 
Oedipus to consult the prophetic voice.  Let us examine closely the words of the oracle and the 
nature of Oedipus’ interpretation of them.  Creon conveys the message of the Oracle as follows: 
 
“I will tell you, then, what I heard from the God.  King Phoebus in plain words commanded us to 
drive out a pollution from our land, pollution grown ingrained within the land; drive it out said 
the God, not cherish it, till it’s past cure.”116   
 
The act of calling out for divine intervention in a situation of crisis is in itself indicative of a 
deep rooted self-deception.  Among all the characters in Oedipus Rex, Jocasta seems to be the 
only who - if not in deed then at least in words – is skeptical of the power of oracles.  She is the 
one who says “human beings have no part in the craft of prophecy”117.  Her inconsistency, 
however, points also towards self-deception on her part; for after all if she was genuinely 
skeptical about the power of oracles, why then did she abandon her son to die on the slopes of 
Cithaeron?   
 
I think that in Oedipus Rex the self-deception associated with oracles and their interpretation 
runs much deeper than the mere fact of calling out for and believing in divine intervention.  If we 
now look closely at the words of the oracle as delivered by Creon and set them within the 
context of the crisis in Thebes, they really do hit the mark.  The oracle speaks of a “pollution” 
that afflicts the city of Thebes.  This refers to the plague or Black Death that the city is suffering 
from.  We have concrete historical evidence that such plagues have occurred in many parts of the 
world wreaking havoc upon entire populations of people.  Sophocles’ depiction of the plague 
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situation has real historical precedents and it can be taken literally for what it is.  The plague, 
however, can also be understood as a metaphor for other types of collective crises.  Would I be 
going too far if I say that the experience of Civil War and Genocide does affect a society like a 
plague?  There are also subtler crises, for instance the crisis of the decline of meaning and value 
than can affect a society like the plague, causing collective acedia in which the soul is torpid and 
dead even though the body may be alive and there may even be a semblance of social order.   
 
My point here is that the oracle promises salvation for Thebes if the crisis at hand is resolved.  
There is nothing irrational in this.  Oedipus as the King of Thebes and as one who cares deeply 
about the people needs to come up with a strategy that would alleviate the crisis over a period of 
time.  However, in responding to the words of the oracle, Oedipus adopts a very transcendental 
mode of thought and speech which is worth paying attention to: 
 
“What is the rite of purification? How shall it be done?” 
 
Oedipus’ attitude towards the matter is already beginning to transform a quite general injunction 
into one that demands the sacrifice of a particular person.  What concrete connection is there 
between the murder of Laius and the plague that afflicts Thebes? If there is, it is only a forced 
one as Oedipus’ words push Creon to speak as follows: 
 
“By banishing a man, or expiation of blood by blood, since it is murder guilt which holds our 
city in this destroying storm.”118  
 
Oedipus then asks – “Who is this man whose fate the God pronounces?”119 “My Lord, before 
you piloted the state we had a king called Laius”120 Responds Creon.  To this, Oedipus responds 
– “I know of him by hearsay. I have not seen him”.  From this point onwards, Oedipus is driven 
by a raging inquisitiveness to search for the truth regarding Laius’ murder.  Underlying this 
search are conflicting feelings – of hope for salvation of Thebes and of himself and the anxiety 
or dread that he himself is the murderer.  The negative emotions of dread and envy come more 
forcefully into the picture once Teiresias comes onto the scene and starts to tear away at 
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Oedipus’ blindness, shaking his confidence.  Before that though Oedipus was in a transcendental 
mood, speaking in clear, albeit priestly terms.  He calls out for the sacrifice of a particular man 
based on an interpretation of the words of the oracle which are set in universal terms.  In doing 
this Oedipus establishes a connection between a crisis that is universal or general in nature and a 
particular act of murder.  We must explore the meaning of this but first let us look at some 
selected quotes from the speech that Oedipus delivers after having spoken to Creon, the priest 
and the suffering people of Thebes: 
 
“For what you ask me – if you will hear my words, and hearing welcome them and fight the 
plague, you will find strength and lightening of your load. Hark to me; what I say to you, I say as 
one that is stranger to the deed.”121
 
“Now I proclaim to all men of Thebes: Who so among you knows the murderer by whose hand 
Laius, son of Labdacus, died – I command him to tell everything to me.”122
 
“I forbid that man, whoever he may be, my land, my land where I hold sovereignty and throne; 
and I forbid any to welcome him or cry him a greeting or make him a sharer in sacrifice or 
offering to the Gods, or give him water for his hands to wash.  I command all to drive him from 
their homes, since he is our pollution, as the oracle of Pytho’s God proclaimed him now to me. 
So I stay forth as a champion of the God and of the man who died etc.”123
 
Let us set aside for the moment the fact that unbeknownst to him, Oedipus is the actual locus of 
his own admonitions.  We need to focus on the following matter.  With a sense of great certitude, 
Oedipus links the general chaos and suffering of the citizens of Thebes with the murder of Laius.  
Oedipus is in no doubt that the diminishing life of the whole city can only be revived by the 
killing of the one who has murdered the previous king.  In setting up this situation in this 
manner, Sophocles has created a model for a type of tragic self deception that runs throughout 
human history.  In his speech Oedipus speaks of a “lightening of your load”.  Can we not 
understand this load as being the burden of sin?  I think that the notion that situations of 
collective crisis are born out of the inability of individual members of a community to endure the 
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burdens of their own sins is not restricted to this or that culture.  And neither is it unique when 
people seek a special figure of sacrifice who will take the burden of everyone’s sins and rid a 
society of its pollution.   
 
Tragic self-deception runs at many different levels in Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex and at this point I 
will flesh out one specific aspect of the problem.  Laius, King of Thebes, was murdered several 
years before the plague that constitutes the crisis pervading Thebes in Oedipus Rex.  At one point 
in the first exchange between Oedipus and Creon, Oedipus asks the following question: “What 
trouble was so great to hinder you inquiring out the murder of your king?” To which Creon 
responds “The riddling Sphinx induced us to neglect mysterious crimes and rather seek solution 
of troubles at our feet”.  As we know, Oedipus murders Laius at the cross-roads in Phocis and 
then proceeds to Thebes where he solves the riddle of the Sphinx and brings respite to the people 
of Thebes from the “troubles” at their feet.  At the beginning of the play, the suppliants tell 
Oedipus that – “You came and by your coming saved our city, freed us from the tribute which 
we paid of old to the Sphinx, cruel singer.  This you did in virtue of no knowledge we could give 
you, in virtue of no teaching; it was God that aided you, men say, and you are held with God’s 
assistance to have saved our lives”124.  Oedipus solved the riddle of the Sphinx through his own 
acumen and not by any knowledge coming from a divine, transcendental source, as the people of 
Thebes claim.   
 
I want to say that the trouble of the plague differs only in degree from the trouble of the Sphinx.  
The plague, as a source of widespread death and decay is a much bigger crisis than the crisis of 
the Sphinx where the citizens are held in some sort of economic bondage due to their own 
blindness more than anything else.  The crisis of the plague is nevertheless a concrete situation 
that demands a concrete solution.  The injunction of the oracle as stated by Creon can be seen as 
a rather universal and general advice to restore civic order and harmony in society.  It seems to 
me that Oedipus - even though he cares deeply for the salvation of Thebes – has given up on 
finding a real solution to the crisis in Thebes.  He has succumbed to the sheer devastation that he 
sees all around him and he now believes that there is a direct causal relation between the murder 
of Laius and the plague of Thebes. Oedipus is working according to the notion that a general, 
universal crisis can be averted by the sacrifice of a particular.  It would be rational to think that 
                                                 
124 Ibid., Grene, vv. 35 – 40, p. 12 
 
 87
the execution of the murderer would be an act of justice but to think that this execution would 
abate the crisis of Thebes is deeply problematic. Let us explore this further. 
 
In forcing a connection between the murder of Laius and the plague in Thebes, Oedipus adopts a 
religious tone of voice.  What he calls for in his raging yet clear speech can be traced in different 
religious traditions.  Speaking of the ancient and multifaceted Buddhist religious tradition, one of 
its central tenets is the notion of Karma.  The basic idea is that as we live in this world, we build 
up Karma through sin and reduce Karma through good deeds and more significantly, through 
suffering.  Temporality in Buddhism is cyclical and there is strong faith in reincarnation.  Every 
time a person is reincarnated in the world, he carries with him the Karma that he accumulated in 
his previous life.  The Karma inherited ostensibly from history can only be reduced through 
suffering and good deeds.  Moreover, there is also a notion of relational Karma whereby a bad 
karma builds up between two persons or even between groups of people over the course of 
history.  Such people or groups remain antagonistic to one another through generations of 
reincarnation unless the karma is reduced through some means.  It can so happen, according to 
Buddhist doctrine, that there is so much karma in a society or among a group of people – in a 
particular “lebenswelt” as Husserl would say – that the collective or individual suffering of all 
the people in that group is not sufficient to bring down the karma.  That the collective karma has 
become overwhelming is borne out by situations of seemingly inextricable crisis, not unlike the 
plague of Thebe as depicted by Sophocles.  In Buddhist religious doctrine, the crisis can only be 
alleviated if a special person takes up the burden of the collective karma and perishes in the 
process.  A forced connection is thus made between alleviation of the general, universal crisis 
and the sacrifice of a particular person who bears the collective guilt.  Is this not tragic self-
deception?  When a crisis situation seems inescapable, with no concrete solution in sight and 
there is a lack of desire to find one, people have a tendency to search for a scapegoat. 
 
It would be an understatement to say that this theme is dominant in the very foundations of 
Christianity.  According to Christian belief Jesus Christ was crucified and in suffering thus on 
the cross he took up the burden of the sins of the coming generations of humanity.  The symbolic 
significance of crucifixion is not limited only to Christian religion and civilization.  Some 
variations may occur across cultures but the basic idea remains the same – a causal connection is 
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drawn between the alleviation of current crises or avoidance of future troubles and the ritualized 
sacrificial murder of an individual.  
 
I think that Islam is very interesting in that if we look at its most fundamental principles, we can 
see an effort to root out precisely the type of causal connection that Oedipus draws between the 
resolution of the crisis in Thebes and the destruction of the murderer of Laius.  One of the basic 
ideas in Islam, at least as it comes across in the Quran is that human beings on an individual or 
collective level are responsible for carrying the burden of their sins and there is no special person 
– either prophet or scapegoat – whose sacrifice is going to alleviate the burden of sins and the 
crises that may falsely be associated with it.  Islam certainly has strong notions of martyrdom; 
however, the martyrs are in no way washing away the pollution of society and culture through 
their sacrifice.  In studying the history or progression of Islam we see that not long after the 
death of Muhammad, the notion of Jesus-like martyr slips into the religion through the battle of 
Karbala and the rise of Shia Islam.  The grandson of the prophet violates the orders of the then 
Caliph Ameer Moavia and enters into a battle with a massive imperial army with only his own 
family fighting by his side.  All the men in the family - and foremost among them Hussein – are 
killed in this battle.  According to the Shia perspective, the blood of Hussein was necessary for 
the revival of Islam and for arresting the corruption that had set in society.  From a secular 
perspective and also from the perspective of Sunni Islam the battle stemmed from a crisis that 
was social and political in nature but Shia Muslims give it a transcendental coloring whereby 
Hussein does indeed become a Christ-like figure of sacrifice who takes up the burden of the 
flaws of a society.  The purpose of this digression is to show that even Islam - a religion so 
rigidly against the notion that a particular individual can take up the burden of sins of others – is 
deeply affected by this idea.            
 
Let us glance briefly at the Great Mayan civilization during its years of decline and fall.  There 
was widespread famine and disease due primarily, I think, to mismanagement of agricultural 
resources, rampant corruption among the ruling classes and a lack of civic order.  As the crisis 
grew, an elaborate system of ritualistic sacrifice was set in place to appease the perceived anger 
of the Gods.  Scapegoats were picked up from areas surrounding the main city and slaughtered in 
a ceremony at a temple as hundreds of onlookers went into a state of frenzy.  The idea was that 
the blood of the victims of sacrificial rites would purify the land of its sickness.  The sickness of 
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society was attributed to the anger of the Gods.  And the Gods were perceived to be angry on 
account of the sinfulness of the people.  The victims of sacrifice are symbolic offerings of faith 
and are also particular bearers of the sins of the collective.  This, in my view, is tragic self-
deception. 
 
One of the biggest issues in contemporary American - and global politics for that matter – is 
what is called the war on terror.  I think that the current form of terrorism is only a symptom of a 
wider state of unrest and discontent in many Muslim countries.  To root out this particular form 
of terrorism, the underlying deeper issues need to be confronted.  However, the focus of this war 
to a great extent has been to search and destroy particular figures or groups of people.  Figures 
like Saddam or Zarqawi or Khalid Sheikh are criminals and they have to be brought to justice. 
However, the execution or killing of these figures should not be linked with the eradication of 
the root cause.  I want to say that the forced connection between the war on terror and the reform 
of Islamic societies is a tragic self deception which has only intensified the symptoms (terrorism, 
extremism) of a general political and cultural disorder.  
 
I have now expended some effort in bringing forth one particular form of tragic self-deception 
from out of Oedipus’s overtly religious interpretation of the words of the oracle as delivered by 
Creon. By linking the plague of Thebes with the murder of Laius and calling for the purge of the 
killer, Oedipus escapes from precisely that responsibility towards the state which he feels so 
deeply.  While holding on to this idea of evasion of responsibility in the face of a concrete crisis, 
let us now examine Laius’ response to the crisis created in his life when he learns from the oracle 
that Oedipus would go on to kill him and his wife.  In comparison with the situation of collective 
crisis in which Oedipus calls for and interprets the words of the oracle, Laius’ crisis is limited to 
himself and his family.    
 
The words of the oracle have certainly cast a dark cloud upon the birth of the first child, which 
should be an occasion of immense joy.  The situation demands most of all that Laius retains a 
strong sense of consciousness and consistency.  I think that Laius lacks both a strong 
consciousness of the crisis and consistency in the adoption of a course of action.  Laius 
maintains in his mind both a belief and the negation of that belief and therefore he is in a state of 
self-deception.  Unlike Oedipus’s self-deception in the face of the oracle about the purgation, I 
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think that Laius’s self-deception is not tragic. Oedipus believes in the voice of the oracle and his 
actions are consistent with this belief and that is what makes him tragic. We can certainly blame 
Oedipus for a lack of consciousness of himself and of his situation but we cannot take away from 
him his capacity to make radical decisions.    
 
The first and main aspect of Laius’s dilemma centers upon whether to believe in or to completely 
disregard the words of the oracle.  His wife Jocasta does not believe in oracles but she is 
inconsistent when it comes to taking action. It seems to me that Laius himself neither believes 
nor disbelieves in the oracles.  He is in a state of confusion and his actions bear this out.  My 
point here is that Laius is, first of all, not conscious of the conflict that he is facing.  The 
situation in itself represents a tragic conflict between two opposing courses of action.  If he 
genuinely doubts the power of oracles then he should keep his son alive and in his home.  One 
the other hand, if he has firm faith in the oracle and thus in the divine, then he is faced with a 
genuinely tragic dilemma.  Whether he kills his son or does not kill him and lets him live in his 
home, Laius is doomed.  Neither course of action guarantees salvation for Laius.  If he kills his 
son, he may avoid future physical confrontation but then his spiritual life would be devastated 
and moreover, he would commit the ultimate crime.  If he does not kill his son and lets him grow 
up in his home, he would then live in constant fear and anxiety.  In any event, Laius is faced with 
a tragic conflict but he refuses to confront it and takes a decision that shows inconsistency of 
character.  He simply decides to avoid the tragic conflict and along with his wife, gives away the 
son to the herdsman.  The herdsman gave the baby to another man who “saved it for the most 
terrible troubles”125.  Laius’s inconsistency leads to his eventual destruction which is not tragic, 
but rather pathetic.  Many years after the birth of Oedipus and during a time when the citizen of 
Thebes are beholden to the Sphinx, Laius sets off on the road towards Delphi and meets his own 
son at the crossroads of Phocis.  Oedipus kills his inconsistent father in a fit of rage.  Laius dies 
without having come to consciousness and retaining his state of indecisiveness and uncertainty.  
Oedipus on the other hand remains decisive throughout even though he is blinded to his situation 
and his actions for the most part, coming to consciousness only at the end after he has brought 
destruction upon his family if not upon the citizens of Thebes.  
 
                                                 
125 Ibid., Grene, vv. 1181 – 1182. p. 63 
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The discussion of Laius’s fate has opened up for us the idea that there is a self-deception which 
is tragic as differentiated from one that is merely pathetic.  Oedipus’s self-deception is tragic 
mainly because he is decisive in trying to fulfill the expectations that he has of himself and for 
what he can do for the people of Thebes.  Oedipus is filled with desire and he does take strong 
actions.  What he lacks is genuine consciousness of the crisis of Thebes and more importantly of 
his own self. Nevertheless, he does make an authentic effort to come to consciousness and gets 
destroyed in the process.  His greatness lies in the fact that he ultimately takes responsibility for 
everything that he has done.  Oedipus’s frantic search for himself also leads to the death of his 
mother Jocasta.  I think that Jocasta is also a figure in self-deception but her fate is sad, not 
tragic.  She also displays inconsistency of character.  I think that Jocasta’s perspective on the 
whole situation can be captured in what she says to Oedipus as she tries to prevent him from his 
search for the terrible self-knowledge: 
 
“Why should man fear since chance is all in all for him, and he can clearly foreknow nothing? 
Best to live lightly, as one can, unthinkingly.  As to your mother’s marriage bed, - don’t fear it. 
Before this, in dreams too, as well as oracles, many a man has lain with his own mother. But he 
to whom such things are nothing bears his life most easily”126. 
 
Socrates tells us that an unexamined life is not worth living.  The first part of Jocasta’s statement 
goes against this basic philosophical attitude towards life that Socrates brings forth.  To either 
give up on or to never undertake the struggle for consciousness is to give up the battle against of 
self-deception.  Jocasta chooses to look away from the situation in which she is trapped.  She is 
skeptical about the power of oracles but does not allow this skepticism to play a role in the 
decisions that she makes.  Also, even after she realizes that Oedipus is her son, she continues to 
look away from this reality.  This ultimately leads to her demise, which is sad but not tragic.  
 
We have thus far constructed our narrative around two statements of the oracle – the one that 
Oedipus hears through Creon and the other that Laius hears after the birth of Oedipus.   Let us 
now examine the third occasion in the play where the oracle speaks, this time to the young 
Oedipus.  Oedipus was living in Corinth as the son of Polybus and Merope and “was held 
                                                 
126 Ibid., Grene, vv. 970 – 984, p. 52 
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greatest of the citizens”127.  He was blind to the fact that he is not the son of the king and queen 
of Corinth.  Then one night, a drunken man at a banquet sowed the seeds of doubt in Oedipus’s 
mind, accusing him of “being a bastard”128.  Polybus and Merope try to comfort Oedipus as they 
continue to conceal from him the truth of his parentage.  Rumors begin to circulate in Corinth 
and Oedipus is immensely disturbed and agitated.  Without informing Polybus and Merope, 
Oedipus goes to Delphi to learn the truth from the oracle.  However, as Oedipus talks about this 
with Jocasta, he tells her: 
 
“Phoebus sent me home again unhonoured in what I came to learn, but he foretold other and 
desperate horrors to befall me, that I was fated to lie with my mother, and show to daylight an 
accursed breed which men should not endure, and I was doomed to be murderer of the father that 
begot me.”129    
 
Oedipus has firm faith in the voice of God; however, what he hears does nothing to free him 
from his ignorance regarding who his parents really are.  If anything, the words of the oracle 
make it even more imperative for Oedipus to reach the truth.  However, with his mind suffused 
by darkness, Oedipus, instead of returning back to Corinth to extract the truth from his supposed 
parents, decides to run far away from them.  I think that his decision is governed by a firm faith 
in and fear of God.  He interprets the words of the oracle as an impossible command to avoid 
doing what he is fated to do.  Since the oracle does not reveal his parentage, Oedipus decides to 
believe that his supposed parents are his true parents.  Oedipus and Laius are both faced with a 
similar type of conflict.  Oedipus, however, unlike Laius takes a firm decision based on faith.  
He acts forcefully by running away from Corinth and towards Thebes.  His action does not save 
him from his ignorance, however.  It is basically this blindness towards who his parents are that 
Oedipus commits the future terrible crimes.  Oedipus begins the search for consciousness when 
it is already too late.  It should be kept in mind that Oedipus’s decision to flee towards Thebes is 
governed by a genuine albeit blind desire to avoid being the destroyer of his family.  He is 
genuinely seeking redemption for himself and for his family. 
 
                                                 
127 Ibid., Grene, v. 776, p. 45 
128 Ibid., Grene, v. 780, p. 45 
129 Ibid., Grene, vv. 790 – 795, p. 45 
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Oedipus’s confrontation with Laius at the crossroads of Phocis is laden with philosophical and 
symbolic meaning.  On the one end there is Oedipus, seeking redemption and fleeing so as to 
avoid committing the terrible acts that the oracle has spoken of.  On the other end there is Laius 
who is Oedipus’s real father, precisely the person that Oedipus wants to avoid harming.  Oedipus 
is coming out of Delphi while Laius is going towards it.  In the scuffle that ensues Oedipus kills 
Laius.  What does this mean?  In his own mind, Oedipus is doing everything to save himself and 
his family.  And that is the way things appear to him on the surface.  In reality, however, his 
actions are bearing destructive consequences and precisely those that he dearly wants to avoid.  
All of this stems from ignorance towards reality.  Oedipus does not know who his parents are 
and Laius is uncertain about the fate of the son whom he had given away.   When Laius tries to 
push Oedipus away from the road, he is enraged130.  His anger is also a function of his desperate 
desire to not bring harm upon his family.  It is said that things are not what they seem to be and 
in Oedipus’s case this assumes tragic significance.   
 
I think that a key form or aspect of tragic self-deception that we can extract from Sophocles’s 
Oedipus Rex is precisely this – if you are not conscious of what you are and of the situation that 
you are in then even your greatest efforts to do good will end in failure and will bear the opposite 
consequences.  Once again, on the surface or in the realm of appearances, Oedipus is taking 
actions that are directed towards salvation and redemption.  If we remove the veil of appearance, 
however, we see that Oedipus’s actions are leading him and his family towards destruction. In 
my view, if we think of Oedipus in terms concrete obligations (in a Hegelian sense), he has 
obligations towards his family and also towards the people of Thebes for he is their King.  He 
has a genuine desire to fulfill all of these obligations but due to his ignorance about reality, he 
ends up failing himself, his family and also the people of Thebes.   
 
Now this tragic juxtaposition of redemption in the realm of appearances and annihilation in 
reality is very powerful for understanding concrete human tragedy.  For me, Oedipus’s desire to 
do good for himself and is family is as important as his desire to do something beneficial for the 
people of Thebes.  However, it is his role as a political leader that strikes me as being something 
that intensifies the tragedy.  For after all, his decisions and his actions are having an impact upon 
people outside of the sphere of his own person and family.  When political leaders in positions of 
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power make decisions in a state of self deception, their tragedy is not simply personal but 
collective.  In history and in current events, we have examples of leaders who genuinely want to 
do good for their people but due to lack of consciousness regarding what they are and what crisis 
they are facing, they plunge themselves and their states into disaster.    
 
My discussion thus far of the tragic self-deception in Oedipus Rex may leave the reader with an 
impression that I have too much of a faith in the capacity of human reason, consciousness and 
freedom.  That is not so.  I think that there are crises whose intractability exceeds the limits of 
human reason and freedom.  In such cases tragedy is inevitable, irrespective of what the actor 
does.  The complexity or the inevitability of a crisis or dilemma should not however absolve the 
actor from the responsibility of overcoming self-deception.  Oedipus too engages in the struggle 
to come to consciousness and to overcome the layers of blindness.  But he has already “spoken 
far too much” and exceeded all limits in his actions.  The struggle though does bring forth all of 
the duality, contradiction and more importantly the mode of human failure that emerges out of 
tragic self-deception.  Sophocles’s description of this struggle can be seen as a universal 
metaphor for what happens when powerful people, driven but blind, overcome this blindness 
when it is already too late.  Oedipus’s greatness lies in the way in which he eventually assumes 
responsibility for everything that he has done; there are many in his position who would not have 
done so. 
 
Oedipus’s battle for consciousness begins in earnest during his dialogue with Teiresias who 
though afflicted with physical blindness, is spiritually aware of what lies uncovered.  Oedipus 
greets the prophet with immense respect, for he genuinely wants to know where the killers of 
Laius are hiding.  However, this attitude changes as Teiresias points out to Oedipus that he 
himself is the killer who is being blamed for the plague in Thebes.  One important notion that I 
think can be extracted from Oedipus’s exchange with Teiresias is that self-deception even in 
figures as powerful as Oedipus does lead to the lowly, negative emotion of resentment.  It is 
resentment, hidden grudges and jealousy that drive Oedipus to make unsubstantiated claims 
against Creon, his loyal friend and against Teiresias himself.  At this stage, Oedipus is strongly 
resisting nascent feelings of his own culpability and still believes that he is now and has in the 
past acted in the best interests of the state.  As this belief begins to waver, feelings of grudge and 
envy come to the surface and these are what really motivate his attack on Teiresias and Creon - 
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as the latter says – “Were his eyes straight in his head? Was his mind right when he accused me 
in this fashion?” Oedipus is resentful against Teiresias because he can see into the heart of the 
matter despite his physical blindness.  Similarly, he is resentful against Creon for his calm, wise 
demeanor in the face of crises.  Both Creon and Teiresias also come across as figures that are not 
driven by ambition, they are at peace with what they are and what they have; Oedipus, I think, 
resents this too.  In this play Creon’s character can be grasped through these words: 
 
“I was not born with a frantic yearning to be a king – but to do what kings do. And so it is with 
everyone who has learned wisdom and self-control. As it stands now, the prizes are all mine – 
and without fear….How should despotic rule seem sweeter to me than painless power and an 
assured authority.”131  
 
I think that in philosophical discussions of tragedy, particularly those inspired by Nietzsche, 
resentment is seen as the antithesis of the essence of the tragic. If I speak of resentment in the 
context of the tragic figure of Oedipus, a Nietzschean response to me would be that my 
perspective is that of the spectator and I am not seeing the drama from the view point of 
Dionysus. I want to say that the negative force of resentment that drives Oedipus comes through 
in his condemnation of Teiresias and Creon who, in this play certainly has greater character than 
Oedipus.  It also comes through in the following dialogue with Jocasta – “Keep up, your heart 
Jocasta. Though I’m proved a slave, thrice slave, and though my mother is thrice slave, you’ll 
not be shown to be of lowly lineage.”  Now this last dialogue reflects, in my view an absence of 
a sense of self.  If one has a strong sense of one’s own being, then one does not need to hold on 
to power or status.  One is what one is and that should be enough.  For Oedipus, this is not so 
and Sophocles’s depiction of the power of resentment in this drama provides some sort of model 
for beginning to understand concrete human tragedy.  There are people who, blind to what they 
are and to their situation, perform terrible deeds purely under the influence of resentment without 
any substantial basis.  It seems that resentment and the emotions associated with it have a strong 
affinity to self-deception. 
 
Jocasta comes across as a figure who is witness to Oedipus’s struggle in the face of his own 
blindness.  She says something which captures something very profound about Oedipus – “For 
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Oedipus excites himself too much at every sort of trouble, not conjecturing like a man of sense, 
what will be from what was, but he is always at the speaker’s mercy, when he speaks terrors.”  
The sense of guilt in Oedipus is evoked to the fullest when Jocasta relates the history of the 
family.  In speaking about the murder of Laius, she speaks with reference to the herdsman in 
reassuring Oedipus that the murderer was not a lone man but a band of robbers.  However, 
during her speech she refers to King Laius’s piercing of Oedipus’s ankles and this is what 
Oedipus later calls “that old pain”132.  So when Jocasta refers to the wounds, Oedipus knows that 
he is guilty.  From this point onwards, he retains in his mind the idea that he is guilty but also the 
negation of this idea.  In his heart of heart he knows that he is guilty but he seeks negation by 
interviewing two different people.  His prevailing self-deception prevents him from coming to 
consciousness of his condition on his own.  So first comes the messenger (shepherd) with the 
news that Polybus, king of Corinth is dead.  Oedipus is filled with a mad joy in which he seems 
to be giving up his responsibility towards the state –  
 
“Ha! Ha! O dear Jocasta, why should one look to the Pythian hearth? Why should one look to 
the birds screaming overhead? They prophesied that I should kill my father! But he’s dead and 
hidden deep in earth, and I stand here who never laid a hand on spear against him…”133
 
These lines show that Oedipus does lack that quality which makes a leader truly great – self 
sacrifice.  Through these words, a now insane Oedipus falls to a level where he takes joy merely 
in the false knowledge that he is free from culpability for the plague in Thebes – the depiction of 
“birds screaming overhead” signify that - and therefore his power is secure.  This blind joy 
however is short lived as the messenger reveals to Oedipus that Merope and Polybus are not his 
real parents. The contradiction in Oedipus’s mind is still not resolved as he searches for the 
negation of his guilt.  He continues to search and through torture, he extracts from the herdsman 
the final pieces of knowledge which he ought to have known earlier – that Laius and Jocasta 
were his parents and that he is the one who murdered Laius.  After this, the contradictions in 
Oedipus’s mind disappear and all of the conflict in his past action emerges clearly.  He assumes 
responsibility for everything.  This consciousness however has come too late and in a symbolic 
gesture, he tears out his own eyes.  Earlier on, we had seen how Oedipus makes a connection 
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between the plague of Thebes and the murder of Laius.  Now seeing himself as the “pollution” of 
Thebes, Oedipus sentences himself to permanent exile from his homeland.  
 
In his very last dialogue with Creon, Oedipus says to him “Since you have torn me from my 
dreadful expectations…”134 On the one hand, we can understand the meaning of “dreadful 
expectations” purely within the context of this particular dialogue. After having gained self-
knowledge but having lost everything else, Oedipus meets Creon and expects the latter to further 
humiliate him.  Creon, however, acts in a noble manner so Oedipus’s expectations are reversed, 
this time for the better.  However, if we look at the play as a whole we can see how due to self-
deception, the main figure experiences a failure of expectations.  Oedipus flees towards Thebes, 
hoping to fulfill the deepest expectations that he has for himself.  Oedipus’s inner life is rooted in 
family and state and these are the sources of his expectations.  On the road to Thebes, he kills his 
father and violates one major expectation.  Then, when he reaches Thebes, he becomes a great 
political figure by solving the riddle of the Sphinx. His status gives him the right to marry 
Jocasta and once again his expectations for himself in his role as the son of the family are 
reversed.  What Oedipus wanted to be was a good son and a good ruler.  He made plans in 
ignorance but events did not unfold according to his expectations. There is an immediacy or 
simultaneity to the manner in which the deepest, innermost expectations collide with the causes 
of their failure.  In coming face to face with Laius at the crossroads, Oedipus confronts the very 
failure of his deepest expectations in the figure of his father.  The entire action of the play turns 
upon the investigation into the murder of Laius.  It starts with Oedipus harboring great 
expectations for himself and for Thebes and it ends with Oedipus finding out that he himself if 
the murderer.  The action of the play can thus also be seen as process during which Oedipus is 
separated from his expectations only after all of his blind actions have already produced terrible 
consequences.  At the end, Oedipus confronts himself as the source of the failure of all of his 
expectations. Thus, if there is a duality between expectations and the failure of expectations, this 
duality is always moving closer to unity as the investigation into the murder proceeds.  Both of 
these opposing elements come together eventually within the soul of Oedipus.   
 
Now that we have drawn, what can be described as some of the aspects of tragic self-deception 
from out of Sophocles’s Oedipus Rex, it is time to move on to a discussion of some philosophical 
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theory.  I will be looking at Sartre’s analysis of self-deception from his book Being and 
Nothingness135 in which he gives some powerful insights which can help us in understanding our 
subject. Before delving into Sartre, however, I think that it is important to draw a clear 
distinction between tragic self-deception as it appears in Oedipus Rex – with particular stridency 
towards the end - and the bad faith that Sartre describes in Being and Nothingness.  In this 
connection, it is crucial that we reflect specifically upon Oedipus’s act of self-blinding: 
 
“He tore the brooches – the gold chased brooches fastening her robe – away from her and lifting 
then up high dashed them on his own eyeballs, shrieking out such things as: they will never see 
the crime I have committed or had done upon me! Dark eyes, now in the days to come look on 
forbidden faces, do not recognize whom you long for – with such imprecations he struck his eyes 
again and yet again with the brooches. And the bleeding eyeballs gushed and stained his beard – 
no sluggish oozing drops but a black rain and bloody hail poured down.”136
 
Oedipus blinds himself at that specific moment when he is no longer alienated from himself and 
his circumstances in the sense that he has now reached a stage of complete recognition. He now 
knows exactly who he is and where his obligations are located. The point however is that this 
overcoming of alienation and attainment of self-knowledge do not in any way heals the injuries 
that have already been caused. The damage done by tragic self-deception is irreversible and the 
value destroyed cannot be recovered. Moreover, the fresh wounds that Oedipus has created by 
blinding himself do not cure the wounds of the past. One way to interpret Oedipus’s self-
blinding would be to say that this is the sacrifice that needed to be made in order to overcome 
alienation and to reach self-knowledge. This interpretation also implies that the tragedy is 
ultimately reconciled. I do not agree with this interpretation because the act of self-blinding is 
the terminal point of the tragic dialectic of self-deception. Beyond this point there is only 
darkness and before it, the irreversible loss of things that are of value. There is no consolation. 
Furthermore, Oedipus’s self-blinding is, in my view, the culmination of a series of actions 
carried out with nothing but sincere intentions. Despite all the blindness that pervades his 
consciousness and obstructs its path, Oedipus does remain sincere throughout towards what he 
perceives to be his family and his state. The starting point of Sartre’s analyses of bad faith and 
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sincerity – the replacement of reality with idea – is already present in Oedipus. We also learn 
from Sartre that bad faith is inevitable and sincerity is bound to fail because the ontology of 
consciousness teaches us that consciousness is nothing but the for-itself which is expressed 
exclusively in action and has no thing-like (in-itself) reality.  Though his theory has tremendous 
potential, the problem is that Sartre, in my view (and at least in this earlier work) retains too 
much of a faith in the capacity of a unified consciousness to discern and overcome the lies that it 
is telling to itself.  In Sartre, consciousness is destined to be in one state of self-deception or the 
other but the main idea is that there is a power of intention, will and freedom (the basic 
characteristic of consciousness) that can overcome this alienation. We learn from the tragedy of 
Oedipus that there is a tragic form of self-deception which cannot be overcome on the basis of 
notions of authenticity.  Moreover, the toll that it takes is radically irreversible compared to the 
toll exacted by Sartre’s bad faith which afflicts us at every moment in our life. To take this point 
further, sincerity is more than a question of recognizing the other and oneself as ‘for-itself’. It is 
a question of fulfilling obligations in the context of deeply formed relations. Oedipus self-
deception does indeed imply a lack of recognition but what pains him much more is his failure at 
doing what he ought to do and sincerely desires to do. Finally, the sources of Oedipus’s 
blindness towards what he is and what he ought to do may well be in his own consciousness but 
it cannot be overcome by the exercise of will and freedom. One must continue to probe with an 
aim to discover further elements in the dialectic of tragic self-deception. I think that an 
extrapolation of Sartre’s ontology can enrich out understanding of tragic self-deception.            
 
In Sartre’s philosophy human consciousness or the ‘for-itself’ is the source of all negation or 
non-being in the world.  The phenomenon of bad faith is a type of “self-negation” where the 
function of negation is directed inwards, that is, towards consciousness itself137. The Szondi text 
on Goethe brings forth the idea that for self-deception to be a tragedy, we must presuppose the 
unity of the psychic whole or ‘I’.  Sartre, in his analysis of bad faith (self-deception) points out 
that it is precisely through the phenomenon of bad faith that we can derive the conclusion that 
the self is a unity.  Sartre makes a subtle distinction between bad faith and lie - in bad faith, I 
conceal the truth from myself.  This concealment does not have any sort of ontological duality 
inherent in it.  In bad faith, I hide a truth from myself, not from an ontological other.  Moreover, 
the process of self-deception is not disjointed in time; rather, it occurs in the unity of the present 
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moment138.  Bad Faith is a tragic paradox that evades the grasp of the Freudian dualism of the 
Ego and Id.  The phenomenon of bad faith both presupposes and demonstrates the unity of a 
psychic whole.  In bad faith there is a subtle veiling of something that is very evident and this 
can occur only within a psychic organism that is unified.  Sartre often takes a position contrary to 
Freud and particularly so when he is speaking of bad faith139.  For Sartre, the Freudian trinity of 
Ego, Id and Superego fail to explain an experience that presupposes the unity of the psychic self 
or I140. 
 
Sartre begins his analysis of bad faith with the following question, “what must be the being of 
man if he is to be capable of bad faith?”141 And he is in search for a response to this question.  I 
think that the most powerful of these attempts centers on the description of patterns of bad 
faith142 which really is an experiential inquiry into the phenomenon.  Sartre gives a typical 
example of bad faith through his description of a woman who goes out on a rendezvous with a 
man for the first time.  The woman has knowledge of the sexual intentions that the man harbors 
regarding her but she hides this from herself.  She knows also that she will need to make a 
decision at some point but she puts it off, so to speak, and focuses her attention only upon what 
is “respectful and discreet in the attitude of her companion”143.  She understands quite well that 
his behavior is an attempt to achieve a “first approach” but she forgets that and chooses to focus 
only on the nobler aspects of his behavior144.  She fixes the phrases with which the man 
addresses her into a thing-like permanence and by doing so she is also seeing the man as an in-
itself.  She sees his current respectful and discreet behavior as an expression of his entire 
personality, his essence.  At the same time, she behaves throughout her appointment as if she 
herself was a thing in-itself and therefore refuses to make any decision in one direction or the 
other.  For Sartre, as we know, human existence precedes essence so that there is nothing 
essential or thing-like about what we are.  We are our consciousness, which is the for-itself that 
is devoid of all content and is characterized only by pure freedom. One of the reasons why the 
woman is in bad faith is that she looks at herself as a thing and wants the other to also recognize 
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her as a thing. She attaches objectivity to her own qualities and those of her suitor while these 
qualities are part of an ever-changing temporal flux.   
 
“We shall say that this woman is in bad faith. But we see immediately that she uses various 
procedures in order to maintain herself in this bad faith. She has disarmed the actions of her 
companion by reducing them to being what they are; that is, to existing in the mode of the in-
itself. But she permits herself to enjoy his desire, to the extent that she will apprehend it as not 
being what it is, will recognize its transcendence. Finally while sensing profoundly the presence 
of her own body – to the degree of being disturbed perhaps – she realizes herself as not being her 
own body, and she contemplates it as though from above as a passive object to which events can 
happen but which can neither provoke them nor avoid them because all its possibilities are 
outside of it.  What unity do we find in these various aspects of bad faith? It is a certain art of 
forming contradictory concepts which unite in themselves both an idea and the negation of that 
idea.  The basic concept which is thus engendered, utilizes the double property of the human 
being, who is at once facticity and transcendence. These two aspects of human reality are and 
ought to be capable of a valid coordination. But bad faith does not wish either to coordinate them 
or to surmount them in a synthesis. Bad faith seeks to affirm their identity while preserving their 
differences. It must affirm facticity as being transcendence and transcendence as being facticity, 
in such a way that at the instant when a person apprehends the one, he can find himself abruptly 
faced with the other.”145
 
The woman is in bad faith because she does not have knowledge of what she wants.  She is full 
of desire and inspires the desire of her companion but she refuses to acknowledge her desire for 
what it really is.  On the one hand she has formed idealizations of the emotions displayed by her 
partner and on the other hand, she does continue to feel and enjoy her desire only to the extent 
that she apprehends its transcendental form. Also in terms of her recognition of her own body, 
she sees her soul not as one with but as distinct from her body.  For her the body is purely an 
object, an in-itself that cannot act in this or that way but is merely at the behest of forces external 
to it. She does not have a grasp on what her possibilities really are.  Bad Faith is an attitude in 
which facticity (reality) and transcendence (idealization) cohere in such a manner that one is 
confused with another. During her rendezvous the woman affirms the idealization of the 
                                                 
145 Ibid., Sartre, p. 56 
 
 102
situation and confuses it with reality or forgets the realty altogether.  Her expectations of the 
situation are formed only by the idealization and objectification of transitory feelings and 
qualities.  Thus Bad Faith brings forth the tragedy of failure of expectations.  We form false 
expectations of a situation by working with a mind that is suffused with contradictions.  We fail 
to see the demands of the situation and to know what is required of us. Sartre refers to the 
transcendence-facticity complex as a metastable concept.  What underlies this metastasis is a 
lack of solid commitment so that when in bad faith, one continually shifts to and fro between 
transcendence and facticity146.         
 
To show with further clarity as to how self-deception represents a tragic paradox, I would like to 
refer back to Szondi’s identification of the tragic with the dialectic which is – “the unity of 
opposites, the change into one’s opposite, the negative positing of oneself, self-division”147. If 
we go by Sartre’s analysis of self-deception, we can see that it is a unification of opposites - 
transcendence and facticity. Also in bad faith, transcendence is taken as facticity and facticity is 
taken as transcendence.  Furthermore, the person in bad faith posits himself negatively, that is, as 
a thing devoid of possibilities.  Finally, bad faith is manifested in the occurrence of arbitrary 
divisions within the self.  We can see for instance the way in which the woman in Sartre’s 
example completely divides her body from her soul.  That Sartre’s conception of self-deception 
follows Szondi’s dialectical formulation of the tragic is in itself not sufficient to show the 
potential for tragedy that this attitude contains. 
 
Let us take for instance Sartre’s description of two opposing and contradictory judgments that 
can be made on the issue of love.  Bad Faith, for Sartre, is subtle art of exploiting such 
contradictory judgments with the aim of establishing that “I am not what I am” which is an 
avoidance of responsibility and an escape into inauthenticity.  In matters of love, Sartre seems to 
be saying, there is an idealism or transcendence found in Plato’s Eros, Lawrence’s Deep Cosmic 
Intuition, Mauriac’s “river of fire” (longing for the infinite)148.  That is one judgment on the 
nature of love but there is another which is based on the facticity of love. Sartre refers here to 
“the contact of two skins, sensuality, egoism, Proust’s mechanism of jealousy, Adler’s battle of 
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sexes”149. Sartre shows how these two contradictory judgments on love are unified in a 
prototypical formula of bad faith captured in the title of a work by a French novelist Jacque 
Chardonne – “Love Is Much More than Love”150.  In this statement the facticity or reality of the 
present of love is unified with its idealized or transcendental form in such a manner that we 
escape instantaneously from the concrete to the transcendent.  On the other hand, there are 
formulae of bad faith where transcendence perpetually disintegrates into facticity.  In this regard 
Sartre gives the example of the title of a play by Sarment – “I Am Too Great for Myself” or the 
following sentence – “He has become what he was”151.  The main point here is that the formulaic 
expressions of bad faith are devoid of substantial content. The coming together of contradictory 
statements in these formulae means that they are perpetually unstable in that they move from 
idealization to reality and vice versa.  
 
“We can see the use which bad faith can make of these judgments which all aim at establishing 
that I am not what I am. If I were only what I am, I could, for example, seriously consider an 
adverse criticism which someone makes of me, question myself scrupulously, and perhaps be 
compelled to recognize the truth in it.  But thanks to transcendence, I am not subject to all that I 
am.  I do not even have to discuss the justice of the reproach…the ambiguity necessary for bad 
faith comes from the fact that I affirm here that I am my transcendence in the mode of being of a 
thing.”152
 
We can break into the above passage by thinking in terms of the distinction that Sartre makes 
between the For-itself and the In-itself.  The For-itself is human consciousness and it is nothing 
but pure freedom and the source of all negation in the world.  The in-itself, on the contrary, is 
fullness and it consists of the world outside of human consciousness.  The consciousness of 
freedom comes only through the anguish in the face of possibilities which are always my 
possibilities.  For Sartre, Bad Faith is an escape from this anguish and thus from freedom itself.  
The engagement with possibilities that Sartre speaks of is conscious and reflective.  If I am 
acting in Bad Faith, I am still reflecting but in such a way that I am pure transcendence devoid of 
the facts of my reality.  Moreover, I am my transcendence in the mode of the in-itself which is 
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duplicitous because what I am is the for-itself which is in opposition to being in-itself.  In bad 
faith I have confused my facticity with my idealizations in such a way that I am completely 
blinded to the responsibility that I bear for my situation – there are clear echoes of Oedipus here.  
Returning to the case of the young woman we can see how she has taken the respect shown her 
by her companion on to the plane of the transcendent.  All the facts of her situation are made to 
adhere to the idealizations and eventually they acquire for her the character of the in-itself 
whereas in fact they are the products of a free consciousness. 
 
Sartre explains that the metastable concept of transcendence-facticity is not the only ground for 
self-deception.  Another very basic example of duplicity as derived from concrete human reality 
is rooted in the distinction between being-for-itself and being-for-others.  Self-deception occurs 
when my being-for-itself is defined by what others make of me.  This is a form of duplicity in 
which I have forgotten that I know more about myself than others know about me.  This implies 
that I am living a second-handed life in which I do not have an original position on any matter.  
All of my beliefs and positions – particularly those that pertain to my inner life – are derived 
from what others make of me. The expectations that I form for myself do not come from within, 
they are based rather on how others see me.   
 
Sartre points out that each one of my actions can be subject to my own gaze and to the gaze of 
the other153.  These two looks or perspectives can be understood as two aspects of my being.  
These two perspectives on my being and actions will not have the exact same structure in any 
given case.  What does happen though, as Sartre points out, is that these two perspectives upon 
my being are not different in the way in which we speak of a difference between “appearance 
and being”154.  In self-deception, I think that what I know about myself is the same as what the 
other knows about me.  I thus fail to realize that there is a difference between the “truth” that I 
know about myself and the deformed image of my self that the other possesses of me.   
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“The equal dignity of being, possessed by my being-for-others and by my being-for-myself 
permits a perpetually disintegrating synthesis and a perpetual game of escape from the for-itself 
to the for-others and from the for-others to the for-itself”155. 
 
For Sartre, consciousness is unified and in self-deception a duality develops within the structure 
of this unity.  This duality results from the formation of a “disintegrating” identity which 
attempts to escape from itself.  Sartre makes a clear distinction between the for-itself and for-
others and explains that an unstable synthesis of the two is one of the basic instruments of bad 
faith.  Once I identify my being-for-myself with my being-for-others, I have fallen into a second-
handedness where my actions are determined not by self-knowledge but by what others think 
and know about me.  My self-awareness and consciousness of my own actions is confused with 
the awareness that others have of me to an extent where the former is covered over and 
forgotten.  I act according to standards that others have set for me and there is a lack of self-
consciousness in all of these actions. 
 
Sartre links this second basic instrument of bad faith with the first one as follows.  There is an 
aspect of our being which is the in-itself, that is, our thing-like presence as an object among 
other objects in the world.  It is through the aspect of our being which is the for-itself that we 
project ourselves beyond our thing-like presence in the world towards our own possibilities156.  
Looking back at the example of the woman who goes out on a rendezvous, we see how she 
manipulates her situation as an inert object in the midst of the world so as to escape her role as a 
being who creates her own world and her own possibilities.  Sartre uses the term “temporal 
ecstasy” to explain the escape from being-for-itself to being-in-itself.  This is an escape that 
occurs in both the instruments of bad faith that we have discussed so far.  Sartre’s elaborations of 
these two instruments of self-deception is directed at establishing that human reality is a “being 
which is what it is not and which is not what it is”157.  The two temporal ecstasies that we have 
studied are metastable concepts which are tied together by a single structure.  There is a 
particular disintegrating or confusing synthesis that lies behind the ambiguity generated by these 
temporal ecstasies.  This disintegrating or metastable synthesis affirms at once that “I am what I 
have been (the man who deliberately arrests himself at one period in his life and refuses to take 
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into consideration the later changes) and that I am not what I have been (the man who in the face 
of reproaches or rancor dissociates himself from his past by insisting on his freedom and on his 
perpetual re-creation)”.  Self-deception thus emerges not only as blindness towards one’s self 
and one’s situation but also as an escape from responsibility.  In the first instance, one’s past is 
seen as being inscribed in stone so that there is blindness towards changes that have occurred and 
an escape from the responsibility that one holds for the present and for the future.  In the second 
instance, one evades responsibility for what has happened in the past by insisting on a freedom 
that has assumed a thing-like form, devoid of consciousness.  In this case, the person in self-
deception is blind towards the fact that freedom is tied with consciousness and consciousness 
brings responsibility.  
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CHAPTER V 
TRAGEDY AS FAILURE OF EXPECTATIONS AND THE QUESTION OF DIGNITY 
 
The ‘tragic’ element in human existence is multi-faceted.  I hope to have brought this across in 
my first three chapters, each of which deals with a different type of tragedy in human life.  I 
think that in order to clarify the subject matter of this particular chapter and to clearly distinguish 
it from the previous three, it would be expedient to begin with the following question – Am I, as 
a person, exclusively a product of social, historical, environmental, cultural and political forces 
acting on me from without and of psychological and physiological forces acting from within? Or 
is there something more to me, other than and above and beyond all the forces that condition 
me?  
 
If I consider the first question within the context of the three chapters on tragedy that I have 
already written, it seems to me that the answer would be ‘yes’.  In my second chapter I drew 
mainly upon Hegel to show how political conflicts emerge from out of the adherence to deeply 
felt rational obligations that come to us from history.  Then in my third chapter, I started by 
drawing upon Simmel to broach upon the tragic conflict within culture or more precisely, the 
conflict that occurs between the inner life of the human person and the autonomous products of 
culture; a in which the latter prevail.  My fourth chapter was about the broad-based inner 
darkness of self-deception which leads to tragedy on an individual and collective level.  In this 
chapter I drew upon Sartre and Oedipus to bring forth the central features of tragic self-
deception, one of which is its seeming inevitability.  In my dissertation, I have not focused at all 
upon human physiology, but I think it is safe to say that there are iron-clad predetermined forces 
that control the body too and there are undoubtedly tragic conflicts that emerge from what we are 
biologically.  
 
In this, the fifth chapter of my dissertation, I will be looking at a different type of tragedy, one 
that will also enable me to provide an affirmative response to the second question (outlined 
above).  To explain myself, I need to speak in terms of well-known and perhaps not very subtle 
facts.  These are also facts that have not yet been tested on the anvil of history.  As I write these 
lines, the news media is reporting that Gaza is now under the control of Hamas while Fatah 
controls the West Bank.  In both Gaza and the West Bank, moves are being made by the 
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respective parties in power to “close the chapter” of activists and supporters of the opposing 
camp.  So until a few years ago, those fighting for the cause of Palestine, driven by deeply felt 
obligations towards their land, clashed with Israel.  It seems now that there are conflicting 
obligations within Palestine that is driving Palestinians to eliminate their own people and not 
Israelis.  So the political tragedy of Palestine now centers upon not just a fight with Israel but 
also a fight amongst the Palestinians themselves. Irrespective of what we can say about the 
rationality of passions or obligations that make groups of people collide against each other, to 
me, the situation in Palestine seems highly absurd and that is where the issue of tragic self-
deception comes into play.  The actions of the politicians have nothing whatsoever to do with 
what the situation on the ground demands of them.  Moreover, there is also the cultural force of 
Islam that is playing a role in the current conflict.  It appears here, as it does in so many other 
parts of the world, as a negative force of resentment.  The distorted face of Islam is not leading 
the Palestinians towards any kind of liberation on a personal or national basis.   
 
My point here is as follows.  All of this that I have pointed towards- the forces of historical 
obligation emanating from 1947 or 1967 or hundreds of years prior to that, self-deception among 
the politically powerful, the emergence of the cultural force of Islam as one that undermines the 
cause of liberation – does not fully capture the tragedy of Palestine.  There is at least one another 
aspect of the tragedy which is linked with the failure of expectations of the people and the loss of 
a sense of personal worth.   I would be making an unwarranted assumption if I were to say that 
every single person living in the occupied territories has a self which is totally and absolutely 
conditioned by forces of environment and history.  There is no doubt that the people living there 
are conditioned by their circumstances and are under the sway of some sort of ideological 
obligations but nevertheless this is not sufficient to explain their personality to the fullest.  What 
evades the grasp of any historicizing tendency or even self-deception is the human being’s sense 
of self-worth and the expectations that people have with regards to their relation to the world 
around them.  
 
I, as a human person, am undoubtedly conditioned by different social, historical and cultural 
forces.  These are forces that enter me from without, penetrating into and conditioning my inner 
life.  These forces are embodied also as expectations which others closely linked with me have 
of me and eventually these expectations that come from without merge with and transform the 
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expectations that I have of myself.  I think that my journey through the world consists of 
relations that I form with the world.  These relations bring expectations that are grounded in 
obligations towards family, nationality, ethnicity, ideology, comradeship and other sources.  
Moreover, there are also expectations that I have of myself with regard to the relation that I form 
with the world with respect to the work that I do here and this work enables me to realize an 
inner potential.  All of these different expectations enable me to live with a sense of belonging to 
the world and my sense of self-worth is associated with whether or not I have a place in this 
world. 
   
I have spoken with reference to Palestine to bring forth the point that the tragedy unfolding there 
has a subtle aspect which is distinct – but not in total separation from – historical obligation, 
thrust for political liberation, self-deception and cultural crisis.  This aspect or view of the 
situations centers upon the failure of people’s expectations in terms of their sense of self-worth 
or their perception of the place that they have in the world.  Many of the people living there may 
well be fighting with or supporting Hamas against Fatah and Israel or Fatah against Israel and 
Hamas.  However, the potential for tragedy is located not just in these fights but also in the 
individual’s sense of being rootless in the world, a loss of dignity and the failure of expectations 
of self-actualization.  When the political and military struggle of the Palestinians started, they 
were rootless due to the power of their enemy.  As Hamas and Fatah fight each other, the people 
of Palestine are even more deracinated and disillusioned because all of the violence is now 
directed inwards and all paths leading towards a dignified and free existence are at present 
closed.   
 
Even though the lines between the personal and the collective blur when speaking of 
deracination and failure of expectations, however, the issue is ultimately personal.  It is alive not 
just in zones of intense crisis like Palestine but can happen anywhere.  The basic idea is that it is 
possible for us to be in circumstances where our sense of belonging in the world and all of our 
expectations regarding our roles, responsibilities and the realization of our potential are 
threatened with failure.  The philosophical question about where our sense of dignity and our 
drive to making a place in the world comes from is another, separate and complicated matter 
which I can address only very briefly in the context of this dissertation.  One answer could be 
that the source of the sense of dignity is mysterious and cannot be localized.  Another response 
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would be that we do not really belong in the world in which we live and this is not something 
new, this is the way it has always been.  Our journey through the world is then an attempt to 
maintain the relations that we form with it and to continue to engender new ones.  This answer 
surely does not provide a sound basis for the perspective that there are personal expectations that 
persist independently of all kinds of conditioning.  For the time being I would take this as an 
assumption and continue working, I think that the source of human dignity and the expectations 
linked with it can only be illuminated by seeing the human person in action. 
 
I will now clarify my understanding of the concept, if not the source of human dignity.  To me, 
the dignity of an individual or of a group of persons centers upon having a meaningful relation 
with the world.  A person has dignity if he has a relation with the world that is characterized by 
reciprocity and leads towards not just a sense of belonging but also a sense of growth.  So the 
failure of expectations in this context becomes a failure of the expectations emerging out of the 
way in which the person has developed a relation with the world. For me, being in the world is a 
quest for making a place for oneself in an environment that is in essence alien to the human 
person.  The word home, for me, is not just a physical building; it is a powerful metaphor for a 
whole complex of features that constitute a deep relation with the world.  It is important to note 
here that the tragedy of a loss of relation with the world is more basic and fundamental when 
compared with the other facets of the tragic in human existence that I have discussed in this 
dissertation.   
 
To explain myself further, I would like to return to the powerful picture that the tragedy of 
Palestine presents which like all human tragedy, is multi-faceted.  Speaking in the context of 
modern history, the tragedy of the Holocaust and the expulsion of Jews from many countries in 
Europe was critical in motivating the desire for a politically, economically and militarily 
powerful and independent Jewish state.   The Jews who struggled for the creation of Israel had, 
in my view, legitimate historical obligations that they wanted to fulfill.  These legitimate 
obligations, of which the powerful state of Israel is an embodiment, came into tragic conflict 
with the equally legitimate obligations that the Palestinians felt as they struggled for their rights.  
So since then, as Israel has grown stronger in a world order that supports them, the Palestinians 
(and their Arab and Muslim sympathizers) have become increasingly marginalized.  After 1967, 
the Palestinians lost more land and power and the number of Palestinian refugees increased.  
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However, speaking now from the Palestinian perspective, many people - despite their physical 
deracination, poverty and humiliation – had a sense of belonging to the world.  And this sense of 
belonging or relatedness or dignity centered precisely upon the tragic struggle against a much 
more powerful enemy.   
 
So when Hamas and Fatah acted to eliminate one another and their actions led to a real split of 
the so called, occupied territories, into a West Bank and a Gaza, the failure of expectations 
occurred at two different level.  Firstly, this was a failure of expectations in terms of victory in 
the tragic conflict with Israel.  And victory here does not mean military conquest.  Victory in this 
conflict would mean genuine, mutual recognition from both sides that the other has a legitimate 
position and that they must learn to reconcile their differences and create an atmosphere of 
respect for each others’ position.  After all, Israel is here to stay and the Palestinians can also not 
be thrown into the Mediterranean Sea.  The internecine conflict among Palestinians has put them 
in a position where they have lost any semblance of genuine respect that the Israelis would have 
for them.  At a deeper level, the bloody inner strife amongst the Palestinians has rendered null 
and void a very way of life.  As I have mentioned before, for many Palestinians, the very 
meaning of the way in which they had constituted themselves in the world, centered upon the 
struggle for independence even though this struggle was always going to be futile.  With the 
inner strife between Hamas and Fatah, years of struggle against Israel have been rendered 
meaningless.  The expectations that have failed in this context were linked with the meaning of 
the struggle and its continuation in the future regardless of its futility.  There are battles in which 
the losers are perceived as winners and I think that Palestinian struggle against Israel was such a 
battle but now, the people’s expectations of being a part of this battle have been placed in a 
crisis.  It was this battle which gave physically deracinated people a sense of belonging in the 
world.  This sense of having a place in the world has now disappeared. 
 
With this analysis of the tragedy of Palestine, I hope to have shown that although, on the one 
hand, the peoples’ struggles are conditioned by specific historical circumstances, on the other 
hand there is an element to the tragedy which stems from something that is universal and 
independent of historical conditioning.  To talk about tragedy as the failure of expectations with 
reference to the issue of the human persons’ relation to the world is to appeal to a particular 
notion of the inner life according to which our effort to make meaningful relations with the 
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world is something which would always evade the grasp of historical determinism.  During this 
discussion of Palestine, I have referred to self-deception and cultural crisis as two facets of the 
tragedy which, once again are distinct from the subject-matter of this chapter.  I think that 
amongst both Arabs and the Israelis, their respective religions (Islam and Judaism) have emerged 
as distorted cultural forces, alienated from their essence.  Speaking of tragic self-deception, there 
is much more of it among the Arabs, the 1967 War being a metaphor for inner blindness.   
 
I would now turn to Arthur Miller’s play, “Death as a Salesman”158.  This play provides a subtle 
model for the facet of human tragedy which is the subject matter of this chapter.  The action of 
this play occurs mainly at the level of family; however, the way in which Miller presents it, the 
play becomes a metaphor for much broader concerns.  In every scene of this play, we can 
observe the dialectic between expectations and their failure along with the transformation of 
hope into despair.  In this sense, Miller’s tragedy does follow Szondi’s theory in that the tragic, 
irrespective of what form it takes, always unravels according to a (Hegelian) dialectical pattern.  
It would be expedient then to analyze this play on a scene by scene basis.     
 
One of the primary ways in which we make a relation with the world is through the work that we 
do in it.  The work that we do forms a link between our inner life and the world around us.  To 
do work that is meaningful is to be involved in an activity with which the inner life flourishes.  If 
the work that we do in the world is meaningful in that sense then we feel connected with the 
world because this relation consists of mutual reciprocation - I put my deepest inner self into the 
world through my work and what the world gives to me is a place, a “spot”.  I think that to have 
a meaningful life, we must affirm the roles give to us by nature – I for instance am biologically a 
son and a brother – and to create and assume new ones.  If the work that we do is meaningful to 
us then it defines a role that we have assumed in this world.  And with this role come 
expectations which center upon the persistence of a reciprocal relation with the world.  The 
failure of expectations in this context would occur if this defining role is taken away from a 
person or if there is no reciprocation – I put my life into my work and correspondingly into the 
world and get nothing in return.  I think that this is one of the fundamental themes in “Death of a 
Salesman”.  
                                                 
158 Arthur Miller, Collected Plays, edited by Tony Kushner (New York: Library Classics of the United 
States Press, 2006), pp. 159 – 258).   
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I look also at Nietzsche’s idea of “eternal recurrence of the same” from the perspective of having 
and playing a role in the world.  If the history of the world consists of repetitive patterns then the 
only thing that is unique and meaningful, as it were, is the role that an individual can assume, 
affirm and play to the fullest during a life span.  So what gives meaning to a human experience is 
precisely this assumption of a role in the world which entails connection with the world.  I 
understand Nietzsche’s Dionysus and Apollo also in this context.  To have the Dionysian force 
active in one’s life is to affirm and be in some way connected with the ebb and flow of life.  It is 
only after having experienced the Dionysian connection with the world that one creates the 
Apollonian image.  This latter can be a work of art or of literature but I think that in Nietzsche’s 
schema the creation is of one’s own self.  The main point here is that in order to chisel out a self, 
I must first have a deep Dionysian connection with the world and this comes out of the process 
of playing a role in the world.  To have lost the role or for the role to lose meaning translates into 
a loss of the Dionysian force in one’s life.  And with the loss of this Dionysian force, one also 
endures destruction of the image that one has made of oneself.   So living life with a role 
(Dionysian connection) is to build an image of oneself and it is with this image that expectations 
are linked.  Once the role goes, so does the image and with that comes the failure of expectations 
which were built around the image that the person created of himself. 
 
To take our discussion of the notion of role further, I would like to examine the character of 
Linda in Death of a Salesman.  If the work that we do in the world is a defining relation for our 
inner life then what is it that Linda does? Willy is a salesman but what does Linda do? Linda is a 
mother and a wife.  The role of mother and wife that Linda gets in virtue of her relation with 
Willy, Biff and Happy is the one that defines Linda’s work in the world.  All of Linda’s 
expectations and obligations regarding what she is in the world stem from this one role.  She 
affirms this role and fulfills all the responsibilities that come with it.  There can be an argument 
about whether Linda is ultimately a tragic character or not.  I think that perhaps she is not a 
tragic character because despite everything, her defining role in life stays with her and she plays 
it fully till the end of the action of the play.  However, there is definite potential for tragedy in 
her character because she is so deeply committed to her role and obligations.   
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We learn about Linda’s character not only through her own actions and words but also from 
what the persons most deeply associated with her say about her.  Happy says, “What a Woman! 
They broke the mold when they made her. You know that, Biff?”159 Biff also loves her dearly, 
referring to her as “pal” on more than one occasion and passionately defending her against the 
“little cruelties”160 of Willy Loman.  Loman himself loves her deeply and says “You’re my 
foundation and my support, Linda.”161  She is the foundation of the Loman family in many 
different ways.  She is the only character in the family who is absolutely consistent in her efforts 
to keep the home together.  While she remains unaware of this, her persistent love for her family 
tragically lies at the center of one of the pivotal sources of the anguish of the family.  Biff Loman 
makes an inner decision to give up on life when he discovers that his father has been unfaithful 
to his beloved mother.  The moment when he says in anger and grief, “You gave her Mama’s 
stockings”162 is also the moment when despite all of the love that he had for him, Biff is 
alienated from his father.  Biff and Willy are both witness to the long standing image of Linda 
darning her old stockings out of a sense of selflessness.  And now when Biff sees Willy giving 
away new stockings to another woman he experiences the rupture of what for him was his 
deepest connection with the world – his relationship with his father Willy.  
 
In my view, the most important thing that anyone in the play says about Linda comes from Willy 
Loman – “The woman has waited and the woman has suffered.”163 Willy speaks more than once 
about wanting to do something to improve the situation of the family because that would lead to 
an alleviation of Linda’s suffering.  Now what has Linda been waiting for and what is the 
meaning of her suffering?  Linda has spent her whole life caring for the household.  She takes 
care of the minutest details.  The play makes references to her waxing of the kitchen floor, the 
selection of cheese, getting the heater repaired, having the refrigerator fixed.  All of these are 
moments which hitherto did not find a place in the annals of tragedy but at the risk of speaking 
tritely, I say that to take care of these everyday objects makes a house a source of our grounding 
in this world.  Linda stands by Willy Loman through all the trials and tribulations.  Their life 
together is for the most part quite difficult with only interstices of joy.  She does not understand 
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as to what exactly it is that Willy does but she saves what she can out of the little that Willy 
brings home.  She makes him feel loved and wanted even at times when he feels degraded and 
unwanted by the American business world.  Linda protects Willy from the illusions that Ben’s 
stories create in his mind.  Linda is also the emotional bulwark for her sons and provides a 
critical, balancing force. For instance when Biff is still a child, she warns Willy against spoiling 
him too much.     
  
In essence, Linda has poured her life into the family on a sustained basis.  But what is her 
teleology? What does she expect to receive at the end?  What outcome is she expecting? I think 
that her position is encapsulated in the following dialogue with Willy which occurs at the 
beginning of the play: 
 
Willy: Figure it out. Work a lifetime to pay off a house. You finally own it, and there’s nobody 
to live in it. 
Linda: Well, dear, life is a casting off. It’s always that way.164
 
Linda understands life as nothing but a series of losses.  This position reflects her wisdom in that 
she has learned to constitute herself in terms of her experiences.  I think that the cause of her 
anguish does not lie in the fact that the situation around her demands further sacrifice from her. 
She is completely loyal to her family and persistent in her willingness to sacrifice and to be 
patient.  She does not expect anything for herself and neither does she expect the family to move 
towards a glorious future.  What hurts her now is that Willy Loman is undergoing increasingly 
humiliating experiences in his life as a salesman.  She does not share Willy’s sense of teleology 
but she does want him to spend the rest of his life in dignity with his family.  While Willy is 
going under, his sons are standing by, incapable - not only of doing something to help him 
financially - but, more importantly, of making him feel at home.  The locus of Linda’s 
expectations is the unity of the family, she struggled all of her life to keep things together but 
now Willy is going under and the sons have failed to recognize and fulfill their role in the 
family.  She thus points towards their disloyalty, “He’s put his whole life into you and you have 
turned your backs on him.”165
                                                 
164 Ibid., Kushner, p. 164.  
165 Ibid., Kushner, p. 197 
 
 116
 
Now what does it mean for a human person to invest his entire life into another person or a 
group of persons and then see the latter turn away from him.  I have previously spoken of the 
Palestinians but I would now like to give another lesser known example from history and 
politics. I would like to speak briefly about the tragic history of a group of people known as 
“stranded Pakistanis”.  When Pakistan was created in 1947 it had an east wing and a west wing 
separated by a massive Indian enclave.  That east wing became Bangladesh in 1971.  The 
political struggle for Pakistan was concentrated to a great extent in areas of India that are still a 
part of that country.  After the creation of Pakistan, countless numbers of those Muslims who 
had struggled for its creation left their homes in India to come to their new country, a promised 
land as it were.  In addition to patriotism towards Pakistan, communal violence within India was 
another factor which motivated people to immigrate.  Most of the immigrants came to the area 
that is now Pakistan and which was then West-Pakistan.  However, there was also a group of 
people originating from the current Indian state of Bihar who chose to settle in East Pakistan.  
When the civil war ensued in East Pakistan in 1971 and India took the side of the Bengalis 
fighting against the Pakistan Army, the Biharis put together a civilian army and fought for 
Pakistan.  These civilian soldiers were ultimately much more valiant in their defense of their 
perceived homeland than even the regular Pakistan Army.  Ninety thousand Pakistani soldiers 
surrendered to the Indians and Bangladesh was created.  Immediately after the creation of 
Bangladesh, the Biharis underwent systematic oppression and persecution.  They were not 
granted citizenship of Bangladesh due to their unflinching loyalty towards Pakistan.  The Biharis 
themselves did not want to live in Bangladesh; they considered themselves to be Pakistanis and 
expected to be repatriated to their homeland in the near future. Even as they were stripped of all 
of their belongings and condemned to live in makeshift settlements, they remained loyal to 
Pakistan.  They flew the flag of their country while living in abject poverty in a place that used to 
be their home but was now an alien country.  This is when the real tragedy of the Biharis started 
to unfold.  Their expectations were rooted in becoming citizens of Pakistan and they began to 
wait for that day to arrive.  Years passed by and that day never came.  The government of 
Pakistan refused to accept these, their own people because they did not want to disturb the 
complex ethnic balance in Pakistan.  The Pakistan government appealed to arbitrary clauses in 
the constitution to cover up their disloyalty to their own people.  In the year 1990 after 19 years 
of waiting, 100000 of these Biharis were accepted by Pakistan and settled in an area of Karachi 
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called Orangi Town which by the way is the largest slum in Asia.  However, even those who 
came out of the makeshift camps into Pakistan were not given Pakistani citizenship.  The worst 
off are clearly those 300,000 or so who are still stateless in Bangladesh and continue to live in 
makeshift communities.  These are the people who are commonly known as ‘stranded 
Pakistanis’.  Despite all these years, there are many among them who hold on to the dream of 
becoming Pakistanis some day.  It seems though that, at least for now, the people whom they 
consider their own have forgotten about them.  Even political parties which speak in the name of 
those who are ethnically immigrants in Pakistan no longer bring up this issue.  The ‘stranded 
Pakistanis’ invested their life into and constructed all of their expectations around the idea of 
Pakistan and the people of Pakistan but they remained stateless and humiliated, continuing to 
hold on to fragments of a shattered dream.    
 
The purpose of this tangential discussion is to show that even though “Death of Salesman” is set 
at the level of a family and an individual and in the context of America, it carries immense 
potential for explaining human tragedy in a universal sense.  The life of Willy Loman is a subtle 
model for understand what the stranded Pakistanis have gone through.  They fight for the 
creation of Pakistan, perceiving it as a land where they would live with dignity.  They migrate 
from India to East Pakistan and become a prosperous community in their chosen country.  The 
Bengalis rise in revolt against the government of West Pakistan.  The Biharis remain fiercely 
patriotic to West Pakistan and what they get in return?  A life lived in the midst of filth and the 
failure of their deepest expectations.  They were rejected by precisely those whom they 
considered to be their own people and for whom they sacrificed their lives.    
 
Coming back to our discussion of Death of a Salesman, I think that it is important to look further 
into the relation between teleology and tragedy.  It seems to me that Linda does not have 
teleology in the sense that Willy has.  Despite this, there is potential for tragedy in her character 
because of the committed manner in which she has constituted herself as the mother of Biff and 
Happy and the wife of Willy.  She is the force that holds the family together.  In the case of 
Willy, it is obvious that he wants and crucially expects things to move towards an outcome. For 
himself, he wants the position of “number one man”166 and to eventually sum up to something.  
He forms expectations regarding a particular type of greatness for Biff and Happy.  The two sons 
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Biff and Happy do not have any tragic potential.  They do not have teleology and neither are 
they fully committed, like Linda, to a framework of obligations.  Now, the comparison of Linda 
and Willy does bring up the point that a person does not of necessity have to be directed towards 
an unrealizable teleological end in order to have tragic potential or to become a tragedy.  What is 
needed though is commitment, being passionately rooted and invested in something.  The 
expectations emerge out of such a commitment and their failure is a tragedy.  I think that Linda 
would never self-destruct or commit suicide as long as her sons consider her to be their mother.  
As long as there is some semblance of her family left, she would continue to live and to struggle 
because her family is her work and her life.  Willy, on the other hand invested himself with a 
strong sense of teleology in his life as a Salesman.  He is being dislodged from his position and 
he knows also that he has done something to damage the relation between him and Biff.  All 
Linda wants is to have a home where the sons would live with their father, support him, respect 
him and become serious men themselves.  She does not really understand the working life but 
more than anyone else, she understands what Willy needs and what the family needs.  She is 
passionately insistent as she tries to evoke a sense of responsibility in her sons: 
 
“I don’t say he is a great man.  Willy Loman never made a lot of money.  His name was never in 
the paper.  He is not the finest character that ever lived.  But he’s a human being, and a terrible 
thing is happening to him.  So attention must be paid.  He’s not to be allowed to fall into his 
grave like an old dog.  Attention, attention must finally be paid to such a person.”167
 
What does it mean for a man to “fall into his grave like an old dog”?  I think that it is pointless to 
speak of this in concepts.  This is ultimately an image, a powerful one with endless 
reverberations.  Linda creates this image for her sons to make them realize that they need to step 
forward and save their father from going under.  A significant part of Willy’s place in the world 
revolved around his work and now that is being taken away from him.  He is slowly becoming 
rootless from that perspective and with that comes a loss of dignity.  Willy is a man who has 
created an image for himself in front of his friend Charley but now by borrowing money from 
him, he is also losing dignity.  The man is going under and Linda has created a subtle evocation 
of this through her words.  Her appeal for intervention is directed towards her sons.  They are 
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expected to intervene, it is their responsibility.  But since they have failed to play the role of 
sons, Linda appeals to them in the name of humanity.   
 
Linda’s appeal to her sons to save Willy - not just because he is their father and has invested his 
whole life in them but simply because he is now a rootless human being - is very meaningful.  
Let us imagine a person going under, losing dignity in a place alien to him where he does not 
have any friends and no one there is related to him by blood.  Even that person would have some 
expectations of help from the others around him who are watching him.  That neither Biff nor 
Happy really care as their father falls apart in front of their very eyes is captured in an extract 
from a dialogue between Letta - a type of girl whom Linda calls “lousy whore” - and Happy.  
These words are exchanged in the scene at the restaurant during which one of the things Willy 
says, “I’m not interested in stories about the past or any crap of that kind because the woods are 
burning, boys, you understand? There’s a big blaze going around. I was fired today.”168  While 
Willy is falling to pieces as he slips into the past inside the restaurant washroom, Biff and Happy 
have an argument in which each of them tries to evade responsibility and they then leave the 
place with the two girls  – 
 
Letta: Don’t you want to tell your father –  
Happy: No, that’s not my father. He’s just a guy. Come on, we’ll catch Biff, and, honey, we’re 
going to paint this town!169
 
One of the aspects of the tragedy of Willy Loman is that Happy and Biff (about whom Willy has 
been most concerned) are incapable and unwilling to invest something meaningful into the 
family. Moreover, Willy expects them to provide a solid support to him as he is going under but 
they fail to do so.  The signs are there for everyone to see.  Linda realizes this most of all, 
Willy’s friend Charley too but precisely those whose intervention Willy needs and expects most 
fail him in this respect.  In the final analysis they are incapable of paying the attention to Willy 
that Linda demands and Willy expects - neither as sons nor as fellow human beings.   
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There is then a distinct aspect to tragedy as failure of expectations in terms of dignity and this is 
defined well by Arthur Miller.  Willy Loman worked to make a place for himself in the world, to 
create some sort of image and now that he is going under, his sons are the amongst those 
watching him and they are the only ones who can truly help him to regain a foothold.  He 
expects their help and yet they fail to do anything.  I think that this failure of the expectation of 
help from the only ones who can really do something and yet fail to do so demands special 
notice.   
 
Willy Loman is an individual going under right in the midst of his beloved family and those who 
can truly help him fail to do so.  This provides a model for understanding a form of tragedy that 
has unfolded in history before and continues to do so to this day.  People go under as a mass, on 
a collective level and those from whom intervention is expected fail to do anything.  It seems 
almost absurdly irrevocable when large numbers of persons undergo a crisis of expectations and 
the dialectic continues to unfold and take its toll.  A tragedy of this type which has captured the 
imagination of the world is that of Darfur.  That this atrocity has been allowed to occur just a few 
years after the genocide in Rwanda and Bosnia is very mysterious to me.  I think that it is 
pedagogically significant to note that there are situations in which, irrespective of what people 
do to help those are going under, nothing works.  From one perspective, Willy does get receive 
kindness from Charley and then most of Linda who has always been there for him.  What he 
really needs and expects is that his sons should affirm and fulfill their roles, this they are 
incapable of and even when they do try to help but it is not enough.  Linda’s simply words echo 
loudly in the theater of Darfur for people over there have indeed been degraded and thrown into 
their graves like “old dogs”.  Based on what I know about the tragedy, the main issue is slavery.  
Slavery of black Africans has always been a part of Arab society.  When Islam came into the 
picture in the seventh century, this issue became contentious because the religion forbids slavery.  
This injunction against slavery was interpreted by the Arab Muslims to mean that a people can 
be enslaved as long as they are not Muslim.  So when the Arab Muslims became rulers of Sudan, 
for years they made efforts to ensure that the black Africans in Darfur would not become 
Muslims.  This gave the Arab based Sudanese a chance to continue to own slaves from among 
the population of the country.  However, Islam did come to the oppressed of Sudan, not through 
the Arabs but through sources within the black Africans of Sudan.  So once the people in what is 
now Darfur converted to Islam, they could no longer be seen as potential slaves and regained 
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their place in the world.  The people of southern Sudan, the original inhabitants of the land, 
developed their own political identity and stood up for themselves in the face of the African 
Arabs who dominate most of the country.  Over the centuries, the Arabs who ruled Sudan 
continued to carry with them a sense of resentment at having lost their erstwhile slaves.  My 
position is that the ongoing genocide in Sudan is a result of feelings of resentment that had been 
bottled up for centuries.  The African Arabs in Sudan – the Janjaweed - now want to eliminate 
them, expel them and change the genetic configuration of the people of Darfur by systematic 
rape on a wide scale.  The Janjaweed are driven by motives coming to them through history.  
These motives are grounded in the denial of and resentment against the fact that an erstwhile 
enslaved people have attained their own political and religious identity, their place in the world.  
The tragedy of Darfur is also one that presents a strong challenge to Hegel’s understanding of 
conflict in history, politics and society.  In genocide, does the side committing atrocity have any 
rationally grounded obligation through which they can justify their actions?   
 
The aspect of this tragedy that we need to focus on in the context of this chapter is as follows – 
How does it happen that the genocide in Darfur unravels over a period of ten years right in front 
of the eyes of the world and yet there is no concrete help?  Global organizations such as the 
United Nations were instituted to ensure that precisely this type of tragedy does not occur.  
These are people who are justified in expecting help as they are being systematically dislodged 
from their place in the world in every possible way and yet those who can do something are 
incapable of stepping forward, failing to fully realize, assume and fulfill their roles.  Within the 
broader tragedy of Darfur, there is also this specific moment where a human being has cried out, 
expecting help and is met only with beauracratic debates over “facts” and an egregious evasion 
of responsibility.    
 
Returning again to the plot elements of Death of a Salesman and the character of Willy Loman, I 
would like to consider the notion of the American Dream.  Willy Loman is a man who 
undoubtedly loves American culture and believes fanatically in the American Dream.  On one of 
the many occasions in the play where he expresses his frustrations over the way Biff has lived 
his life, he says, “Biff Loman is lost.  In the greatest country in the world a young man with such 
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- personal attractiveness gets lost.”170  Willy also says once, “America if full of beautiful towns 
and fine, upstanding people.”171 Willy does have an intimate relation with the geographical and 
cultural landscape of America.  His line of work required him to travel all over the country, 
opening up “unheard of territories” for his company.  In the play we get images of Willy driving 
across long distances, always carrying the hope that wherever he went, he would be recognized 
and “well liked” for what he is and this would be eventually translated into success in economic 
terms.  Despite all of the setbacks, Willy never really loses the sense that the land of America is 
congenial to him and his dreams and expectations.  Towards the end of the play, even as he his 
falling apart and losing everything, Willy sets out to purchase seeds so as to plant a garden in the 
now barren ground in front of his home: 
 
“I’ve got to get some seeds.  I’ve got to get some seeds, right away.  Nothing’s planted. I don’t 
have a thing in the ground.”172
 
What then is the American dream? I will speak about it from the perspective of an outsider, 
looking into America.  As long as you possess a valid (specifically - legal) perception of the 
manner in which you want to relate to the world in terms of the work that you do in it and 
provided that you are willing to put in a fight, then America is a place that would be congenial 
for you to realize the expectations that you have created for yourself.  The term ‘American 
dream’ is nothing but a pluralistic metaphor for the expectations of personal success that many 
different people from all over the world carry with them when they come to this country.  When 
a person dreams the American dream, that person is taking a courageous step towards affirming 
and fulfilling not only the expectations that center upon self actualization but also the 
expectations that others most dear to him have of him.  There is an atmosphere of hope in 
America; it invites a person to have expectations of becoming rooted, making a place in the 
world, of amounting to something.  Since Willy Loman believes so strongly in America and the 
America dream he simply cannot understand his son Biff, “Don’t you want to be anything?” he 
says to him on multiple occasions.  I think that what Willy finds truly intangible about his son 
Biff is that he does not have any expectations of himself.  Biff is hiding from his expectations 
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and this is also precisely the reason for saying that he does not have the potential to become a 
tragic character.   
 
To me, as an outsider in America, the deepest aspect of American society is that it calls out for 
an investment of expectations.  The atmosphere generates hope.  More importantly, the 
American dream, as I have discussed above, is multi-various.  It does not matter as to what kind 
of expectations you have; the crucial thing is to have expectations and to work towards their 
fulfillment.  In my country Pakistan the scope of the dream, as it were, is very limited.  In 
general, the atmosphere of the country does not really call out for an investment of hope.  In 
Pakistan if you haven’t got it made then the struggle to make yourself is so overwhelming that 
many simply give up.  It would be accurate to say that in Pakistan, there is no equivalent to the 
American dream.  There used to be a Pakistani dream when the country first came into being in 
1947.  People came to the country with many expectations and worked hard to build a new 
nation but those expectations have died a silent and unacknowledged death not once, but many 
times over the course of the country’s history.  It is interesting for me to note that Death of a 
Salesman can be read as a subtle metaphor for the history of Pakistan specifically of my city, 
Karachi.  When Pakistan came into being, Karachi had a population of no more than 100,000 
people; it is now 15 million.  The city was populated and built up by those who fought for it as 
citizens of India.  One of the primary reasons given for the creation of Pakistan was that in this 
country people would live with dignity, that is, they would succeed in making a place for 
themselves, an identity in the world.  The people of my father’s generation lived with this dream 
and worked hard. Like the dream of Willy Loman, this was a new and original dream, a 
deviation from historical conditioning.  They expected the country to move in the direction that 
they had dreamed of but things turned out otherwise.  The fragments of the original dream stile 
shine through sometimes when one is in Karachi, but in general it is an urban jungle 
characterized by crime, corruption, civic mismanagement and most crucially, despair.     
 
The relation between Willy and his son Biff is complex and full of contradictions.  The two of 
them say contradictory things about each other.  At one moment Willy says, “Biff is a lazy 
bum!” and the next moment, “there’s one thing about Biff – he’s not lazy”173.  Biff, on his side 
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calls his father “fake” or “phony”174 at two critical moments in the play.  The first occasion is 
when Biff discovers that his father has a mistress; the second occasion is when he gives Willy 
the instrument of suicide (rubber pipe) and basically points out to him that he has been nothing 
but a failure all of his life.  Despite this, however, Biff also says something during the play 
which for me encapsulates the character of Willy Loman: “You’ve just seen a prince walk by. A 
fine, troubled prince.  A hardworking, unappreciated prince. A pal, you understand? A good 
companion. Always for his boys.”175
 
At the beginning of this chapter I made the point about how the inner life of the individual has 
something unique to it which evades the grasp of historical and social conditioning.  We learn 
during the play that Willy is the son of a father who was never there for him.  That father simply 
took off at some point in Willy’s early childhood and did not ever come back.  We learn also 
about Willy’s brother Ben who makes an appearance only on a few of occasions in Willy’s life 
but leaves a make on his active memory.  Ben has accumulated immense wealth through the 
diamond trade in Africa.  He comes across as a person who approaches his floundering brother 
not to help him but only to display his own wealth and to demonstrate to Willy and his family 
that they are nothing.  Ben makes empty propositions to Willy, asking him to come to Alaska – 
“there’s a new continent at your doorstep” – while his real purpose is to make Willy regret the 
path that he has chosen for himself and to show him that he and the family that he has nurtured 
are failures.  Willy then belongs to a family in which there is no sense of loyalty.  I think that in 
this context it would be accurate to say that at some point in his life Willy must have made a 
conscious, inner decision to be a loyal father and husband.  He suffers immense guilt for having 
cheated on his wife which in my view only goes to show how much he loves her and the family.  
He tells Linda on a couple of occasions, “I will make it all up to you”.  I think that to refer to 
someone as a prince is to say that he is genuine, authentic.  Despite his personal failings, Willy 
remains an authentic father figure and husband till the end.  I read his suicide as the final 
expression of his deep commitment to his family.  He has given his deepest inner resources to 
them and he is therefore fully justified in placing expectations in his sons and it is tragic when he 
says – “Where are you guys, where are you? The woods are burning! I can’t drive a car!” 
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Willy Loman is also a prince in his chosen line of work.  He does not ever become “number one 
man” but setting aside the success factor, he is a salesman in the same manner as Picasso is an 
artist.  He works for his family, which is his connection to the world but his work also keeps him 
ontologically connected to the world.  He has made a place, albeit a precarious one, for himself 
in the world by playing the role of the salesman.  He works very hard and with a great sense of 
personal dignity and style.  Willy’s work as a salesman is a part of his inner life; he could never 
see himself otherwise.  Biff, for instance, insists to the end that Willy could have been better as a 
carpenter, “there is more of him in that front stoop than in all the sales he ever made”176, he says 
in the funeral.  Even if, as Biff implies, Willy has lived all of his life in bad faith, his seriousness 
and his tragedy emerges out of the fact that he did work hard and invested all of his expectations 
in his work and his family only to find himself rootless and unrecognized.   Willy is also in bad 
faith due to the way in which he carries his personal sense of loyalty into the cut-throat jungle 
that is the world of business.  And this too, in my view, was an inner, authentic, breakaway 
decision from a man who comes from a family where his brother Ben says to Biff after felling 
him through a rough and unwarranted move at the end of a friendly boxing game, “Never fight 
fair with a stranger boy, you’ll never get out of the jungle that way”177.  All that Willy wants is 
to be “well liked”, that is, he wants to be loyal to people and expects loyalty in return.  His friend 
Charley points towards this as a flaw in Willy’s attitude: 
 
WILLY: That snotnose.  Imagine that? I named him. I named him Howard. 
CHARLEY: Willy, when’re you gonna realize that them things don’t mean anything? You 
named him Howard, but you can’t sell that.  The only thing you got in this world is what you can 
sell.  And the funny thing is that you’re a salesman, and you don’t know that.  
WILLY: I’ve always tried to think otherwise, I guess. I always felt that if a man was impressive, 
and well liked, that nothing -  
 
Willy, however, consistently lives his ideal of loyalty and continues to expect reciprocation to 
the end.  At the specific moment when he walks out of his home for the last time to commit 
suicide he is not in despair but full of joy because he imagines the “grandeur” of Biff with 
“twenty-thousand dollars in his pockets.”  Willy is also expecting that his funeral would be 
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attended by a large number of salesmen and other people.  He expects also that his son would 
love him and finally realize Willy’s worth as a father and a salesman.   
 
“That funeral will be massive! They’ll come from Maine, Massachusetts, Vermont, New 
Hampshire! All the old-timers with the strange license plates – that boy will be thunderstruck, 
Ben, because he never realized – I am known, Ben, and he’ll see it with his eyes once and for 
all…Why, why can’t I give him something and not have him hate me?”178  
 
None of this happened.  “Where were all the people he knew?” says Linda at the funeral.  A total 
of four people came to the funeral – Biff, Happy, Linda and Willy’s only true friend in the 
world, Charley.  Moreover, even at the funeral Biff says, “He had all the wrong dreams.  All, all, 
wrong…the man didn’t know what he was.”179  So even after having given his life, Willy does 
not find the reciprocation for the loyalty that he gave to his profession and his son.  Unlike Biff, 
Willy was sure of his role in life, he was a salesman and a father.  Willy may have become a 
carpenter or even a diamond miner but the point is that he constituted himself as a salesman and 
affirmed this to the fullest.  The tragedy emerges from the failure of all of the expectations that 
emerged from his role as a salesman and a father.   
 
The sense of personal loyalty that Willy carries into his field of commerce has with time become 
truly obsolete in it.  It is a world that is suffused with the capitalistic ethos.  What to speak of 
business, it seems to me that now the capitalistic ethos pervades through all fields of work in 
society.  The scene at Howard’s office deserves special attention in this connection.  This scene, 
however, like the rest of Miller’s play provides a subtle model for the expression of that tragic 
moment when a human person is being dislodged from his place in the world and his sense of 
dignity is tarnished.   
 
In the immediate background to Willy’s appearance at Howard’s office is the hopeful event of 
the previous night.  During this event the entire Loman family had a discussion the conclusion of 
which was that Biff would go to his former boss, a businessman named Oliver and ask him for a 
loan with which Biff and Happy would open a sporting equipment business in Florida.  As Hap 
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says more than once about Willy, “he’s never so happy as when he’s looking forward to 
something”.  The sons have also arranged a symbolic dinner for Willy after both sons have 
successfully emerged from their respective challenges.  So Willy stands at the door to Howard’s 
office with a renewal of his deepest expectations, “I’m gonna knock Howard for a loop, kid. I’ll 
get an advance, and I’ll come home with a New York job. Goddammit, now I’m gonna do it!”   
All he wants from Howard is a place at the New York office in recognition of a life spent on the 
road, selling for the company because Willy is exhausted with traveling.   
 
The movement of expectations towards their failure is already underway even as Willy stands at 
the entrance to Howard’s office and the latter does not pay any attention to him for a few 
moments.  And it is not that Howard was engaged with important work, he was simply playing 
with a wire-recording machine.  When Howard acknowledges Willy’s presence and calls him in, 
Willy is awkward, in a sense already out of place in an office that was a hallowed place, source 
of hope for him.  It is deeply meaningful when Willy says, “Ts, ts. Like to ask a little favor if 
you…” and in response Howard only fiddles with the machine and plays the voices of his son 
and wife.  Howard is about the same age as Willy’s son Biff and after all, Willy wants Biff to 
live in the home that he built and raise a family of his own.  So the sounds of Howard’s family 
would hurt Willy for he also dreams of a family for his own son.  More than that, by not paying 
any attention to Willy and focusing only on frivolities, Howard, even without having said 
anything, has alienated, literally shut out his most loyal employee.  I this moment of the scene, I 
see reverberations of Kafka’s letter to his father in which he describes the moment from his 
childhood when he was pushed by on the “Pavlache” by his father with the glass door 
definitively shut, making the child realize that he “was a mere nothing” to his father.  The use of 
the term “spot” in the dialogue between Howard and Willy is significant here: 
 
“Remember, Christmas time, when you had the party here? You said you’d try to think of some 
spot for me here in town…God knows, Howard, I never asked a favor of any man. But I was 
with the firm when your father used to carry you here in his arms…Your father came to me the 
day you were born and asked me what I thought of the name of Howard, may he rest in peace…” 
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“I appreciate that, Willy, but there is just no spot here for you.  If I had a spot I’d slam you right 
in, but I just don’t have a single solitary spot.”180
 
In Willy’s mind this “spot” is not just a job or a position in the company.  I would go on to say 
that this spot can only be understood in terms of metaphysics of human experience.  This spot 
that Willy wants constitutes a significant portion of the relation that he has formed with the 
world in his journey through it.  Willy’s job is not simply a job from which he gets money.  The 
job is a complex of factors which makes Willy what he is, gives him his “personality”181.  Later 
on in the dialogue, he tries to explain to an unresponsive and inattentive Howard as to how he 
chose his line of work.  When he was very young he even had doubts about his future in the line 
of work and could have gone off to Alaska during the gold rush in search of the absentee father.  
But then he saw an old salesman who becomes his role model: 
 
“His name was Dave Singleman.  And he was eighty-four years old, and he’d drummed 
merchandise in thirty-one states.  And old Dave, he’d go up to his room, y’ understand, put on 
his green velvet slippers – I’ll never forget – and pick up his phone and call the buyers, and 
without ever leaving his room, at the age of eighty-four, he made his living.  And when I saw 
that, I realized that selling was the greatest career a man could want.  ‘Cause what could be more 
satisfying than to be able to go, at the age of eighty-four, into twenty or thirty different cities, 
and pick up a phone, and be remembered and loved and helped by so many different people? Do 
you know? When he died – and by the way he died the death of a salesman, in his green velvet 
slippers in the smoker of the New York, New Haven and Hartford, going into Boston – when he 
died, hundreds of salesmen and buyers were at this funeral.  Things were sad on a lotta trains for 
months after that.  He stands up. Howard has not looked at him. In those days there was 
personality in it, Howard.  There was respect, and comradeship, and gratitude in it.  Today, it’s 
all cut and dried, and there’s no chance for bringing friendship to bear – or personality.  You see 
what I mean? They don’t know me any more.” 
 
“Moving away, toward the right: That’s just the thing, Willy.” 
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In this long statement and Howard’s response to it, Willy - even though speaking in ordinary, 
everyday terms – has mapped out the trajectory for the failure of expectations in terms of the 
relation that one makes with the world through the work that one does in it.  So at first there is an 
example, a powerful image of a role model.  Willy Loman’s role model is the old salesman.  It is 
not that Willy never had a choice about what to do but he chose to live the life of a salesman.  He 
became rooted in his life as a salesman only after he met David Singleman.  The way I see it, the 
values of loyalty and respect which Willy wants to inculcate in his family life are precisely the 
values that he found and admired in his field of work.  When speaking of the old salesman, Willy 
of course has some interest in the money that the man made but what really attracts him to the 
person is something else entirely.  Willy sees David Singleman as a consummate salesman and 
the chief quality of a consummate salesman is that he is loved and respected – not just on the 
basis of the business that he generates – for what he is, the style of his personality.  So selling, 
for Willy is a line of work which brings a certain style of personality which he wants to adopt.  
As far as loyalty and respect are concerned, these are qualities which keep us grounded in the 
world irrespective of the line of work that we are in.  Now in the case of Willy Loman his entire 
working life revolves around being liked which is an expression of loyalty and its reciprocation.  
Once Willy decides that he wants to be a consummate salesman he invests his whole life into it.  
In his inner life he remains a salesman even though he is falling apart and there are many 
occasions where he is regretful at not having gone away to Alaska with his brother Ben. 
 
In the scene at Howard’s office, we see a return of the theme of broken promises.  When Willy 
says, “promises were made across this desk”182, there are echoes of Caesar’s - “you too Brutus”.  
Howard comes across as a typical uncultured man, a person who cannot make and keep 
promises.  The fact that Willy gave his entire life to his work means nothing to Howard.   
Howard does not in any way seek to reciprocate Willy life long act of investing his entire person 
into a process.  More than that, Howard stabs Willy in the back, dislodging him from his rightful 
place in the world.  This can be read as a cultural tragedy of the American world of commerce 
for there is no recognition of promises and of the passions of the individual.  More than that, 
however, there is the simple but powerful image of one and the same space (the office) 
becoming the source of all expectations and their eventual collapse.  There is more than perfidy 
at stake in Howard’s denial of the promises.  The investment of the deepest inner resources is 
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also an investment of trust.  It is important to note that the violation of trust and the absence of 
loyalty emerge from a source located outside of Willy’s own self.  Willy’s tragic flaw is that he 
continues to adhere to ideals of loyalty in a sphere that is not amenable to this notion.  The 
promises that Willy speaks of were the tenuous bond that linked him to a process.  Up until that 
point when Howard turns away in a very nonchalant, careless manner, Willy believed in the 
validity and power of that promise.  When his demands for their fulfillment are met with a total 
disregard, a failure even to remember and to notice that something more important that sales’ 
figures is breaking apart in this person’s life, Willy’s faith and trust are catastrophically broken.  
What for Howard is merely nothing, meant the world to Willy.  While nothing moves in Howard 
as the embodiment of the world of commerce, Willy undergoes a cataclysm and he becomes a 
tragic hero in his refusal to move away with a whimper.  Among other things, I think that 
Willy’s suicide is a protest, a figurative self-immolation as a reminder of broken, forgotten 
promises.  One needs to draw a distinction between the struggles of Willy Loman and those of 
the mythical Sisyphus.  The mythical hero spends all his energies in a process from which he 
expects nothing; he is quite literally acting in a void and that is why he is not tragic, but absurd.  
In the case of Willy however, “promises” have been made, not in a void but with people.  Unlike 
Sisyphus, the all-consuming process does not simply yield nothing, rather, it yields a violation of 
trust.  Sisyphus has not placed hopes and expectations in the process, Willy Loman has.  And 
this is why Willy Loman is a tragic character and Sisyphus simply absurd.  My point is that the 
breaking of the promises has a shattering impact when these were made in an relational context, 
with people whom one trusted.   
 
Willy’s role as the father of the family is enmeshed with his role as a salesman through the 
common quality of loyalty and respect with which he invests both areas of his life.  What makes 
Willy’s story tragic is precisely this element of investment.  There are many people who speak of 
becoming this or that or fulfilling this or that obligation.  They even make some inconsistent 
efforts in these directions.  However, tragic potential is essentially linked with consistent 
commitment for it is this which gives birth to expectations.  Charley, for instance, comes across 
as a very wise character but not a tragic one (Charley seems to be more interested in shooting 
casino than in his son Bernard or the business) because as he himself says, “my salvation is that I 
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never took any interest in anything.183”  To not be invested in something with all of one’s inner 
life is to not have too many expectations the collapse of which can prove fatal.  In the case of 
Willy all of his expectations – regarding his self image as a salesman and as a father – emerge 
out of his total commitment to this one “spot”.  It is around this spot that he builds his working 
life and his family.  So when Howard shows Willy that according to Willy’s own law – being 
“well liked” as a principle - he should no longer be working, Willy’s relation with the world and 
not just with the company is threatened.  Howard points out to Willy that since he is no longer 
“well liked”, he should leave the company; this rejection being based on a process of irreversible 
decline.  Howard’s act implies the removal of a redundant cog in the wheel and not that of a soul 
that has spent all its passion in a process that eventually yields turns against him.     
 
The shadow of obsolescence looms large over this meeting between Willy and Howard as Willy 
struggles for the “spot” that he is losing.  Willy reminds Howard of the fact that he “put thirty-
four years into this firm”184.  He reminds Howard of his meager achievements, “I averaged a 
hundred and seventy dollars a week in the year of 1928!” Most significantly, he points towards 
the “promises made across this desk!” Willy continues to remind Howard about the strong ties 
that he had with his father Frank.  But Frank Wagner is now dead and Ben does not remember 
anything about the promises made by his father to Willy or of Willy’s achievements for the firm.  
In the eyes of Ben, Willy is an obsolete relic of a past that he does not share with him or 
appreciate.  Since Willy is not making any significant sales, moreover, he tends to “crack up”185 
so in Billy’s eyes Willy is completely dispensable.  Willy’s words - “You can’t eat the orange 
and throw the peel away a man is not a piece of fruit!”186 -  hold no value for Ben.  According to 
an inexorable logic, Willy has been uprooted from a spot that constitutes an overwhelmingly 
significant component of his dignity and sense of place in the world.  
 
As the expectations that stem from his role as a salesman collapse in Ben’s office, one can look 
at this definitive progression towards failure and offer an explanation based on causality.  The 
play itself provides enough clues in this regard.  There are references, for instance, to the 
overcrowding of Willy’s neighborhood.  He complains about there being too many people as his 
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once well lighted, well aired house is literally boxed into a small, dark spot now.  More people 
means more competition, fresh blood, new ideas therefore it was inevitable that Willy would lose 
his place.  We can even point towards the rise of the capitalistic ethos and say that Willy’s 
adherence to values of loyalty has nothing whatsoever to do with what the business cherishes.  
One can also take Biff Loman’s line of argument and say that Willy’s failure comes down to the 
fact that he had false expectations.  We could give many other explanations for what is 
happening to Willy but the tragedy of failure of explanations maintains its distinctness and 
evades the grasp of these explanations.  Irrespective of what the social or historical 
circumstances were and whether or not Willy was in bad faith, the main point is that he 
committed himself fully to his role in life as a father and a salesman and all of these expectations 
ended in failure.  The violation that occurs is not centered simply upon Willy’s poverty.  Willy 
worked to establish a relation with the world, playing a role in which his inner life was invested.  
It is this relation and the sense of dignity associated with it that has been disrupted. 
 
Let us take the case of an authentic patriot who has invested himself fully into the creation and 
development of Pakistan, by all means a “failed state”.  Now, once the failures of the state 
became prominent, we can say to this person that this was inevitable, it had to happen this way.  
We can say for instance that the dream of Pakistan was flawed in the first place.  There has been 
a long line of corrupt rulers.  The country has never had a sacred constitution.  The majority of 
the population consists of ignorant people who deserved what they got.  Now none of this can 
explain away the failure of expectations.  This is a person who has committed himself fully to a 
country and the failure of this country creates a rupture in his inner life that cannot be healed.  
He struggles against overwhelming odds to keep his expectations alive about Pakistan alive.  
Why? Precisely because his commitment is rooted in his inner life, it defines what he is.  And he 
is a Pakistani through and through, there is no other source of expectation for him.     
 
I will turn now to the two most important lines in Willy Loman’s drama: 
 
Biff: Pop! I’m a dime a dozen, and so are you! 
Willy: I am not a dime a dozen! I am Willy Loman, and you are Biff Loman!  
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In these two lines, we see a conflict, not just between a son and his father but more importantly, 
between two different styles of making relations with the world during the journey of life.  Biff 
has not made any effort to fully commit to work and family therefore he does not have any 
expectations.  Willy, on the other hand, has spent his entire life in fulfilling his commitments, 
playing the interconnected roles of salesman and father of the family.  His inner life and sense of 
personal integrity are defined by these roles. He would always refuse to submit in the face of a 
failure of all of the expectations that emerge from these roles.  He ardently wants and expects 
Biff to make something of himself.  So in the dialogues preceding these two lines, Willy is 
persistent that Biff should go out in the morning and see Bill Oliver.  He refuses to accept the 
fact that Biff is going to leave the family and wander off, doing nothing substantial.  Willy has 
spent his whole life in working to create and sustain a place in the world for himself and his 
family.  And now even as he has lost his role as a salesman and recognizes that his role as father 
is also suspect in the eyes of his sons, he refuses to give up.       
 
During the scene preceding the one where these lines are spoken, Willy has an inner dialogue 
with his long lost brother Ben.  To be accurate, this is not a dialogue but a monologue for Willy 
is now only talking to himself.  It is during this monologue that Willy makes the decision to kill 
himself and there are two main questions confronting him.  The first question is if the suicide 
would be an act of courage and the second is about the results that it would yield.  His response 
to the first one can be extracted from his line, “Does it take more guts to stand here the rest of 
my life ringing up a zero?”187 Despite the oncoming fog of madness, he is clear, first of all about 
the collapse of his relations with the world but more importantly, he is clear also about the 
obligations that those relations place upon him.  His response to the second question can be 
encapsulated in his words about Biff: “Why, why can’t I give him something and not have him 
hate me?”  For Willy Loman, the suicide would achieve two main purposes.  It would bring 
twenty-thousand dollars to the family and enable Biff to do something to make a place for 
himself in the world.  The second and most important expectation in Willy’s mind is that after 
the suicide, there would be a funeral attended by all of those salesmen with whom he formed 
relations.  Therefore, Biff would finally recognize the place that his father made in the world as a 
salesman and also love him for the sacrifice that he made for the family.   
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As we know from the play, most of the expectations that Willy formed around the act of suicide 
also failed.  That, however, does not detract anything from the value of the act.  Even in the face 
of an overwhelming collapse of the relations that Willy formed with the world, he refuses to give 
up on his failed expectations.  In the line “I am not a dime a dozen…” and also the act of suicide, 
it is the inner life that shines through.  So even as historical circumstances move in such a way 
that a person’s expectations fail, the inner life has the potential to stay active.  As long as this 
inner life is vibrant, one would continue to forge relations and fulfill ensuing expectations till the 
end.  And when the person’s place in the world has fallen away then suicide for the sake of 
fulfilling expectations that cannot be fulfilled through living in the world is an act of courage.  
This, in my view, is the chief ameliorative aspect of the tragedy of Willy Loman.  All that 
remains at the end is an overwhelming sense of dignity; all expectations of reciprocation meet 
nothing but failure.  
 
The ‘tragic’ element in human existence is multi-faceted.  I hope to have brought this across in 
my first three chapters, each of which deals with a different type of tragedy in human life.  I 
think that in order to clarify the subject matter of this particular chapter and to clearly distinguish 
it from the previous three, it would be expedient to begin with the following question – Am I, as 
a person, exclusively a product of social, historical, environmental, cultural and political forces 
acting on me from without and of psychological and physiological forces acting from within? Or 
is there something more to me, other than and above and beyond all the forces that condition 
me?  
 
If I consider the first question within the context of the three chapters on tragedy that I have 
already written, it seems to me that the answer would be ‘yes’.  In my second chapter I drew 
mainly upon Hegel to show how political conflicts emerge from out of the adherence to deeply 
felt rational obligations that come to us from history.  Then in my second chapter, I started by 
drawing upon Simmel to broach upon the tragic conflict within culture or more precisely, the 
conflict that occurs between the inner life of the human person and the autonomous products of 
culture; a in which the latter prevail.  My third chapter was about the broad-based inner darkness 
of self-deception which leads to tragedy on an individual and collective level.  In this third 
chapter I drew upon Sartre and Oedipus to bring forth the central features of tragic self-
deception, one of which is its seeming inevitability.  In my dissertation, I have not focused at all 
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upon human physiology, but I think it is safe to say that there are iron-clad predetermined forces 
that control the body too and there are undoubtedly tragic conflicts that emerge from what we are 
biologically.  
 
In this, the fourth and final chapter of my dissertation, I will be looking at a different type of 
tragedy, one that will also enable me to provide an affirmative response to the second question 
(outlined above).  To explain myself, I need to speak in terms of well-known and perhaps not 
very subtle facts.  These are also facts that have not yet been tested on the anvil of history.  As I 
write these lines, the news media is reporting that Gaza is now under the control of Hamas while 
Fatah controls the West Bank.  In both Gaza and the West Bank, moves are being made by the 
respective parties in power to “close the chapter” of activists and supporters of the opposing 
camp.  So until a few years ago, those fighting for the cause of Palestine, driven by deeply felt 
obligations towards their land, clashed with Israel.  It seems now that there are conflicting 
obligations within Palestine that is driving Palestinians to eliminate their own people and not 
Israelis.  So the political tragedy of Palestine now centers upon not just a fight with Israel but 
also a fight amongst the Palestinians themselves. Irrespective of what we can say about the 
rationality of passions or obligations that make groups of people collide against each other, to 
me, the situation in Palestine seems highly absurd and that is where the issue of tragic self-
deception comes into play.  The actions of the politicians have nothing whatsoever to do with 
what the situation on the ground demands of them.  Moreover, there is also the cultural force of 
Islam that is playing a role in the current conflict.  It appears here, as it does in so many other 
parts of the world, as a negative force of resentment.  The distorted face of Islam is not leading 
the Palestinians towards any kind of liberation on a personal or national basis.   
 
My point here is as follows.  All of this that I have pointed towards- the forces of historical 
obligation emanating from 1947 or 1967 or hundreds of years prior to that, self-deception among 
the politically powerful, the emergence of the cultural force of Islam as one that undermines the 
cause of liberation – does not fully capture the tragedy of Palestine.  There is at least one another 
aspect of the tragedy which is linked with the failure of expectations of the people and the loss of 
a sense of personal worth.   I would be making an unwarranted assumption if I were to say that 
every single person living in the occupied territories has a self which is totally and absolutely 
conditioned by forces of environment and history.  There is no doubt that the people living there 
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are conditioned by their circumstances and are under the sway of some sort of ideological 
obligations but nevertheless this is not sufficient to explain their personality to the fullest.  What 
evades the grasp of any historicizing tendency or even self-deception is the human being’s sense 
of self-worth and the expectations that people have with regards to their relation to the world 
around them.  
 
I, as a human person, am undoubtedly conditioned by different social, historical and cultural 
forces.  These are forces that enter me from without, penetrating into and conditioning my inner 
life.  These forces are embodied also as expectations which others closely linked with me have 
of me and eventually these expectations that come from without merge with and transform the 
expectations that I have of myself.  I think that my journey through the world consists of 
relations that I form with the world.  These relations bring expectations that are grounded in 
obligations towards family, nationality, ethnicity, ideology, comradeship and other sources.  
Moreover, there are also expectations that I have of myself with regard to the relation that I form 
with the world with respect to the work that I do here and this work enables me to realize an 
inner potential.  All of these different expectations enable me to live with a sense of belonging to 
the world and my sense of self-worth is associated with whether or not I have a place in this 
world. 
   
I have spoken with reference to Palestine to bring forth the point that the tragedy unfolding there 
has a subtle aspect which is distinct – but not in total separation from – historical obligation, 
thrust for political liberation, self-deception and cultural crisis.  This aspect or view of the 
situations centers upon the failure of people’s expectations in terms of their sense of self-worth 
or their perception of the place that they have in the world.  Many of the people living there may 
well be fighting with or supporting Hamas against Fatah and Israel or Fatah against Israel and 
Hamas.  However, the potential for tragedy is located not just in these fights but also in the 
individual’s sense of being rootless in the world, a loss of dignity and the failure of expectations 
of self-actualization.  When the political and military struggle of the Palestinians started, they 
were rootless due to the power of their enemy.  As Hamas and Fatah fight each other, the people 
of Palestine are even more deracinated and disillusioned because all of the violence is now 
directed inwards and all paths leading towards a dignified and free existence are at present 
closed.   
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Even though the lines between the personal and the collective blur when speaking of 
deracination and failure of expectations, however, the issue is ultimately personal.  It is alive not 
just in zones of intense crisis like Palestine but can happen anywhere.  The basic idea is that it is 
possible for us to be in circumstances where our sense of belonging in the world and all of our 
expectations regarding our roles, responsibilities and the realization of our potential are 
threatened with failure.  The philosophical question about where our sense of dignity and our 
drive to making a place in the world comes from is another, separate and complicated matter 
which I can address only very briefly in the context of this dissertation.  One answer could be 
that the source of the sense of dignity is mysterious and cannot be localized.  Another response 
would be that we do not really belong in the world in which we live and this is not something 
new, this is the way it has always been.  Our journey through the world is then an attempt to 
maintain the relations that we form with it and to continue to engender new ones.  This answer 
surely does not provide a sound basis for the perspective that there are personal expectations that 
persist independently of all kinds of conditioning.  For the time being I would take this as an 
assumption and continue working, I think that the source of human dignity and the expectations 
linked with it can only be illuminated by seeing the human person in action. 
 
I will now clarify my understanding of the concept, if not the source of human dignity.  To me, 
the dignity of an individual or of a group of persons centers upon having a meaningful relation 
with the world.  A person has dignity if he has a relation with the world that is characterized by 
reciprocity and leads towards not just a sense of belonging but also a sense of growth.  So the 
failure of expectations in this context becomes a failure of the expectations emerging out of the 
way in which the person has developed a relation with the world. For me, being in the world is a 
quest for making a place for oneself in an environment that is in essence alien to the human 
person.  The word home, for me, is not just a physical building; it is a powerful metaphor for a 
whole complex of features that constitute a deep relation with the world.  It is important to note 
here that the tragedy of a loss of relation with the world is more basic and fundamental when 
compared with the other facets of the tragic in human existence that I have discussed in this 
dissertation.   
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To explain myself further, I would like to return to the powerful picture that the tragedy of 
Palestine presents which like all human tragedy, is multi-faceted.  Speaking in the context of 
modern history, the tragedy of the Holocaust and the expulsion of Jews from many countries in 
Europe was critical in motivating the desire for a politically, economically and militarily 
powerful and independent Jewish state.   The Jews who struggled for the creation of Israel had, 
in my view, legitimate historical obligations that they wanted to fulfill.  These legitimate 
obligations, of which the powerful state of Israel is an embodiment, came into tragic conflict 
with the equally legitimate obligations that the Palestinians felt as they struggled for their rights.  
So since then, as Israel has grown stronger in a world order that supports them, the Palestinians 
(and their Arab and Muslim sympathizers) have become increasingly marginalized.  After 1967, 
the Palestinians lost more land and power and the number of Palestinian refugees increased.  
However, speaking now from the Palestinian perspective, many people - despite their physical 
deracination, poverty and humiliation – had a sense of belonging to the world.  And this sense of 
belonging or relatedness or dignity centered precisely upon the tragic struggle against a much 
more powerful enemy.   
 
So when Hamas and Fatah acted to eliminate one another and their actions led to a real split of 
the so called, occupied territories, into a West Bank and a Gaza, the failure of expectations 
occurred at two different level.  Firstly, this was a failure of expectations in terms of victory in 
the tragic conflict with Israel.  And victory here does not mean military conquest.  Victory in this 
conflict would mean genuine, mutual recognition from both sides that the other has a legitimate 
position and that they must learn to reconcile their differences and create an atmosphere of 
respect for each others’ position.  After all, Israel is here to stay and the Palestinians can also not 
be thrown into the Mediterranean Sea.  The internecine conflict among Palestinians has put them 
in a position where they have lost any semblance of genuine respect that the Israelis would have 
for them.  At a deeper level, the bloody inner strife amongst the Palestinians has rendered null 
and void a very way of life.  As I have mentioned before, for many Palestinians, the very 
meaning of the way in which they had constituted themselves in the world, centered upon the 
struggle for independence even though this struggle was always going to be futile.  With the 
inner strife between Hamas and Fatah, years of struggle against Israel have been rendered 
meaningless.  The expectations that have failed in this context were linked with the meaning of 
the struggle and its continuation in the future regardless of its futility.  There are battles in which 
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the losers are perceived as winners and I think that Palestinian struggle against Israel was such a 
battle but now, the people’s expectations of being a part of this battle have been placed in a 
crisis.  It was this battle which gave physically deracinated people a sense of belonging in the 
world.  This sense of having a place in the world has now disappeared. 
 
With this analysis of the tragedy of Palestine, I hope to have shown that although, on the one 
hand, the peoples’ struggles are conditioned by specific historical circumstances, on the other 
hand there is an element to the tragedy which stems from something that is universal and 
independent of historical conditioning.  To talk about tragedy as the failure of expectations with 
reference to the issue of the human persons’ relation to the world is to appeal to a particular 
notion of the inner life according to which our effort to make meaningful relations with the 
world is something which would always evade the grasp of historical determinism.  During this 
discussion of Palestine, I have referred to self-deception and cultural crisis as two facets of the 
tragedy which, once again are distinct from the subject-matter of this chapter.  I think that 
amongst both Arabs and the Israelis, their respective religions (Islam and Judaism) have emerged 
as distorted cultural forces, alienated from their essence.  Speaking of tragic self-deception, there 
is much more of it among the Arabs, the 1967 War being a metaphor for inner blindness.   
 
I would now turn to Arthur Miller’s play, “Death as a Salesman”188.  This play provides a subtle 
model for the facet of human tragedy which is the subject matter of this chapter.  The action of 
this play occurs mainly at the level of family; however, the way in which Miller presents it, the 
play becomes a metaphor for much broader concerns.  In every scene of this play, we can 
observe the dialectic between expectations and their failure along with the transformation of 
hope into despair.  In this sense, Miller’s tragedy does follow Szondi’s theory in that the tragic, 
irrespective of what form it takes, always unravels according to a (Hegelian) dialectical pattern.  
It would be expedient then to analyze this play on a scene by scene basis.     
 
One of the primary ways in which we make a relation with the world is through the work that we 
do in it.  The work that we do forms a link between our inner life and the world around us.  To 
do work that is meaningful is to be involved in an activity with which the inner life flourishes.  If 
                                                 
188 Arthur Miller, Collected Plays, edited by Tony Kushner (New York: Library Classics of the United 
States Press, 2006), pp. 159 – 258).   
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the work that we do in the world is meaningful in that sense then we feel connected with the 
world because this relation consists of mutual reciprocation - I put my deepest inner self into the 
world through my work and what the world gives to me is a place, a “spot”.  I think that to have 
a meaningful life, we must affirm the roles give to us by nature – I for instance am biologically a 
son and a brother – and to create and assume new ones.  If the work that we do is meaningful to 
us then it defines a role that we have assumed in this world.  And with this role come 
expectations which center upon the persistence of a reciprocal relation with the world.  The 
failure of expectations in this context would occur if this defining role is taken away from a 
person or if there is no reciprocation – I put my life into my work and correspondingly into the 
world and get nothing in return.  I think that this is one of the fundamental themes in “Death of a 
Salesman”.  
 
I look also at Nietzsche’s idea of “eternal recurrence of the same” from the perspective of having 
and playing a role in the world.  If the history of the world consists of repetitive patterns then the 
only thing that is unique and meaningful, as it were, is the role that an individual can assume, 
affirm and play to the fullest during a life span.  So what gives meaning to a human experience is 
precisely this assumption of a role in the world which entails connection with the world.  I 
understand Nietzsche’s Dionysus and Apollo also in this context.  To have the Dionysian force 
active in one’s life is to affirm and be in some way connected with the ebb and flow of life.  It is 
only after having experienced the Dionysian connection with the world that one creates the 
Apollonian image.  This latter can be a work of art or of literature but I think that in Nietzsche’s 
schema the creation is of one’s own self.  The main point here is that in order to chisel out a self, 
I must first have a deep Dionysian connection with the world and this comes out of the process 
of playing a role in the world.  To have lost the role or for the role to lose meaning translates into 
a loss of the Dionysian force in one’s life.  And with the loss of this Dionysian force, one also 
endures destruction of the image that one has made of oneself.   So living life with a role 
(Dionysian connection) is to build an image of oneself and it is with this image that expectations 
are linked.  Once the role goes, so does the image and with that comes the failure of expectations 
which were built around the image that the person created of himself. 
 
To take our discussion of the notion of role further, I would like to examine the character of 
Linda in Death of a Salesman.  If the work that we do in the world is a defining relation for our 
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inner life then what is it that Linda does? Willy is a salesman but what does Linda do? Linda is a 
mother and a wife.  The role of mother and wife that Linda gets in virtue of her relation with 
Willy, Biff and Happy is the one that defines Linda’s work in the world.  All of Linda’s 
expectations and obligations regarding what she is in the world stem from this one role.  She 
affirms this role and fulfills all the responsibilities that come with it.  There can be an argument 
about whether Linda is ultimately a tragic character or not.  I think that perhaps she is not a 
tragic character because despite everything, her defining role in life stays with her and she plays 
it fully till the end of the action of the play.  However, there is definite potential for tragedy in 
her character because she is so deeply committed to her role and obligations.   
 
We learn about Linda’s character not only through her own actions and words but also from 
what the persons most deeply associated with her say about her.  Happy says, “What a Woman! 
They broke the mold when they made her. You know that, Biff?”189 Biff also loves her dearly, 
referring to her as “pal” on more than one occasion and passionately defending her against the 
“little cruelties”190 of Willy Loman.  Loman himself loves her deeply and says “You’re my 
foundation and my support, Linda.”191  She is the foundation of the Loman family in many 
different ways.  She is the only character in the family who is absolutely consistent in her efforts 
to keep the home together.  While she remains unaware of this, her persistent love for her family 
tragically lies at the center of one of the pivotal sources of the anguish of the family.  Biff Loman 
makes an inner decision to give up on life when he discovers that his father has been unfaithful 
to his beloved mother.  The moment when he says in anger and grief, “You gave her Mama’s 
stockings”192 is also the moment when despite all of the love that he had for him, Biff is 
alienated from his father.  Biff and Willy are both witness to the long standing image of Linda 
darning her old stockings out of a sense of selflessness.  And now when Biff sees Willy giving 
away new stockings to another woman he experiences the rupture of what for him was his 
deepest connection with the world – his relationship with his father Willy.  
 
                                                 
189 Ibid., Kushner, p. 202 
190 Ibid., Kushner, p. 162 
191 Ibid., Kushner, p. 166 
192 Ibid., Kushner, p. 242 
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In my view, the most important thing that anyone in the play says about Linda comes from Willy 
Loman – “The woman has waited and the woman has suffered.”193 Willy speaks more than once 
about wanting to do something to improve the situation of the family because that would lead to 
an alleviation of Linda’s suffering.  Now what has Linda been waiting for and what is the 
meaning of her suffering?  Linda has spent her whole life caring for the household.  She takes 
care of the minutest details.  The play makes references to her waxing of the kitchen floor, the 
selection of cheese, getting the heater repaired, having the refrigerator fixed.  All of these are 
moments which hitherto did not find a place in the annals of tragedy but at the risk of speaking 
tritely, I say that to take care of these everyday objects makes a house a source of our grounding 
in this world.  Linda stands by Willy Loman through all the trials and tribulations.  Their life 
together is for the most part quite difficult with only interstices of joy.  She does not understand 
as to what exactly it is that Willy does but she saves what she can out of the little that Willy 
brings home.  She makes him feel loved and wanted even at times when he feels degraded and 
unwanted by the American business world.  Linda protects Willy from the illusions that Ben’s 
stories create in his mind.  Linda is also the emotional bulwark for her sons and provides a 
critical, balancing force. For instance when Biff is still a child, she warns Willy against spoiling 
him too much.     
  
In essence, Linda has poured her life into the family on a sustained basis.  But what is her 
teleology? What does she expect to receive at the end?  What outcome is she expecting? I think 
that her position is encapsulated in the following dialogue with Willy which occurs at the 
beginning of the play: 
 
Willy: Figure it out. Work a lifetime to pay off a house. You finally own it, and there’s nobody 
to live in it. 
Linda: Well, dear, life is a casting off. It’s always that way.194
 
Linda understands life as nothing but a series of losses.  This position reflects her wisdom in that 
she has learned to constitute herself in terms of her experiences.  I think that the cause of her 
anguish does not lie in the fact that the situation around her demands further sacrifice from her. 
                                                 
193 Ibid., Kushner, p. 231.  
194 Ibid., Kushner, p. 164.  
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She is completely loyal to her family and persistent in her willingness to sacrifice and to be 
patient.  She does not expect anything for herself and neither does she expect the family to move 
towards a glorious future.  What hurts her now is that Willy Loman is undergoing increasingly 
humiliating experiences in his life as a salesman.  She does not share Willy’s sense of teleology 
but she does want him to spend the rest of his life in dignity with his family.  While Willy is 
going under, his sons are standing by, incapable - not only of doing something to help him 
financially - but, more importantly, of making him feel at home.  The locus of Linda’s 
expectations is the unity of the family, she struggled all of her life to keep things together but 
now Willy is going under and the sons have failed to recognize and fulfill their role in the 
family.  She thus points towards their disloyalty, “He’s put his whole life into you and you have 
turned your backs on him.”195
 
Now what does it mean for a human person to invest his entire life into another person or a 
group of persons and then see the latter turn away from him.  I have previously spoken of the 
Palestinians but I would now like to give another lesser known example from history and 
politics. I would like to speak briefly about the tragic history of a group of people known as 
“stranded Pakistanis”.  When Pakistan was created in 1947 it had an east wing and a west wing 
separated by a massive Indian enclave.  That east wing became Bangladesh in 1971.  The 
political struggle for Pakistan was concentrated to a great extent in areas of India that are still a 
part of that country.  After the creation of Pakistan, countless numbers of those Muslims who 
had struggled for its creation left their homes in India to come to their new country, a promised 
land as it were.  In addition to patriotism towards Pakistan, communal violence within India was 
another factor which motivated people to immigrate.  Most of the immigrants came to the area 
that is now Pakistan and which was then West-Pakistan.  However, there was also a group of 
people originating from the current Indian state of Bihar who chose to settle in East Pakistan.  
When the civil war ensued in East Pakistan in 1971 and India took the side of the Bengalis 
fighting against the Pakistan Army, the Biharis put together a civilian army and fought for 
Pakistan.  These civilian soldiers were ultimately much more valiant in their defense of their 
perceived homeland than even the regular Pakistan Army.  Ninety thousand Pakistani soldiers 
surrendered to the Indians and Bangladesh was created.  Immediately after the creation of 
Bangladesh, the Biharis underwent systematic oppression and persecution.  They were not 
                                                 
195 Ibid., Kushner, p. 197 
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granted citizenship of Bangladesh due to their unflinching loyalty towards Pakistan.  The Biharis 
themselves did not want to live in Bangladesh; they considered themselves to be Pakistanis and 
expected to be repatriated to their homeland in the near future. Even as they were stripped of all 
of their belongings and condemned to live in makeshift settlements, they remained loyal to 
Pakistan.  They flew the flag of their country while living in abject poverty in a place that used to 
be their home but was now an alien country.  This is when the real tragedy of the Biharis started 
to unfold.  Their expectations were rooted in becoming citizens of Pakistan and they began to 
wait for that day to arrive.  Years passed by and that day never came.  The government of 
Pakistan refused to accept these, their own people because they did not want to disturb the 
complex ethnic balance in Pakistan.  The Pakistan government appealed to arbitrary clauses in 
the constitution to cover up their disloyalty to their own people.  In the year 1990 after 19 years 
of waiting, 100000 of these Biharis were accepted by Pakistan and settled in an area of Karachi 
called Orangi Town which by the way is the largest slum in Asia.  However, even those who 
came out of the makeshift camps into Pakistan were not given Pakistani citizenship.  The worst 
off are clearly those 300,000 or so who are still stateless in Bangladesh and continue to live in 
makeshift communities.  These are the people who are commonly known as ‘stranded 
Pakistanis’.  Despite all these years, there are many among them who hold on to the dream of 
becoming Pakistanis some day.  It seems though that, at least for now, the people whom they 
consider their own have forgotten about them.  Even political parties which speak in the name of 
those who are ethnically immigrants in Pakistan no longer bring up this issue.  The ‘stranded 
Pakistanis’ invested their life into and constructed all of their expectations around the idea of 
Pakistan and the people of Pakistan but they remained stateless and humiliated, continuing to 
hold on to fragments of a shattered dream.    
 
The purpose of this tangential discussion is to show that even though “Death of Salesman” is set 
at the level of a family and an individual and in the context of America, it carries immense 
potential for explaining human tragedy in a universal sense.  The life of Willy Loman is a subtle 
model for understand what the stranded Pakistanis have gone through.  They fight for the 
creation of Pakistan, perceiving it as a land where they would live with dignity.  They migrate 
from India to East Pakistan and become a prosperous community in their chosen country.  The 
Bengalis rise in revolt against the government of West Pakistan.  The Biharis remain fiercely 
patriotic to West Pakistan and what they get in return?  A life lived in the midst of filth and the 
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failure of their deepest expectations.  They were rejected by precisely those whom they 
considered to be their own people and for whom they sacrificed their lives.    
 
Coming back to our discussion of Death of a Salesman, I think that it is important to look further 
into the relation between teleology and tragedy.  It seems to me that Linda does not have 
teleology in the sense that Willy has.  Despite this, there is potential for tragedy in her character 
because of the committed manner in which she has constituted herself as the mother of Biff and 
Happy and the wife of Willy.  She is the force that holds the family together.  In the case of 
Willy, it is obvious that he wants and crucially expects things to move towards an outcome. For 
himself, he wants the position of “number one man”196 and to eventually sum up to something.  
He forms expectations regarding a particular type of greatness for Biff and Happy.  The two sons 
Biff and Happy do not have any tragic potential.  They do not have teleology and neither are 
they fully committed, like Linda, to a framework of obligations.  Now, the comparison of Linda 
and Willy does bring up the point that a person does not of necessity have to be directed towards 
an unrealizable teleological end in order to have tragic potential or to become a tragedy.  What is 
needed though is commitment, being passionately rooted and invested in something.  The 
expectations emerge out of such a commitment and their failure is a tragedy.  I think that Linda 
would never self-destruct or commit suicide as long as her sons consider her to be their mother.  
As long as there is some semblance of her family left, she would continue to live and to struggle 
because her family is her work and her life.  Willy, on the other hand invested himself with a 
strong sense of teleology in his life as a Salesman.  He is being dislodged from his position and 
he knows also that he has done something to damage the relation between him and Biff.  All 
Linda wants is to have a home where the sons would live with their father, support him, respect 
him and become serious men themselves.  She does not really understand the working life but 
more than anyone else, she understands what Willy needs and what the family needs.  She is 
passionately insistent as she tries to evoke a sense of responsibility in her sons: 
 
“I don’t say he is a great man.  Willy Loman never made a lot of money.  His name was never in 
the paper.  He is not the finest character that ever lived.  But he’s a human being, and a terrible 
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thing is happening to him.  So attention must be paid.  He’s not to be allowed to fall into his 
grave like an old dog.  Attention, attention must finally be paid to such a person.”197
 
What does it mean for a man to “fall into his grave like an old dog”?  I think that it is pointless to 
speak of this in concepts.  This is ultimately an image, a powerful one with endless 
reverberations.  Linda creates this image for her sons to make them realize that they need to step 
forward and save their father from going under.  A significant part of Willy’s place in the world 
revolved around his work and now that is being taken away from him.  He is slowly becoming 
rootless from that perspective and with that comes a loss of dignity.  Willy is a man who has 
created an image for himself in front of his friend Charley but now by borrowing money from 
him, he is also losing dignity.  The man is going under and Linda has created a subtle evocation 
of this through her words.  Her appeal for intervention is directed towards her sons.  They are 
expected to intervene, it is their responsibility.  But since they have failed to play the role of 
sons, Linda appeals to them in the name of humanity.   
 
Linda’s appeal to her sons to save Willy - not just because he is their father and has invested his 
whole life in them but simply because he is now a rootless human being - is very meaningful.  
Let us imagine a person going under, losing dignity in a place alien to him where he does not 
have any friends and no one there is related to him by blood.  Even that person would have some 
expectations of help from the others around him who are watching him.  That neither Biff nor 
Happy really care as their father falls apart in front of their very eyes is captured in an extract 
from a dialogue between Letta - a type of girl whom Linda calls “lousy whore” - and Happy.  
These words are exchanged in the scene at the restaurant during which one of the things Willy 
says, “I’m not interested in stories about the past or any crap of that kind because the woods are 
burning, boys, you understand? There’s a big blaze going around. I was fired today.”198  While 
Willy is falling to pieces as he slips into the past inside the restaurant washroom, Biff and Happy 
have an argument in which each of them tries to evade responsibility and they then leave the 
place with the two girls  – 
 
Letta: Don’t you want to tell your father –  
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Happy: No, that’s not my father. He’s just a guy. Come on, we’ll catch Biff, and, honey, we’re 
going to paint this town!199
 
One of the aspects of the tragedy of Willy Loman is that Happy and Biff (about whom Willy has 
been most concerned) are incapable and unwilling to invest something meaningful into the 
family. Moreover, Willy expects them to provide a solid support to him as he is going under but 
they fail to do so.  The signs are there for everyone to see.  Linda realizes this most of all, 
Willy’s friend Charley too but precisely those whose intervention Willy needs and expects most 
fail him in this respect.  In the final analysis they are incapable of paying the attention to Willy 
that Linda demands and Willy expects - neither as sons nor as fellow human beings.   
 
There is then a distinct aspect to tragedy as failure of expectations in terms of dignity and this is 
defined well by Arthur Miller.  Willy Loman worked to make a place for himself in the world, to 
create some sort of image and now that he is going under, his sons are the amongst those 
watching him and they are the only ones who can truly help him to regain a foothold.  He 
expects their help and yet they fail to do anything.  I think that this failure of the expectation of 
help from the only ones who can really do something and yet fail to do so demands special 
notice.   
 
Willy Loman is an individual going under right in the midst of his beloved family and those who 
can truly help him fail to do so.  This provides a model for understanding a form of tragedy that 
has unfolded in history before and continues to do so to this day.  People go under as a mass, on 
a collective level and those from whom intervention is expected fail to do anything.  It seems 
almost absurdly irrevocable when large numbers of persons undergo a crisis of expectations and 
the dialectic continues to unfold and take its toll.  A tragedy of this type which has captured the 
imagination of the world is that of Darfur.  That this atrocity has been allowed to occur just a few 
years after the genocide in Rwanda and Bosnia is very mysterious to me.  I think that it is 
pedagogically significant to note that there are situations in which, irrespective of what people 
do to help those are going under, nothing works.  From one perspective, Willy does get receive 
kindness from Charley and then most of Linda who has always been there for him.  What he 
really needs and expects is that his sons should affirm and fulfill their roles, this they are 
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incapable of and even when they do try to help but it is not enough.  Linda’s simply words echo 
loudly in the theater of Darfur for people over there have indeed been degraded and thrown into 
their graves like “old dogs”.  Based on what I know about the tragedy, the main issue is slavery.  
Slavery of black Africans has always been a part of Arab society.  When Islam came into the 
picture in the seventh century, this issue became contentious because the religion forbids slavery.  
This injunction against slavery was interpreted by the Arab Muslims to mean that a people can 
be enslaved as long as they are not Muslim.  So when the Arab Muslims became rulers of Sudan, 
for years they made efforts to ensure that the black Africans in Darfur would not become 
Muslims.  This gave the Arab based Sudanese a chance to continue to own slaves from among 
the population of the country.  However, Islam did come to the oppressed of Sudan, not through 
the Arabs but through sources within the black Africans of Sudan.  So once the people in what is 
now Darfur converted to Islam, they could no longer be seen as potential slaves and regained 
their place in the world.  The people of southern Sudan, the original inhabitants of the land, 
developed their own political identity and stood up for themselves in the face of the African 
Arabs who dominate most of the country.  Over the centuries, the Arabs who ruled Sudan 
continued to carry with them a sense of resentment at having lost their erstwhile slaves.  My 
position is that the ongoing genocide in Sudan is a result of feelings of resentment that had been 
bottled up for centuries.  The African Arabs in Sudan – the Janjaweed - now want to eliminate 
them, expel them and change the genetic configuration of the people of Darfur by systematic 
rape on a wide scale.  The Janjaweed are driven by motives coming to them through history.  
These motives are grounded in the denial of and resentment against the fact that an erstwhile 
enslaved people have attained their own political and religious identity, their place in the world.  
The tragedy of Darfur is also one that presents a strong challenge to Hegel’s understanding of 
conflict in history, politics and society.  In genocide, does the side committing atrocity have any 
rationally grounded obligation through which they can justify their actions?   
 
The aspect of this tragedy that we need to focus on in the context of this chapter is as follows – 
How does it happen that the genocide in Darfur unravels over a period of ten years right in front 
of the eyes of the world and yet there is no concrete help?  Global organizations such as the 
United Nations were instituted to ensure that precisely this type of tragedy does not occur.  
These are people who are justified in expecting help as they are being systematically dislodged 
from their place in the world in every possible way and yet those who can do something are 
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incapable of stepping forward, failing to fully realize, assume and fulfill their roles.  Within the 
broader tragedy of Darfur, there is also this specific moment where a human being has cried out, 
expecting help and is met only with beauracratic debates over “facts” and an egregious evasion 
of responsibility.    
 
Returning again to the plot elements of Death of a Salesman and the character of Willy Loman, I 
would like to consider the notion of the American Dream.  Willy Loman is a man who 
undoubtedly loves American culture and believes fanatically in the American Dream.  On one of 
the many occasions in the play where he expresses his frustrations over the way Biff has lived 
his life, he says, “Biff Loman is lost.  In the greatest country in the world a young man with such 
- personal attractiveness gets lost.”200  Willy also says once, “America if full of beautiful towns 
and fine, upstanding people.”201 Willy does have an intimate relation with the geographical and 
cultural landscape of America.  His line of work required him to travel all over the country, 
opening up “unheard of territories” for his company.  In the play we get images of Willy driving 
across long distances, always carrying the hope that wherever he went, he would be recognized 
and “well liked” for what he is and this would be eventually translated into success in economic 
terms.  Despite all of the setbacks, Willy never really loses the sense that the land of America is 
congenial to him and his dreams and expectations.  Towards the end of the play, even as he his 
falling apart and losing everything, Willy sets out to purchase seeds so as to plant a garden in the 
now barren ground in front of his home: 
 
“I’ve got to get some seeds.  I’ve got to get some seeds, right away.  Nothing’s planted. I don’t 
have a thing in the ground.”202
 
What then is the American dream? I will speak about it from the perspective of an outsider, 
looking into America.  As long as you possess a valid (specifically - legal) perception of the 
manner in which you want to relate to the world in terms of the work that you do in it and 
provided that you are willing to put in a fight, then America is a place that would be congenial 
for you to realize the expectations that you have created for yourself.  The term ‘American 
dream’ is nothing but a pluralistic metaphor for the expectations of personal success that many 
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different people from all over the world carry with them when they come to this country.  When 
a person dreams the American dream, that person is taking a courageous step towards affirming 
and fulfilling not only the expectations that center upon self actualization but also the 
expectations that others most dear to him have of him.  There is an atmosphere of hope in 
America; it invites a person to have expectations of becoming rooted, making a place in the 
world, of amounting to something.  Since Willy Loman believes so strongly in America and the 
America dream he simply cannot understand his son Biff, “Don’t you want to be anything?” he 
says to him on multiple occasions.  I think that what Willy finds truly intangible about his son 
Biff is that he does not have any expectations of himself.  Biff is hiding from his expectations 
and this is also precisely the reason for saying that he does not have the potential to become a 
tragic character.   
 
To me, as an outsider in America, the deepest aspect of American society is that it calls out for 
an investment of expectations.  The atmosphere generates hope.  More importantly, the 
American dream, as I have discussed above, is multi-various.  It does not matter as to what kind 
of expectations you have; the crucial thing is to have expectations and to work towards their 
fulfillment.  In my country Pakistan the scope of the dream, as it were, is very limited.  In 
general, the atmosphere of the country does not really call out for an investment of hope.  In 
Pakistan if you haven’t got it made then the struggle to make yourself is so overwhelming that 
many simply give up.  It would be accurate to say that in Pakistan, there is no equivalent to the 
American dream.  There used to be a Pakistani dream when the country first came into being in 
1947.  People came to the country with many expectations and worked hard to build a new 
nation but those expectations have died a silent and unacknowledged death not once, but many 
times over the course of the country’s history.  It is interesting for me to note that Death of a 
Salesman can be read as a subtle metaphor for the history of Pakistan specifically of my city, 
Karachi.  When Pakistan came into being, Karachi had a population of no more than 100,000 
people; it is now 15 million.  The city was populated and built up by those who fought for it as 
citizens of India.  One of the primary reasons given for the creation of Pakistan was that in this 
country people would live with dignity, that is, they would succeed in making a place for 
themselves, an identity in the world.  The people of my father’s generation lived with this dream 
and worked hard. Like the dream of Willy Loman, this was a new and original dream, a 
deviation from historical conditioning.  They expected the country to move in the direction that 
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they had dreamed of but things turned out otherwise.  The fragments of the original dream stile 
shine through sometimes when one is in Karachi, but in general it is an urban jungle 
characterized by crime, corruption, civic mismanagement and most crucially, despair.     
 
The relation between Willy and his son Biff is complex and full of contradictions.  The two of 
them say contradictory things about each other.  At one moment Willy says, “Biff is a lazy 
bum!” and the next moment, “there’s one thing about Biff – he’s not lazy”203.  Biff, on his side 
calls his father “fake” or “phony”204 at two critical moments in the play.  The first occasion is 
when Biff discovers that his father has a mistress; the second occasion is when he gives Willy 
the instrument of suicide (rubber pipe) and basically points out to him that he has been nothing 
but a failure all of his life.  Despite this, however, Biff also says something during the play 
which for me encapsulates the character of Willy Loman: “You’ve just seen a prince walk by. A 
fine, troubled prince.  A hardworking, unappreciated prince. A pal, you understand? A good 
companion. Always for his boys.”205
 
At the beginning of this chapter I made the point about how the inner life of the individual has 
something unique to it which evades the grasp of historical and social conditioning.  We learn 
during the play that Willy is the son of a father who was never there for him.  That father simply 
took off at some point in Willy’s early childhood and did not ever come back.  We learn also 
about Willy’s brother Ben who makes an appearance only on a few of occasions in Willy’s life 
but leaves a make on his active memory.  Ben has accumulated immense wealth through the 
diamond trade in Africa.  He comes across as a person who approaches his floundering brother 
not to help him but only to display his own wealth and to demonstrate to Willy and his family 
that they are nothing.  Ben makes empty propositions to Willy, asking him to come to Alaska – 
“there’s a new continent at your doorstep” – while his real purpose is to make Willy regret the 
path that he has chosen for himself and to show him that he and the family that he has nurtured 
are failures.  Willy then belongs to a family in which there is no sense of loyalty.  I think that in 
this context it would be accurate to say that at some point in his life Willy must have made a 
conscious, inner decision to be a loyal father and husband.  He suffers immense guilt for having 
cheated on his wife which in my view only goes to show how much he loves her and the family.  
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He tells Linda on a couple of occasions, “I will make it all up to you”.  I think that to refer to 
someone as a prince is to say that he is genuine, authentic.  Despite his personal failings, Willy 
remains an authentic father figure and husband till the end.  I read his suicide as the final 
expression of his deep commitment to his family.  He has given his deepest inner resources to 
them and he is therefore fully justified in placing expectations in his sons and it is tragic when he 
says – “Where are you guys, where are you? The woods are burning! I can’t drive a car!” 
 
Willy Loman is also a prince in his chosen line of work.  He does not ever become “number one 
man” but setting aside the success factor, he is a salesman in the same manner as Picasso is an 
artist.  He works for his family, which is his connection to the world but his work also keeps him 
ontologically connected to the world.  He has made a place, albeit a precarious one, for himself 
in the world by playing the role of the salesman.  He works very hard and with a great sense of 
personal dignity and style.  Willy’s work as a salesman is a part of his inner life; he could never 
see himself otherwise.  Biff, for instance, insists to the end that Willy could have been better as a 
carpenter, “there is more of him in that front stoop than in all the sales he ever made”206, he says 
in the funeral.  Even if, as Biff implies, Willy has lived all of his life in bad faith, his seriousness 
and his tragedy emerges out of the fact that he did work hard and invested all of his expectations 
in his work and his family only to find himself rootless and unrecognized.   Willy is also in bad 
faith due to the way in which he carries his personal sense of loyalty into the cut-throat jungle 
that is the world of business.  And this too, in my view, was an inner, authentic, breakaway 
decision from a man who comes from a family where his brother Ben says to Biff after felling 
him through a rough and unwarranted move at the end of a friendly boxing game, “Never fight 
fair with a stranger boy, you’ll never get out of the jungle that way”207.  All that Willy wants is 
to be “well liked”, that is, he wants to be loyal to people and expects loyalty in return.  His friend 
Charley points towards this as a flaw in Willy’s attitude: 
 
WILLY: That snotnose.  Imagine that? I named him. I named him Howard. 
CHARLEY: Willy, when’re you gonna realize that them things don’t mean anything? You 
named him Howard, but you can’t sell that.  The only thing you got in this world is what you can 
sell.  And the funny thing is that you’re a salesman, and you don’t know that.  
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WILLY: I’ve always tried to think otherwise, I guess. I always felt that if a man was impressive, 
and well liked, that nothing -  
 
Willy, however, consistently lives his ideal of loyalty and continues to expect reciprocation to 
the end.  At the specific moment when he walks out of his home for the last time to commit 
suicide he is not in despair but full of joy because he imagines the “grandeur” of Biff with 
“twenty-thousand dollars in his pockets.”  Willy is also expecting that his funeral would be 
attended by a large number of salesmen and other people.  He expects also that his son would 
love him and finally realize Willy’s worth as a father and a salesman.   
 
“That funeral will be massive! They’ll come from Maine, Massachusetts, Vermont, New 
Hampshire! All the old-timers with the strange license plates – that boy will be thunderstruck, 
Ben, because he never realized – I am known, Ben, and he’ll see it with his eyes once and for 
all…Why, why can’t I give him something and not have him hate me?”208  
 
None of this happened.  “Where were all the people he knew?” says Linda at the funeral.  A total 
of four people came to the funeral – Biff, Happy, Linda and Willy’s only true friend in the 
world, Charley.  Moreover, even at the funeral Biff says, “He had all the wrong dreams.  All, all, 
wrong…the man didn’t know what he was.”209  So even after having given his life, Willy does 
not find the reciprocation for the loyalty that he gave to his profession and his son.  Unlike Biff, 
Willy was sure of his role in life, he was a salesman and a father.  Willy may have become a 
carpenter or even a diamond miner but the point is that he constituted himself as a salesman and 
affirmed this to the fullest.  The tragedy emerges from the failure of all of the expectations that 
emerged from his role as a salesman and a father.   
 
The sense of personal loyalty that Willy carries into his field of commerce has with time become 
truly obsolete in it.  It is a world that is suffused with the capitalistic ethos.  What to speak of 
business, it seems to me that now the capitalistic ethos pervades through all fields of work in 
society.  The scene at Howard’s office deserves special attention in this connection.  This scene, 
however, like the rest of Miller’s play provides a subtle model for the expression of that tragic 
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moment when a human person is being dislodged from his place in the world and his sense of 
dignity is tarnished.   
 
In the immediate background to Willy’s appearance at Howard’s office is the hopeful event of 
the previous night.  During this event the entire Loman family had a discussion the conclusion of 
which was that Biff would go to his former boss, a businessman named Oliver and ask him for a 
loan with which Biff and Happy would open a sporting equipment business in Florida.  As Hap 
says more than once about Willy, “he’s never so happy as when he’s looking forward to 
something”.  The sons have also arranged a symbolic dinner for Willy after both sons have 
successfully emerged from their respective challenges.  So Willy stands at the door to Howard’s 
office with a renewal of his deepest expectations, “I’m gonna knock Howard for a loop, kid. I’ll 
get an advance, and I’ll come home with a New York job. Goddammit, now I’m gonna do it!”   
All he wants from Howard is a place at the New York office in recognition of a life spent on the 
road, selling for the company because Willy is exhausted with traveling.   
 
The movement of expectations towards their failure is already underway even as Willy stands at 
the entrance to Howard’s office and the latter does not pay any attention to him for a few 
moments.  And it is not that Howard was engaged with important work, he was simply playing 
with a wire-recording machine.  When Howard acknowledges Willy’s presence and calls him in, 
Willy is awkward, in a sense already out of place in an office that was a hallowed place, source 
of hope for him.  It is deeply meaningful when Willy says, “Ts, ts. Like to ask a little favor if 
you…” and in response Howard only fiddles with the machine and plays the voices of his son 
and wife.  Howard is about the same age as Willy’s son Biff and after all, Willy wants Biff to 
live in the home that he built and raise a family of his own.  So the sounds of Howard’s family 
would hurt Willy for he also dreams of a family for his own son.  More than that, by not paying 
any attention to Willy and focusing only on frivolities, Howard, even without having said 
anything, has alienated, literally shut out his most loyal employee.  I this moment of the scene, I 
see reverberations of Kafka’s letter to his father in which he describes the moment from his 
childhood when he was pushed by on the “Pavlache” by his father with the glass door 
definitively shut, making the child realize that he “was a mere nothing” to his father.  The use of 
the term “spot” in the dialogue between Howard and Willy is significant here: 
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“Remember, Christmas time, when you had the party here? You said you’d try to think of some 
spot for me here in town…God knows, Howard, I never asked a favor of any man. But I was 
with the firm when your father used to carry you here in his arms…Your father came to me the 
day you were born and asked me what I thought of the name of Howard, may he rest in peace…” 
 
“I appreciate that, Willy, but there is just no spot here for you.  If I had a spot I’d slam you right 
in, but I just don’t have a single solitary spot.”210
 
In Willy’s mind this “spot” is not just a job or a position in the company.  I would go on to say 
that this spot can only be understood in terms of metaphysics of human experience.  This spot 
that Willy wants constitutes a significant portion of the relation that he has formed with the 
world in his journey through it.  Willy’s job is not simply a job from which he gets money.  The 
job is a complex of factors which makes Willy what he is, gives him his “personality”211.  Later 
on in the dialogue, he tries to explain to an unresponsive and inattentive Howard as to how he 
chose his line of work.  When he was very young he even had doubts about his future in the line 
of work and could have gone off to Alaska during the gold rush in search of the absentee father.  
But then he saw an old salesman who becomes his role model: 
 
“His name was Dave Singleman.  And he was eighty-four years old, and he’d drummed 
merchandise in thirty-one states.  And old Dave, he’d go up to his room, y’ understand, put on 
his green velvet slippers – I’ll never forget – and pick up his phone and call the buyers, and 
without ever leaving his room, at the age of eighty-four, he made his living.  And when I saw 
that, I realized that selling was the greatest career a man could want.  ‘Cause what could be more 
satisfying than to be able to go, at the age of eighty-four, into twenty or thirty different cities, 
and pick up a phone, and be remembered and loved and helped by so many different people? Do 
you know? When he died – and by the way he died the death of a salesman, in his green velvet 
slippers in the smoker of the New York, New Haven and Hartford, going into Boston – when he 
died, hundreds of salesmen and buyers were at this funeral.  Things were sad on a lotta trains for 
months after that.  He stands up. Howard has not looked at him. In those days there was 
personality in it, Howard.  There was respect, and comradeship, and gratitude in it.  Today, it’s 
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all cut and dried, and there’s no chance for bringing friendship to bear – or personality.  You see 
what I mean? They don’t know me any more.” 
 
“Moving away, toward the right: That’s just the thing, Willy.” 
 
In this long statement and Howard’s response to it, Willy - even though speaking in ordinary, 
everyday terms – has mapped out the trajectory for the failure of expectations in terms of the 
relation that one makes with the world through the work that one does in it.  So at first there is an 
example, a powerful image of a role model.  Willy Loman’s role model is the old salesman.  It is 
not that Willy never had a choice about what to do but he chose to live the life of a salesman.  He 
became rooted in his life as a salesman only after he met David Singleman.  The way I see it, the 
values of loyalty and respect which Willy wants to inculcate in his family life are precisely the 
values that he found and admired in his field of work.  When speaking of the old salesman, Willy 
of course has some interest in the money that the man made but what really attracts him to the 
person is something else entirely.  Willy sees David Singleman as a consummate salesman and 
the chief quality of a consummate salesman is that he is loved and respected – not just on the 
basis of the business that he generates – for what he is, the style of his personality.  So selling, 
for Willy is a line of work which brings a certain style of personality which he wants to adopt.  
As far as loyalty and respect are concerned, these are qualities which keep us grounded in the 
world irrespective of the line of work that we are in.  Now in the case of Willy Loman his entire 
working life revolves around being liked which is an expression of loyalty and its reciprocation.  
Once Willy decides that he wants to be a consummate salesman he invests his whole life into it.  
In his inner life he remains a salesman even though he is falling apart and there are many 
occasions where he is regretful at not having gone away to Alaska with his brother Ben. 
 
In the scene at Howard’s office, we see a return of the theme of broken promises.  When Willy 
says, “promises were made across this desk”212, there are echoes of Caesar’s - “you too Brutus”.  
Howard comes across as a typical uncultured man, a person who cannot make and keep 
promises.  The fact that Willy gave his entire life to his work means nothing to Howard.   
Howard does not in any way seek to reciprocate Willy life long act of investing his entire person 
into a process.  More than that, Howard stabs Willy in the back, dislodging him from his rightful 
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place in the world.  This can be read as a cultural tragedy of the American world of commerce 
for there is no recognition of promises and of the passions of the individual.  More than that, 
however, there is the simple but powerful image of one and the same space (the office) 
becoming the source of all expectations and their eventual collapse.  There is more than perfidy 
at stake in Howard’s denial of the promises.  The investment of the deepest inner resources is 
also an investment of trust.  It is important to note that the violation of trust and the absence of 
loyalty emerge from a source located outside of Willy’s own self.  Willy’s tragic flaw is that he 
continues to adhere to ideals of loyalty in a sphere that is not amenable to this notion.  The 
promises that Willy speaks of were the tenuous bond that linked him to a process.  Up until that 
point when Howard turns away in a very nonchalant, careless manner, Willy believed in the 
validity and power of that promise.  When his demands for their fulfillment are met with a total 
disregard, a failure even to remember and to notice that something more important that sales’ 
figures is breaking apart in this person’s life, Willy’s faith and trust are catastrophically broken.  
What for Howard is merely nothing, meant the world to Willy.  While nothing moves in Howard 
as the embodiment of the world of commerce, Willy undergoes a cataclysm and he becomes a 
tragic hero in his refusal to move away with a whimper.  Among other things, I think that 
Willy’s suicide is a protest, a figurative self-immolation as a reminder of broken, forgotten 
promises.  One needs to draw a distinction between the struggles of Willy Loman and those of 
the mythical Sisyphus.  The mythical hero spends all his energies in a process from which he 
expects nothing; he is quite literally acting in a void and that is why he is not tragic, but absurd.  
In the case of Willy however, “promises” have been made, not in a void but with people.  Unlike 
Sisyphus, the all-consuming process does not simply yield nothing, rather, it yields a violation of 
trust.  Sisyphus has not placed hopes and expectations in the process, Willy Loman has.  And 
this is why Willy Loman is a tragic character and Sisyphus simply absurd.  My point is that the 
breaking of the promises has a shattering impact when these were made in an relational context, 
with people whom one trusted.   
 
Willy’s role as the father of the family is enmeshed with his role as a salesman through the 
common quality of loyalty and respect with which he invests both areas of his life.  What makes 
Willy’s story tragic is precisely this element of investment.  There are many people who speak of 
becoming this or that or fulfilling this or that obligation.  They even make some inconsistent 
efforts in these directions.  However, tragic potential is essentially linked with consistent 
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commitment for it is this which gives birth to expectations.  Charley, for instance, comes across 
as a very wise character but not a tragic one (Charley seems to be more interested in shooting 
casino than in his son Bernard or the business) because as he himself says, “my salvation is that I 
never took any interest in anything.213”  To not be invested in something with all of one’s inner 
life is to not have too many expectations the collapse of which can prove fatal.  In the case of 
Willy all of his expectations – regarding his self image as a salesman and as a father – emerge 
out of his total commitment to this one “spot”.  It is around this spot that he builds his working 
life and his family.  So when Howard shows Willy that according to Willy’s own law – being 
“well liked” as a principle - he should no longer be working, Willy’s relation with the world and 
not just with the company is threatened.  Howard points out to Willy that since he is no longer 
“well liked”, he should leave the company; this rejection being based on a process of irreversible 
decline.  Howard’s act implies the removal of a redundant cog in the wheel and not that of a soul 
that has spent all its passion in a process that eventually yields turns against him.     
 
The shadow of obsolescence looms large over this meeting between Willy and Howard as Willy 
struggles for the “spot” that he is losing.  Willy reminds Howard of the fact that he “put thirty-
four years into this firm”214.  He reminds Howard of his meager achievements, “I averaged a 
hundred and seventy dollars a week in the year of 1928!” Most significantly, he points towards 
the “promises made across this desk!” Willy continues to remind Howard about the strong ties 
that he had with his father Frank.  But Frank Wagner is now dead and Ben does not remember 
anything about the promises made by his father to Willy or of Willy’s achievements for the firm.  
In the eyes of Ben, Willy is an obsolete relic of a past that he does not share with him or 
appreciate.  Since Willy is not making any significant sales, moreover, he tends to “crack up”215 
so in Billy’s eyes Willy is completely dispensable.  Willy’s words - “You can’t eat the orange 
and throw the peel away a man is not a piece of fruit!”216 -  hold no value for Ben.  According to 
an inexorable logic, Willy has been uprooted from a spot that constitutes an overwhelmingly 
significant component of his dignity and sense of place in the world.  
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As the expectations that stem from his role as a salesman collapse in Ben’s office, one can look 
at this definitive progression towards failure and offer an explanation based on causality.  The 
play itself provides enough clues in this regard.  There are references, for instance, to the 
overcrowding of Willy’s neighborhood.  He complains about there being too many people as his 
once well lighted, well aired house is literally boxed into a small, dark spot now.  More people 
means more competition, fresh blood, new ideas therefore it was inevitable that Willy would lose 
his place.  We can even point towards the rise of the capitalistic ethos and say that Willy’s 
adherence to values of loyalty has nothing whatsoever to do with what the business cherishes.  
One can also take Biff Loman’s line of argument and say that Willy’s failure comes down to the 
fact that he had false expectations.  We could give many other explanations for what is 
happening to Willy but the tragedy of failure of explanations maintains its distinctness and 
evades the grasp of these explanations.  Irrespective of what the social or historical 
circumstances were and whether or not Willy was in bad faith, the main point is that he 
committed himself fully to his role in life as a father and a salesman and all of these expectations 
ended in failure.  The violation that occurs is not centered simply upon Willy’s poverty.  Willy 
worked to establish a relation with the world, playing a role in which his inner life was invested.  
It is this relation and the sense of dignity associated with it that has been disrupted. 
 
Let us take the case of an authentic patriot who has invested himself fully into the creation and 
development of Pakistan, by all means a “failed state”.  Now, once the failures of the state 
became prominent, we can say to this person that this was inevitable, it had to happen this way.  
We can say for instance that the dream of Pakistan was flawed in the first place.  There has been 
a long line of corrupt rulers.  The country has never had a sacred constitution.  The majority of 
the population consists of ignorant people who deserved what they got.  Now none of this can 
explain away the failure of expectations.  This is a person who has committed himself fully to a 
country and the failure of this country creates a rupture in his inner life that cannot be healed.  
He struggles against overwhelming odds to keep his expectations alive about Pakistan alive.  
Why? Precisely because his commitment is rooted in his inner life, it defines what he is.  And he 
is a Pakistani through and through, there is no other source of expectation for him.     
 
I will turn now to the two most important lines in Willy Loman’s drama: 
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Biff: Pop! I’m a dime a dozen, and so are you! 
Willy: I am not a dime a dozen! I am Willy Loman, and you are Biff Loman!  
 
In these two lines, we see a conflict, not just between a son and his father but more importantly, 
between two different styles of making relations with the world during the journey of life.  Biff 
has not made any effort to fully commit to work and family therefore he does not have any 
expectations.  Willy, on the other hand, has spent his entire life in fulfilling his commitments, 
playing the interconnected roles of salesman and father of the family.  His inner life and sense of 
personal integrity are defined by these roles. He would always refuse to submit in the face of a 
failure of all of the expectations that emerge from these roles.  He ardently wants and expects 
Biff to make something of himself.  So in the dialogues preceding these two lines, Willy is 
persistent that Biff should go out in the morning and see Bill Oliver.  He refuses to accept the 
fact that Biff is going to leave the family and wander off, doing nothing substantial.  Willy has 
spent his whole life in working to create and sustain a place in the world for himself and his 
family.  And now even as he has lost his role as a salesman and recognizes that his role as father 
is also suspect in the eyes of his sons, he refuses to give up.       
 
During the scene preceding the one where these lines are spoken, Willy has an inner dialogue 
with his long lost brother Ben.  To be accurate, this is not a dialogue but a monologue for Willy 
is now only talking to himself.  It is during this monologue that Willy makes the decision to kill 
himself and there are two main questions confronting him.  The first question is if the suicide 
would be an act of courage and the second is about the results that it would yield.  His response 
to the first one can be extracted from his line, “Does it take more guts to stand here the rest of 
my life ringing up a zero?”217 Despite the oncoming fog of madness, he is clear, first of all about 
the collapse of his relations with the world but more importantly, he is clear also about the 
obligations that those relations place upon him.  His response to the second question can be 
encapsulated in his words about Biff: “Why, why can’t I give him something and not have him 
hate me?”  For Willy Loman, the suicide would achieve two main purposes.  It would bring 
twenty-thousand dollars to the family and enable Biff to do something to make a place for 
himself in the world.  The second and most important expectation in Willy’s mind is that after 
the suicide, there would be a funeral attended by all of those salesmen with whom he formed 
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relations.  Therefore, Biff would finally recognize the place that his father made in the world as a 
salesman and also love him for the sacrifice that he made for the family.   
 
As we know from the play, most of the expectations that Willy formed around the act of suicide 
also failed.  That, however, does not detract anything from the value of the act.  Even in the face 
of an overwhelming collapse of the relations that Willy formed with the world, he refuses to give 
up on his failed expectations.  In the line “I am not a dime a dozen…” and also the act of suicide, 
it is the inner life that shines through.  So even as historical circumstances move in such a way 
that a person’s expectations fail, the inner life has the potential to stay active.  As long as this 
inner life is vibrant, one would continue to forge relations and fulfill ensuing expectations till the 
end.  And when the person’s place in the world has fallen away then suicide for the sake of 
fulfilling expectations that cannot be fulfilled through living in the world is an act of courage.  
This, in my view, is the chief ameliorative aspect of the tragedy of Willy Loman.  All that 
remains at the end is an overwhelming sense of dignity, all expectations of reciprocation meet 
nothing but failure.  
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 
There are three main ties that bind all four chapters of my dissertation.  I hope to have 
established the significance of the dialectic as a starting point for philosophical inquiry into 
different forms of tragedy.  My position is that prior to the dialectic, all we have is the powerful 
impression that tragedy makes upon us and the emotive power that it generates in us.  It is 
important to note that I have embraced only the bare bones of the Hegelian dialectic during my 
journeys into four different forms of tragedy.  This is a dialectic that does not involve necessary 
sublation, an overarching teleology or the justification of what tragedy destroys through recourse 
to metaphysical systems, absolutes and conceptual schema.  It is only after we search for and 
discover the dialectic simply as a structural principle at work in concrete elements of tragedy that 
we can begin to take into account that which divides a unit from within, conflicts between forces 
coming from the past and those which prevail in the present, the chasm between appearance and 
reality, reversals of original meaning and the way in which the source that gives birth to hope 
becomes also the source of despair, decay and death.  The other two ties that bind the themes 
together are intertwined.  It can be shown that at the base of all tragedies is a crisis of 
expectations or identity and the tragic flaw that manifests itself in this crisis.  These, in my view 
are the two traits of character that keep a tragedy in place.  It is crucial to note though that 
emphasis upon crisis of identity and tragic flaw should not lead us the think that this study has 
only a psychological consequence.  The matter runs much deeper for when Lear in the midst of 
tragic unraveling asks the question – “Who is it that can tell me who I am?” it is more that the 
reflection of a neurosis; something more fundamental has been threatened with displacement.         
 
The fifth chapter of my dissertation is about Willy Loman and this is where the theme of failure 
of expectations comes into prominence not only as a distinct tragic process but also a general 
notion on the basis of which the other three forms of tragedy are tied together.  Chapters II, III 
and IV are about what is called “high tragedy”.  These three are well recognized themes in 
philosophical discussions on tragedy but the fourth theme is relatively less explored.  In my 
mind, the chapter on Willy Loman brings to view an element within tragic events which can 
possibly help us tie them together not simply through the dialectic as a structuring principle but 
also with reference to content.  The analysis of the character of Willy Loman opens up the 
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possibility of conversation among all the themes that have been developed in this project.  There 
is a striking contrast between the figures that take center stage in the first three chapters and 
Willy Loman in chapter V.  Broadly speaking, in the first three chapters, those that undergo the 
tragic process are for the most part universal embodiments of the spirit of a people or a culture.  
Simply stated, these are people who are politically and culturally eminent; they draw immense 
power from their positions.  Willy Loman, on the other hand, is not a universal embodiment of 
any spirit or culture.  He does not occupy any position of power but is simply a particular, an 
individual, an ordinary person whose life is falling apart.  I think that the distinction between a 
Lear, an Antigone, an Oedipus and Willy Loman is not arbitrary but real.  This, in my mind is 
akin to the philosophical distinction between Universal and Particular and the extraction of the 
latter from the former.  Irrespective of the moral character or even the intellectual level of those 
who wield great power, it seems to me that they do possess a charisma which others do not have.  
Even when power is attained not through effort but through inheritance, there is something more 
than mere good luck which is at play.  Hitler may well have been an abomination in the minds of 
many Germans when he came to power but the fact remains that he did become the driving force 
of the German nation and millions did willingly follow him to commit catastrophic crimes.  The 
question of how leaders become leaders is one that calls out for serious philosophical 
investigation.  My main point is that there is a real distinction between Willy Loman and the 
figures of high tragedy.  I understand Willy as simply a particular in contrast to Lear, Oedipus 
and Antigone who are particulars from whom a universal can be extracted.  Lear and Oedipus 
can be seen as embodiments of the state while Antigone is seen by Hegel as the embodiment of 
the world of love which is a distinct set of obligations within ethical life.   
 
Having clarified this significant distinction between the figure of Willy Loman and the figures 
that dominate the discussion in the first three chapters, I would like to point towards a quality 
which is common to all tragic figures – the tension between expectations and their failure.  My 
point here is that in the absence of expectation, there is no tragedy.  Expectations arise when one 
has invested oneself with all of the energies available in the inner life into a sphere outside of 
oneself.  The investment of the self into a sphere of activity and other people does not 
necessarily have to be moral for there to be tragedy.  For instance, Macbeth as a well recognized 
tragic figure has struggled against all inner moral compunctions to invest himself fully into the 
project of attaining power over Scotland.  Macbeth has built his identity on the basis of a lust for 
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power; in his mind he wants to see himself as nothing other than the King of Scotland.  We see 
Macbeth as having deeply rooted himself in a process that would see him become King.  All of 
Macbeth’s expectations emerge from this process of treachery and murder which drives his lust 
for power. The tragedy of Macbeth can therefore be read as the failure of expectations even 
though these are false expectations, so to speak, from a moral standpoint.  The source of the 
failure of these expectations is precisely the process, “the throne of blood” around which 
Macbeth builds up his identity.  The theme of broken promises is linked also with the crisis of 
identity or expectation.  That which is the source of the birth of the promise becomes also the 
source of its violation.  In the case of Macbeth, the promises at the origin of the tragic process 
come from the three witches whom I see as forces of deception that seduce and urge out 
Macbeth’s lust for power.       
 
I think that when the focus is on a tragic process undergone by powerful persons who are 
connected with a broader whole, the theme of failure of expectations is somewhat suppressed.  In 
the tragic unraveling of Willy Loman, however, the dialectic which he undergoes is centered 
almost exclusively upon the crisis of expectations, the creation and destruction of identity and 
broken promises.  It is precisely the bareness of Willy Loman’s character which brings to clarity 
the crisis of expectations and broken promise as a major theme in tragedy.  Willy’s character 
may be bare and simple but he does have the seriousness necessary for one to become a tragic 
figure.  A tragic figure demonstrates a deep sense of self, of personal dignity, a presence that 
refuses to be crushed by circumstances and this is visible in Willy Loman.  Willy has invested all 
of his deepest inner resources into his work as a salesman and into his family; this total 
commitment breeds expectations.  Willy Loman’s identity revolves around the deep relations 
that he has nurtured with his blood and toil.  He justly expects reciprocation from these two 
sources.  The demands of the American business world dictate that all promises made to him at 
his place of work are to be broken. His relation with his work which is the chief constitutive 
factor in Willy’s identity is thus snatched from him generating a crisis of identity.  Willy has also 
seen a promise in Biff in that he believes that his son would make something of his life.  If Biff 
were to become successful, he would fulfill this promise.  Biff Loman however comes across as 
a character with no potential for tragedy precisely because he is a drifter and does not form any 
deep relations with a field of work and neither does he genuinely reciprocate any of the love that 
his father invests in him.  Willy’s tragic flaw consists in his refusal to give up on his expectations 
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even as the sources of these expectations have turned against him.  Willy adheres to his role as 
father and salesman.  He wants to fulfill his commitments to his relations even as things have 
moved towards inevitable catastrophe.  He is not willing to give up on his sense of personal 
worth: 
           
“There were promises made across this desk!.....You can’t eat the orange and throw the peel 
away, a man is not a piece of fruit.” 
“I am not a dime a dozen! I am Willy Loman, and you are Biff Loman.” 
The ordinariness of Willy Loman not only brings into powerful perspective the theme of crisis of 
expectations but also and perhaps more significantly, it establishes the notion that a common 
person can also undergo the tragic process or event.  I am not asserting that the tragedy of great 
persons is equivalent to the tragedy of Willy Loman.  All I want to say is that for the study of 
tragedy to have broader socio historical importance, it is crucial to consider the expectations of 
ordinary people. The displacement of identity or dignity nourished over the course of a lifetime 
or centuries can cause other forms of tragedy.  All categories of tragedy overlap and one can 
cause the other; however, I think that the failure of persons’ expectations has the strongest causal 
relation with tragedies of culture and civil conflicts.  For instance, when a society moves in such 
a manner that for the common person there is nothing but a constant crisis of expectations then, 
there is a chance that the gap left by a Willy Loman would be filled by persons who adhere to 
virulent forms of radical and violent nihilism.  These persons would cause further tragedies of 
culture and also civil conflict.   
 
Let us now delve briefly into the first three chapters to see how the theme of crisis of 
expectations plays itself out.  An important reference in the second chapter is to Sophocles’s 
Antigone. Antigone’s identity is constituted around the ties that she has to her family.  All of her 
expectations emerge out of her ties to her family and she must fulfill the obligation to give her 
brother a dignified burial.  The hindrances erected in her path by Creon threaten to displace her 
identity and this is where her tragedy lies.  Creon, on the other hand has fully assumed the role of 
law giver and this is what constitutes his identity.  All he wants to do is to ensure that the law is 
applied consistently.  The law demands that Antigone be stopped from carrying out her duties 
towards the family.  Her insistence upon doing so threatens to displace Creon’s identity.  We 
have a tragic situation where the fulfillment of Antigone’s deepest expectations would lead to the 
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failure of Creon’s expectations and vice versa.   Similarly, if Antigone were to be allowed to 
fulfill the promise that she has made with her family, Creon would break the promise that he has 
made with the law and vice versa.  This issue gains further depth in Chapter III where I draw 
upon Sophocles’s Oedipus Rex.  Oedipus has also invested himself with his deepest inner 
resources into his role as ruler of Thebes and the son of his parents.  The paradox is that he is 
completely, irreconcilable blind to his actual identity and to the demands of his role.  Oedipus’s 
tragedy is the failure of all of the expectations that emerge from the roles which constitute his 
identity.  Oedipus desperately seeks to fulfill all expectations but they come crashing down 
because the circumstances do not permit him to see that the content in his mind is not reality but 
abstraction.  One of the central insights of the chapter on culture is that a person can be 
considered cultured only if he can give and keep promises.  With reference to this theme, I look 
into Shakespeare’s King Lear.  King Lear has formed his identity around the state as a cultural 
institution based on the principle of loyalty.  He places complete trust in the promises given him 
by his successors and expects loyalty from them.  The disloyalty of his successors causes the 
failure of Lear’s deepest expectations.  Moreover, the violation of his trust jolts his very sense of 
identity for this was built around his conception of an institution that could reciprocate loyalty 
and trust. 
 
It should be noted that the dialectic as a structuring principle and the failure of expectations as a 
general element of content provide a crucial starting point for making forays into various 
categories of tragedy.  However, the consequences of thoughts developed around a form of 
tragedy emerge only when it is pressed further with reference to that which is being threatened 
by the mode of destruction.  I do not abide by any form of pantragism.  A form of tragedy is a 
specific and objective dialectical process that unfolds within social and historical contexts.  The 
tragic dialectic always threatens something of great value with irreversible loss.  Some values are 
universal but then there are also values which have meaning only within a social and historical 
context.  Moreover, the tragic dialectic can move in both a subtle and an unsubtle manner.  For 
example, the reversal of the meaning of democracy in America is a tragedy which is unfolding at 
a very subtle pace.  In Pakistan, however, the distortion of the promise of Islam as a cultural 
force is an abrupt tragedy the patterns of which have already scarred the body of the nation.   
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The significance of these distinctions comes to the fore in the second chapter of my dissertation.  
Here I develop an interpretation of Hegel’s employment of tragedy as a model for explaining 
diremption or irreconcilable conflict.  I understand Hegel’s concept of “ethical life” as referring 
to the complex of values or more specifically obligations that prevail in a single community or 
among different communities.  The ethical whole is necessarily split apart as it manifests itself in 
the life of different groups of people.  Dictated purely by the contingency of circumstance, 
people embodying opposing obligations can come into irreconcilable conflict with each other 
and one group calls out for the elimination of the other because an equivalent force of 
justification on both sides negates the possibility of peaceful coexistence. The key point that 
needs to be made here is that people have different historical obligations in different contexts.  
These obligations are also felt with different intensity in different contexts. I think that for a 
modern American it would be difficult to understand why one person may be willing to 
eliminate another for the sake of honor or ethnicity or on the basis of obligations emerging from 
religious faith.  America is the world’s most diverse society but there is an overarching 
American dream – an obligation to be successful – and a reliable system of Justice which covers 
over any ancient obligations that may cause people to call out for elimination of others in 
circumstances where opposing, irreconcilable obligations actively manifest themselves in the 
lives of people.  
 
In the second chapter we explored the themes involved in the tragedy of culture which consists 
of a conflict between institutional certitude and individual freedom.  In a tragedy of culture, the 
basic promises that underlie various cultural products are objectified, distorted and reversed 
when culture manifests itself in the shape of institutions.  In the third chapter we pressed upon 
tragic self-deception which is blindness that cannot be overcome by an exercise of freedom and 
will.  It is conflict within the soul that radically alienates a person from himself.  This blindness 
threatens to impede the very struggle for consciousness.  In tragic-self deception, the gulf 
between reality and abstraction in the mind of the protagonist translates into a corresponding 
chasm between the good intentions that underlie actions and the destruction that these actions 
cause.  The notion of tragic self-deception becomes particularly potent when placed in the 
context of those who wield power and those who unthinkingly follow the dictates of this power.     
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This study of the relation between the dialectic and forms of tragedy brings up one insight 
which, in my view, provides a basis for future inquiry and also constitutes the possibility that the 
ideas discussed in this dissertation can be a prelude to amelioration.  The recognition of the 
dialectical structure of a tragic event or phenomenon or process reveals the manner in which it 
unfolds over time.  To examine tragedy through the heuristic prism of dialectic is to discern the 
forces that constitute tragedy.  Another major tie which binds all parts of this dissertation is the 
theme of crisis of expectations and broken promises.  We have also gained some insight into the 
tragic flaw, that is, the traits of character that keep tragedy in place.  It should be obvious that a 
tragic event does not unfold in a void; it is located rather in the midst of concrete historical 
circumstances.  There is always a history that precedes a tragic event.  This means that all of the 
forces that would form a tragic dialectic, the promises that would be violated and the tragic flaw 
that would be manifested in human action are already present in the historical circumstances that 
prevail in the vicinity of a tragic event.  My position is that once a tragic event is underway, it is 
unstoppable and intractable.  The tragic dialectic ends only after it has taken its toll in the 
destruction of something that is of great value and is irreplaceable.  However, there are also 
tragedies which are now only potential and waiting in the wings of history.  I assert once again 
that tragedy destroys that which is valuable and irreplaceable; moreover, this destruction cannot 
be justified on the basis of any ideology or metaphysics.  An insight into the tragic can – and I 
think should – breed pessimistic thinking; one needs however to draw distinctions among 
pessimisms.  There is a pessimistic thought which is characterized by fatalism, resignation, 
cynicism and pure self-reference (self-absorption). But then there is also a type of pessimistic 
thought which jolts consciousness into action with full recognition of the fact that all of these 
actions may well be futile, having only some short-term consequence in a narrow sphere but in 
the long-term the tragedy that has to take place will take place.  It is with this latter kind of 
pessimism that I am now calling out for serious micro-historical inquiries not only into events, 
personalities and martyrs (as a character type) that have already been tested on the anvil of 
history but also into current crises and ‘ordinary’ tragic heroes like Willy Loman who are 
quickly forgotten after their demise.  The concepts developed in this dissertation emerge 
primarily out of an analysis of the powerful impression that the tragic fundamental phenomenon 
leaves upon literature and theory.  Life and history, however, are much more complex and 
ambiguous and it is this ambiguity which would present the proposed genealogical research with 
its greatest challenge.  One hopes, however that the dialectic as structural framework and 
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sensitivity towards persons’ deepest expectations in any given context would help in attaining 
insight into the ineffable impressions left by past tragedies and the signs and symptoms of 
tragedies that may occur in the future.  A basic presupposition underlying this suggestion for 
future research is that the tragic is not absurd for it does become intelligible when probed by 
thought.  In these, the darkest of times, the rich philosophical and literary tradition of tragedy can 
yield thoughts that have genuine socio-historical relevance.  One can perhaps take courage from 
Hölderlin, “But where danger is, grows the saving power also”.     
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